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I. INTRODUCTION
First Amendment law governing public protest has been
shaped by the turbulent political events of the past century.1
As protesters took to the streets again and again-voicing opposi-
tion to U.S. military involvement in World War 1,2 Vietnam,3
1. See G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes ofAge: The Emergence of Free
Speech in Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REv. 299 (1996); William E. Lee, Lonely
Pamphleteers, Little People, and the Supreme Court: The Doctrine of Time, Place, and Manner
Regulations of Expression, 54 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 757 (1986).
2. See, e.g., Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211,212-13 (1919) (upholding an Espionage
Act conviction and a ten-year jail sentence based on the anti-war sentiments expressed by the
defendant in a public speech); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204,205-06 (1919) (sustain-
ing an Espionage Act conviction and a ten-year jail sentence for preparing and publishing
anti-war articles in Missouri's German language newspaper); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47, 48-51 (1919) (upholding an Espionage Act conviction of the Socialist Party General Secre-
tary who, in opposition to World War I, mailed to draft-age men certain leaflets urging resis-
tance to the draft, denouncing conscription, and impugning the motives of those backing the war
effort).
3. See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 105-07 (1973) (holding that a campus anti-war
protester who joined other demonstrators in blocking a street could not be punished for declar-
ing, after police dispersed the crowd, "[w]e'll take the fucking street later"); Bachellar v. Mary-
land, 397 U.S. 564, 568-71 (1970) (setting aside the disorderly conduct convictions of anti-war
protesters who inspired a hostile reaction among 100 onlookers while demonstrating at an Army
recruiting station); Washington Mobilization Comm. v. Cullinane, 566 F.2d 107, 111 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (rejecting claims by anti-war protesters for injunctive restrictions on the crowd-control
tactics used by Washington, D.C. police after plaintiffs adduced in a three-week trial evidence
that D.C. police, in an effort to quell Vietnam War protests in 1969-1971, used stationary police
lines to block the progress of marches; used moving police lines, or "sweeps," to enforce dis-
persal orders; and made widespread use of the District's "failure to move on" statute to conduct
mass arrests of nonviolent demonstrators); Wolin v. Port Auth., 392 F.2d 83, 84-85 (2d Cir.
1968) (affording injunctive relief to anti-war protesters who sought access to New York City's
Port Authority Bus Terminal for the purpose of expressing their views on Vietnam by distribut-
413
HeinOnline  -- 45 Loy. L. Rev. 413 1999
Loyola Law Review
and the Persian Gulf;4 clamoring for racial integration5 and
civil rights; 6 raising their voices on abortion,7 AIDS,8 and nuclear
ing leaflets, carrying placards, and conducting discussions with passers-by); United States v.
Sroka, 307 F. Supp. 400,401 (E.D. Wis. 1969) (rejecting First Amendment defense by anti-war
protesters who assembled in a federal building corridor to read the names of soldiers killed in
Vietnam); United States v. Akeson, 290 F. Supp. 212, 213-14, 217 (D. Colo. 1968) (rejecting
First Amendment defense by anti-war protesters who ventured into a government building to
interfere with the processing of individuals being admitted into the military); Hurwitt v. City of
Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995, 998, 1000, 1007 (N.D. Cal. 1965) (enjoining city officials from
prohibiting a parade intended to protest U.S. military intervention in Vietnam-even though
plaintiffs' previous marches had been disrupted by angry spectators, including the Hell's Angels,
who hurled tear gas bombs, broke through a police cordon, ripped banners, and disabled loud-
speakers, and where plaintiffs and their followers had always remained nonviolent).
4. See, e.g., Ohio v. Lessin, 620 N.E.2d 72, 73-74, 79 (1993) (overturning conviction of
Revolutionary Communist Party member who burfied an American flag to protest President
George Bush's decision to send troops to the Persian Gulf, and holding that flag-burner's
inciting-to-violence conviction could not rest upon angry crowd reaction to her provocative
expression).
5. See, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 143 (1966) (setting aside breach-of-the-
peace convictions of civil rights protesters who staged a sit-in at a racially segregated public
library).
6. See, e.g., Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 112-13 (1969) (overturning disor-
derly conduct convictions of civil rights protesters whose march to and picketing before the
mayor's residence produced a hostile reaction by onlookers); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536,
538-39,558 (1965) (setting aside a breach-of-the-peace conviction of a civil rights activist who
-led a peaceful march by 2000 students to a courthouse where, with songs, prayers, and speeches,
they protested the incarceration of fellow activists, who were being held in the adjacent jail);
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 230-33, 238 (1963) (setting aside
breach-of-the-peace convictions of 187 civil rights protesters who, after marching peacefully
on a sidewalk around State House grounds, refused a police dispersal order and, after 15 minutes
of singing and speech-making, were arrested); Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Movement, Inc. v.
City of Chicago, 419 F. Supp. 667, 672-73, 677-78 (N.D. I1. 1976) (involving a civil rights
organization that sought to march through Caucasian neighborhood, where its previous foray
there having been curtailed when bystanders pelted the procession with rocks, bricks, and
explosive devices, city officials violated the First Amendment in denying organizers a permit for
a second march through the same neighborhood, proposing instead an alternate route through
an all-black neighborhood); Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 102-03, 111 (M.D. Ala.
.l 965) (granting civil rights activists injunctive relief ordering the State ofAlabama to permit and
not to interfere with the plaintiffs' plans to march from Selma to Montgomery).
7. See, e.g., Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 357-58,361 (1997) (striking
down an injunction that imposed a "floating buffer zone," requiring anti-abortion protesters to
stay 15 feet from those entering or leaving an abortion clinic; but upholding, on the other hand,
a "fixed buffer zone" injunction, requiring protesters to remain 15 feet from clinic driveways and
doorways); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 757-58, 776 (1994) (analyzing
a speech-restrictive injunction aimed at anti-abortion protesters who, in willful violation of
previous injunctions, had continued to block clinic driveways and doorways and had used
loudspeakers and bullhorns that were audible in the clinic's surgery and recovery rooms and
upholding the injunction's noise restrictions and its 36-foot buffer zone around the clinic, but
414 [Vol. 45
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arms;9 and urging social reforms concerning gay rights, l° the
striking down such other provisions as a 300-foot no-approach zone around the clinic and a
sweeping ban on "images observable" by patients inside the clinic); Mahoney v. Babbitt, 105
F.3d 1452, 1453-54, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (rejecting National Park Service attempt to privatize
sidewalks lining the route of President Clinton's inaugural parade in an effort to thwart
anti-abortion protesters who sought to display banners there); Cannon v. City of Denver, 998
F.2d 867, 869-70, 879 (10th Cir. 1993) (disallowing police officers the ability to assert qualified
immunity defense to a section 1983 action brought by anti-abortion protesters who they arrested
for carrying signs reading "The Killing Place"); United States v. Lynch, 952 F. Supp. 167, 168,
172 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that in a criminal contempt proceeding against an elderly bishop
and a young monk who blocked access to an abortion clinic in violation of a permanent injunc-
tion, the defendants, who sat quietly praying in the clinic driveway, did not manifest the requisite
willfulness to be convicted of criminal contempt, acting as they did from a sense of conscience
and sincere religious conviction), aff'd mem., 104 F.3d 357 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S.
1170 (1997); Fischer v. City of St. Paul, 894 F. Supp. 1318, 1321-23, 1329 (D. Minn. 1995)
(upholding police segregation of pro-choice and anti-abortion demonstrators outside a Planned
Parenthood clinic during a 10-day Operation Rescue campaign-including a police order
fencing off the clinic's front sidewalk and banning all public access to it except by Planned
Parenthood invitees seeking entry to the clinic); United States v. Terry, 802 F. Supp. 1094, 1096,
1103 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (involving criminal contempt proceedings against an anti-abortion
protester who, in violation of district court's injunction, presented then-Governor Bill Clinton
with a fetus).
8. See, e.g., Schwitzgebel v. City of Strongsville, 898 F. Supp. 1208, 1211, 1219 (N.D.
Ohio 1995) (rejecting First Amendment claims by two AIDS activists who, while attending a
campaign speech by President George Bush in a traditional public forum, were ejected and
arrested after silently unfurling signs critical of Bush's policy on AIDS), affid mem., 97 F.3d
1452 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub. nom., DeLong v. City of Strongsville, 522 U.S. 827
(1997); ACT-UP v. Walp, 755 F. Supp. 1281, 1284, 1292 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (holding that police,
in their effort to shield the governor from criticism and thwart a planned protest by AIDS activ-
ists, violated the First Amendment by closing the state legislature's public gallery for the first
time ever during the governor's annual address).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680, 690-91 (1985) (upholding the
conviction of the defendant who, after being barred from a military base for having previously
destroyed secret Air Force documents by pouring animal blood on them, illegally re-entered the
same base to protest the nuclear arms race); Hale v. Department of Energy, 806 F.2d 910, 913,
917-18 (9th Cir. 1986) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge by nuclear weapons protesters
to Energy Department regulations governing demonstrations at the Nevada Nuclear Weapons
Test Site); United States v. Quilty, 741 F.2d 1031, 1032, 1034 (7th Cir. 1984) (affirming federal
trespass convictions of anti-nuclear protesters who staged an unauthorized demonstration at the
Rock Island Arsenal); United States v. Shiel, 611 F.2d 526, 527-28 (4th Cir. 1979) (affirming
defendant's conviction for lying down in Pentagon passageway during nuclear arms protest).
10. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 581
(1995) (holding that Massachusetts could not invoke its public accommodations law to force
private organizers of St. Patrick's Day Parade to include a contingent of Irish gays and lesbians
who would impart a message that the organizers did not wish to convey; compelling the inclu-
sion of this group effectively altered the expressive content of the organizers' parade, thereby
violating the First Amendment); Olivieri v. Ward, 801 F.2d 602, 603, 607-08 (2d Cir. 1986)
(holding that advocates and opponents of gay rights who sought access to the same unique
forum-the sidewalk in front of St. Patrick's Cathedral-in order to raise their voices in re-
415
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homeless," and the environment12-the courts gradually devel-
oped a complex jurisprudence to balance the competing interests
in free expression and public order.
The purpose of this Article is to alleviate the confusion
that so frequently surrounds the law of public protest. Much
of that confusion can be avoided, when analyzing a given case,
by zeroing in on who is regulating the speech in question. There
are four regulatory players, who act in four distinct settings:
restrictions enacted by legislative bodies, the issuance of permits
and fees by government administrators, speech-restrictive
injunctions imposed by the judiciary, and the influence of police
as a regulatory presence on the street. Discrete lines of prece-
dent attend each of these players. Legislators and judges, for
example, are governed by a different legal standard when they
impose time, place, or manner restrictions on public protest.' 3
sponse to New York City's annual Gay Pride Parade were entitled to equal recognition of their
First Amendment rights and equal time in the desired forum for conducting their demonstra-
tions), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1987); Irish Lesbian & Gay Org. v. Giuliani, 918 F. Supp.
732, 735, 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (denying injunctive relief to gay rights organization that sought
to stage its own St. Patrick's Day parade, commencing 90 minutes before, and covering exactly
the same route through New York City, as the traditional parade).
11. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 299 (1984)
(upholding as a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction aNational Park Service regulation
prohibiting camping in Lafayette Park and the Mall, even though enforcing the regulation against
plaintiffs prevented them from sleeping overnight in "tent cities" they had erected under permit
as part of a larger demonstration publicizing the plight of the homeless); Community for Creative
Non-Violence v. Kerrigan, 865 F.2d 382, 383, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that a regulation
prohibiting the maintenance of props on U.S. Capitol grounds in excess of any 24-hour period
did not violate the First Amendment rights of protesters who, in carrying out a seven day vigil
to publicize the plight of the homeless, sought to employ a 500-pound clay statue of a man,
woman, and child huddled over a steam grate, even though dismantling the statue every evening
would prove enormously difficult and, consequently, the 24-hour provision effectively thwarted
their plans to use the statue in their week-long protest).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Fee, 787 F. Supp. 963,964-65,970 (D. Colo. 1992) (convict-
ing nine environmental protesters for willfully defying a special order of the National Forest
Service that closed a portion of a national forest for logging activities, and holding that the
closure order did not violate the First Amendment because its issuance had been precipitated by
prior protests in which demonstrators occupied a tree for 12 days, locked themselves to a cattle
guard, blocked motor vehicles, rolled logs into the road, and surrounded both loggers and trees
to prevent cutting).
13. Injunctions that impose content-neutral time, place, or manner restrictions are subject
to a heightened form of intermediate scrutiny, under a test that is slightly more stringent than that
for legislation. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 765. Observing that "[i]njunctions. . . carry greater
risks of censorship and discriminatory application than do general ordinances," the Supreme
416 [Vol. 45
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Administrators are governed by a special body of precedent
when they issue permits for parades or demonstrations. 14 And
street-level decisionmaking by police is governed by yet another
line of cases.15 Failure to distinguish among these four regula-
tory players, and failure to recognize the distinct bodies of
precedent that have grown up around each of them, are salient
causes for the confusion that so often plagues the law of public
protest.
Accordingly, this Article is aimed at disentangling lines
of precedent that are all too frequently entwined by urging an
analysis of public protest cases that distinguishes among the
four regulatory players. Thus, this Article devotes separate
sections to the regulatory roles of legislators, 16 administrators,
17
judges,'" and police, 9 with an introductory section on the doc-
trinal bedrock in this field: the public forum doctrine.20
Court held in 1994 that speech-restrictive injunctions should be subjected by appellate courts
to more "stringent" First Amendment scrutiny than comparable legislation, stating that, "when
evaluating a content-neutral injunction, we think that our standard time, place, and manner
analysis is not sufficiently rigorous." Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764-65 (emphasis added). Announc-
ing a new standard of review for content-neutral injunctions, the Court held that, rather than
inquiring whether the order is narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,
"[w]e must ask instead whether the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more
speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest." Id. at 765 (emphasis added).
14. A permit scheme will run afoul of the First Amendment if: (1) it vests unbridled discre-
tion in the licensing official, Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-53,
(1969); (2) it allows the licensor to charge a higher police-protection fee based on the antici-
pated level of hostility among onlookers, Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S.
123, 133-36 (1992); or (3) it imposes advance registration requirements that build into the
application process a lengthy delay before the licensee may speak, NAACP v. City of Richmond,
743 F.2d 1346, 1356-57 (9th Cir. 1984).
15. Though police have an affirmative duty to protect speakers who inspire a hostile audi-
ence reaction, Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 905-06 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 930 (1975), courts are generally quite deferential to police-imposed time, place, or
manner restrictions, Concerned Jewish Youth v. McGuire, 621 F.2d 471,472-78 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913 (1981), and to on-the-streetjudgments by police to arrest or disperse
demonstrators, Washington Mobilization Committee v. Cullinane, 566 F.2d 107, 120 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
16. Section IV-infra notes 268-408 and accompanying text.
17. Section V-infra notes 409-474 and accompanying text.
18. Section VI-infra notes 475-513 and accompanying text.
19. Section VII-infra notes 514-570 and accompanying text.
20. Section lI-infra notes 21-263 and accompanying text.
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II. THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE
A. Origins and Basic Principles
Access to public property for speech-related activity is
governed by the public forum doctrine. 2' Though judges and
scholars disagree on the doctrine's source,2 2 the Supreme Court
has repeatedly23 identified its inspiration as Hague v. CIO, 4
where Justice Roberts, finding a constitutional right to use
"streets and parks for communication of views,"25 based that
right on the fact that "streets and parks.., have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind,
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.""
21. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinctte, 515 U.S. 753, 757-70 (1995)
(holding that Ohio could not bar Ku Klux Klan from erecting a cross in traditional public forum,
the statehouse grounds, where the forum was open to all prospective speakers and where the
government, even in denying the Klan a permit, granted a rabbi's application to erect a menorah
in the very same location, stating that "[t]he right to use government property for one's private
expression depends upon whether the property has by law or tradition been given the status of
a public forum, or rather has been reserved for specific official uses"). For an excellent discus-
sion of the public forum doctrine, see Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management.:
The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987), and Geoffrey R.
Stone, Fora Americana: Free Speech in Public Places, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 233.
22. Compare Irish Subcomm. v. Rhode Island Heritage Comm'n, 646 F. Supp. 347,353 n.3
(D.R.I. 1986) (tracing the doctrine to Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939), and describing it as
a "response to increasing efforts by government to cut back, restrict, and close off access to
forums which were historically, traditionally, and, perhaps, inherently wide open for all types
of expression" (quoting Toward a Gayer Bicentennial Comm. v. Rhode Island Bicentennial
Foundation, 417 F. Supp. 632, 639 n.10 (D.R.I. 1976))), with Post, supra note 21, at 1718-19
(tracing the doctrine to an article by Harry Kalven, The Concept of the Puplic Forum: Cox v.
Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1, cited in Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 n.3, 99 n.6
(1972)).
23. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992);
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480-81 (1988); Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 813-14 (1984); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 45 (1983); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460 (1980).
24. Hague, 307 U.S. at 501-18 (striking down an ordinance that, inter alia, imposed a flat
ban on public distribution of printed materials, and required a permit issued based on the uncon-
trolled discretion of the public safety director for all public meetings and demonstrations).
25. Id. at 515-16.
26. Id. at515.
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But, the right to engage in public protest has never entailed
free access to all types of government property.27 The government,
no less than a private property owner, "'has the power to preserve
the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully
dedicated."'28 "Nothing in the Constitution requires the Government
freely to grant access to all who wish to exercise their right to free
speech on every type of Government property without regard to the
nature of the property or to the disruption that might be caused by
the speaker's activities."2 9 The First Amendment has never meant
that people who want to engage in public protest "'have a
constitutional right to do so whenever and however and wherever
they please. ' ' °
B. The Supreme Court's Division of Public Prop-
erty into Three Discrete Categories: "Tradi-
tional," "Designated," and "Nonpublic" Fora
In light of these principles, the Supreme Court has adopted
a "forum-based" approach to assessing restrictions that the
government seeks to place on the use of its property."' Govern-
ment-owned property has been divided into three categories
for purposes of forum analysis: (1) "traditional" public fora;
(2) "designated" public fora; and (3) "nonpublic" fora, the last
category comprising all of the government property not embraced
within the first two.
32
27. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 761 ("It is undeniable, of course, that speech which is constitu-
tionally protected against suppression is not thereby accorded a guaranteed forum on all property
owned by the State."); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
799 (1985) ("Even protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all times.").
28. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976) (quoting Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39,47
(1966)); accord Lee, 505 U.S. at 679-80.
29. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799-800.
30. Greer, 424 U.S. at 836 (quoting Adderly, 385 U.S. at 48).
31. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 677-83 (reaffirming the Court's commitment to a forum-based
analysis and holding that airport terminals are nonpublic fora, thereby rejecting the challenge by
the Krishnas to the port authority's ban on soliciting money inside the terminals).
32. See id. at 678-79. For an especially clear account of this tripartite framework, see
Paulsen v. County ofNassau, 925 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1991), where a challenge was brought by an
evangelical Christian group whose members had been arrested for leafletting outside a heavy
metal concert. See id. at 66-71. The court held that the county coliseum where the leafletting
took place was a designated public forum such that the county could not impose a total ban on
leafletting conducted outside the facility. See id. at 71. The Supreme Court first established the
tripartite framework in Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators 'Association, 460
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Traditional public fora are places that "by long tradition
or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and
debate"3"-including, for example, such areas as public streets,
parks and sidewalks, 4 and the curtilage of legislative seats. 5
Designated public fora are places that the government "has
opened for expressive activity by part or all of the public"36
-including, for example, university meeting facilities 7 and
municipal theaters.
38
U.S. 37 (1983), and held that teacher mailboxes and an interschool mail system constituted
nonpublic fora, so that granting access to the exclusive bargaining representative of the teachers
union and denying access to a rival union did not violate First Amendment rights of the rival
union. Perry, 460 U.S. at 44-46.
33. Id. at 45.
34. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802; see also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,476-88 (1988)
(holding that residential streets are no less traditional public fora than their downtown counter-
parts-so that restrictions on residential picketing must be judged under the same stringent
standards that govern the regulation of speech in public fora); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S.
171, 172-84 (1983) (striking down the statutory prohibition against leafletting or displaying
signs on the U.S. Supreme Court's sidewalk and holding that a traditional public forum cannot
be transformed by government fiat into a nonpublic forum, the Court concluded that the sidewalk
lining its perimeter must be treated as a public forum, so that the sweeping ban on expressive
activity there could not be justified as a reasonable place restriction).
35. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995) (hold-
ing that the Ohio Statehouse grounds where the Ku Klux Klan sought to erect a cross constituted
a traditional public forum); Jeannette Rankin Brigade v. Chief of Capitol Police, 342 F. Supp.
575, 577-88 (D.D.C.) (striking down federal statute flatly prohibiting all parades and assem-
blages on U.S. Capitol grounds and relying on Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963),
a three-judge district court held that a sweeping ban on expressive activity near the seat of the
legislature cannot be justified on the sole governmental interest cited by defendants: to enable
Congress "to function in the 'serenity' of a 'park-like setting"'), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 972
(1972).
36. Lee, 505 U.S. at 678; see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 ("In addition to traditional
public fora, a public forum may be created by government designation of a place or channel of
communication for use by the public at large for assembly and speech, for use by certain speak-
ers, or for the discussion of certain subjects.").
37. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that where a state university
had an express policy of making its meeting facilities available to registered student groups,
those facilities constituted a designated public forum and the university was not free to exclude
students from the forum based on their desire to hold religious meetings).
38. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546,547-62 (1975). In Conrad,
a municipal board charged with managing a city auditorium and a city-leased theater refused to
permit the staging in either facility of the rock musical "Hair," because it asserted that the pro-
duction would not be "in the best interest of the community." Id. at 548. The Court found that
the board's refusal to permit the performance was a prior restraint that violated the First Amend-
ment because it was effected under a scheme that gave unfettered discretion to the board and
afforded applicants no procedure for prompt judicial review. See id. at 562. As a result, the
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Nonpublic fora are places that, by tradition, nature, or
design, "are not appropriate platforms for unrestrained communi-
cation" 39-including, for example, military installations4" and
federal workplaces.41. In a series of famous decisions, the Su
Court held that the municipal auditorium and city-leased theater here were "public forums
designed for and dedicated to expressive activities." Conrad, 420 U.S. at 555.
39. Paulsen, 925 F.2d at 69. For example, in Community for Creative Non-Violence v.
Hodel, 623 F. Supp. 528 (D.D.C. 1985), a public advocacy group was rebuffed by the National
Park Service in its request to include a controversial statue depicting a homeless man sleeping
on a steam grate in the Christmas Pageant of Peace, a "national celebration event" held annually
on the Ellipse in Washington, D.C. See id. at 529. The court found that the Pageant was a
nonpublic forum and concluded that the National Park Service was free to select only "tradi-
tional" Christmas displays for inclusion in the event, and that plaintiffs' First Amendment rights
would not be violated if they were permitted to erect their statue on the Ellipse outside the
Pageant boundary. See id. at 529, 533. The court concluded that the Pageant was a nonpublic
forum because the National Park Service has never treated it as "a forum for all expression on
the subjectof Christmas, or for all displays on that subject," and because the National Park
Service "carefully selects only a few displays and does not routinely accept displays from those
who tender them." Id. at 533. As a result, the court held that in a nonpublic forum, the govern-
ment may deny access to any prospective speaker, so long as its decision is "reasonable and
viewpoint neutral." Id.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 677-91 (1985) (involving a defen-
dant, barred from a military base for having previously destroyed secret Air Force documents by
pouring animal blood on them, who was convicted of illegally re-entering the base to protest the
nuclear arms race; the Court upheld the defendant's conviction and reaffirmed that "[m]ilitary
bases are not generally public fora," and that "[t]here is 'no generalized constitutional right to
make political speeches or distribute leaflets' on military bases, even if they are generally open
to the public"); see also, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 830-42 (1976) (holding that mili-
tary bases are nonpublic fora and rejecting a challenge to a base regulation that banned all
speeches and demonstrations of a partisan political nature); United States v. Corrigan, 144 F.3d
763,765-69 (11 th Cir. 1998) (holding that military bases are non-public fora, the court affirmed
the trespass convictions of protesters who staged an unauthorized demonstration at Fort Benning,
Georgia to commemorate the murders of six Jesuit priests in El Salvador); United States v.
LaValley, 957 F.2d 1309, 1314 (6th Cir.) (military base is not a public forum), cert. denied, 506
U.S. 972 (1992); United States v. McCoy, 866 F.2d 826, 830-34 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that
a military base is not a public forum and, even if its driveway were deemed a public forum, the
government could still prohibit leafletting there); Hale v. Department of Energy, 806 F.2d 910,
911-18 (9th Cir. 1986) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge by nuclear weapons protesters
to Energy Department regulations governing demonstrations at the Nevada Nuclear Weapons
Test Site and holding that the road on the test site property leading to the main guard gate was
not a public forum, even though the general public was afforded unrestricted access as far as the
guard gate); United States v. Quilty, 741 F.2d 1031, 1032-34 (7th Cir. 1984) (affirming federal
trespass convictions of anti-nuclear protesters who staged an unauthorized demonstration at the
Rock Island Arsenal and holding that a military arsenal is not a public forum).
41. See, e.g., Sefick v. Gardner, 164 F.3d 370,371-73 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that a federal
courthouse is a nonpublic forum, the court affirmed the denial of an injunction where an artist
sought to display his satirical sculpture in the lobby of Chicago's federal court building), cert.
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preme Court likewise identified as nonpublic fora utility poles,42
residential letterboxes, 43 an interschool mail system," and a
workplace charity drive aimed at government employees.45
C. How the Level of Judicial Scrutiny Hinges on
Whether the Property is Deemed a Traditional,
Designated, or Nonpublic Forum
In forum analysis, the government's power to impose speech
restrictions depends on how the affected property is categorized;
the level of judicial scrutiny hinges on whether the property
denied, 119 S. Ct. 2393 (1999); United States v. Sachs, 679 F.2d 1015, 1016-22(5th Cir. 1982)
(upholding the conviction of an anti-draft protester who sat down in a federal building elevator
and obstructed its use); United States v. Shiel, 611 F.2d 526, 526-28 (4th Cir. 1979) (affirming
the defendant's conviction for lying down in a Pentagon passageway during a nuclear arms
protest); Arbeitman v. District Court, 522 F.2d 1031, 1032-34 (2d Cir. 1975) (affirming a
conviction of a Vietnam war protester who blocked an entrance to a federal building); United
States v. Jones, 365 F.2d 675, 676-79 (2d Cir. 1966) (affirming the disorderly conduct convic-
tions of civil rights protesters who chained themselves to a federal courthouse entranceway);
United States v. Sroka, 307 F. Supp. 400, 401-02 (E.D. Wis. 1969) (rejecting a First Amend-
ment defense by anti-war protesters who assembled in a federal building corridor to read the
names of soldiers killed in Vietnam); United States v. Akeson, 290 F. Supp. 212, 213-17 (D.
Colo. 1968) (rejecting First Amendment defense by anti-war protesters who ventured into a
government building to interfere with the processing of individuals being admitted into the
military).
42. For example, in Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
814-15 (1984), a political candidate's challenge to an ordinance that banned the posting of signs
on public property, and effectively proscribed his practice of attaching campaign signs to utility
pole crosswires was unsuccessful because the Court held that the property covered by the ordi-
nance, which included lampposts, curbstones, fire hydrants, and tree trunks, was not a public
forum. See id. The Court ruled that the ordinance satisfied the reasonableness test as a con-
tent-neutral restriction on visual clutter. See id at 816-17.
43. See United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114,
126-27 (1981) (holding that residential letterboxes do not constitute a public forum, and reject-
ing a First Amendment challenge to a federal statute prohibiting the deposit of unstamped
mailable matter in such letterboxes).
44. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46-48, 54-55 (holding that teacher mailboxes and an interschool
mail system constituted a nonpublic forum so that the granting of access to the exclusive bargain-
ing representative of the teachers union, and denying access to a rival union, did not violate the
First Amendment rights of the rival union).
45. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802-06, 813 (distinguishing between public and nonpublic
fora, the Court held that a charity drive aimed at federal employees was a nonpublic forum, and
ruled that the federal government did not violate the First Amendment rights of legal defense and
political advocacy organizations by excluding them from participation in the drive).
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is deemed a traditional, designated, or nonpublic forum.46 Tradi-
tional public fora "may be regulated only via content-neutral
time, place, and manner restrictions."47  To survive judicial
scrutiny, such restrictions must be (1) "justified without refer-
ence to the content of the regulated speech," (2) "narrowly tai-
lored to serve a significant governmental interest," and (3) must
"leave open ample alternative channels for communication of
the information."4' Governmental restrictions on the content
of public forum speech are presumptively unconstitutional; 49
they will be struck down unless shown to be "necessary, and
narrowly drawn, to serve a compelling state interest."0
These same standards govern the second cate-
46. See Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 672, 678-79
(1992).
47. Paulsen v. County of Nassau, 925 F.2d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Capitol Square
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995) (In a public forum, "a State's right
to limit protected expressive activity is sharply circumscribed: it may impose reasonable,
content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions.., but it may regulate expressive content
only if such a restriction is necessary, and narrowly drawn, to serve a compelling state interest.").
48. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)); accord United States v. Grace, 461 U.S.
171, 177 (1983). Time, place, and manner restrictions need not be the least restrictive or least
intrusive means of achieving the stated governmental interest; rather, "the requirement of narrow
tailoring is satisfied 'so long as the... regulation promotes a substantial government interest that
would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation."' Ward, 491 U.S. at 798-99 (quoting
Albertini, 472 U.S. at 689 (1985)). A more thorough treatment of time, place, and manner
restrictions may be found infra in sections IE and IVB of this Article.
49. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995).
"It is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive content or
the message it conveys .... Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed
to be unconstitutional." Id. (citations omitted).
50. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 761; see Lee, 505 U.S. at 678; United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S.
720,726 (1990); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800; Grace, 461 U.S. at 177; Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). For a rare example of a content-based restric-
tion on public forum speech surviving strict scrutiny see Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191
(1992), which upheld a Tennessee statute prohibiting the solicitation of votes and the display or
distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of a polling place entrance. See id. at 211.
The Court concluded that this restriction was narrowly tailored to serve the compelling state
interest in preventing voter intimidation and election fraud. See id. The dissent asserted that
strict scrutiny was not the appropriate standard here and that the statute should have been sus-
tained as a viewpoint-neutral regulation of a nonpublic forum. See id. at 214 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring). "Because restrictions on speech around polling places on election day are as venerable
a part of the American tradition as the secret ballot, [the challenged statute] does not restrict
speech in a traditional public forum, and the 'exacting scrutiny' that the plurality purports to
apply is inappropriate." Id.
423
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gory-restrictions on speech in designated public fora.5 Though
the government may limit access to certain speakers (e.g., stu-
dent groups 52) or certain subjects (e.g., school board business"3 ),
and though it need not keep such a forum open indefinitely,
its restrictions must be applied evenhandedly to all similarly
situated parties.5 4
Judicial scrutiny is substantially relaxed, however, vis-a-vis
the third category-restrictions on speech in nonpublic fora.
Here, the government enjoys "maximum control over communica-
tive behavior" because its role "is most analogous to that of
a private owner."55 The challenged regulation need only be
reasonable, so long as it is not an effort "to suppress expression
merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view. " 5'
"Indeed, 'control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based
on subject matter and speaker identity, so long as the distinc-
tions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by
the forum and are viewpoint neutral."'57 Ultimately, "the Govern-
ment's decision to restrict access to a nonpublic forum 'need
only be reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the
only reasonable limitation. ' '
In distinguishing among these three categories, the Supreme
Court has advanced narrow definitions of both traditional and
designated public fora. Traditional public fora "are those places
which 'by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted
to assembly and debate,"'59 places whose "principal purpose
51. See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 678-79; Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 726-27; Cornelius, 473 U.S.
at 800; Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
52. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
53. See, e.g., City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wisconsin Pub. Employment Relations
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
54. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46 & n.7, 48.
55. Paulsen, 925 F.2d at 69.
56. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46; see Lee, 505 U.S. at 679; Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730; Cornelius,
473 U.S. at 800.
57. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806).
58. Id. (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 808)(emphasis added). But see Board of Airport
Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 575 (1987) (holding that even if an airport
terminal were deemed a nonpublic forum, a sweeping ban on "all First Amendment activities"
is facially invalid under the overbreadth doctrine "because no conceivable governmental interest
would justify such an absolute prohibition of speech").
59. Cornelius, 473 US. at 802.
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*.. is the free exchange of ideas."6" Designated public fora are
likewise narrowly conceived. The government does not create
such a forum "by inaction,"6' or by allowing the public "'freely
to visit,' 6e2 or by "permitting limited discourse"" there; instead,
such a forum is created only where the government "'intention-
ally open[s] a nontraditional forum for public discourse."'64
Under these definitions, public forum status has eluded such
heavily frequented public spaces as airport terminals,6 5 state
fairgrounds, 6 post office sidewalks, 67 public housing complexes, 68
60. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.
61. Lee, 505 U.S. at 680; accord Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
62. Lee, 505 U.S. at 680 (quoting Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976)); accord Grace,
461 U.S. at 177.
63. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802..
64. Lee, 505 U.S. at 680 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802); accord Kokinda, 497 U.S.
at 730 (stressing that a designated public forum is not created unless it is "expressly dedicated"
by the government to "expressive activity," it will not suffice that the government has acquiesced
in even a longstanding pattern of leafletting, speaking, and picketing on the premises, and "a
practice of allowing some speech activities on [the] property do[es] not add up to the dedication
of [that] property to speech activities"). After opening such a forum, there is no requirement that
the government keep it open indefinitely. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
65. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 683-85 (holding that airport terminals are nonpublic fora and
rejecting a challenge by Hare Krishnas to the port authority's ban on soliciting money inside the
terminals; the regulatory scheme satisfied the reasonableness test given the burden and inconve-
nience that passengers would face and the fact that soliciting is permitted on the sidewalks
outside the terminal buildings); ISKCON Miami, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 147 F.3d
1282, 1287-91 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (upholding regulations banning solicitation both inside and
outside an airport terminal, including its sidewalks and parking lots, and vesting the airport
director with discretion to select areas within the airport where other First Amendment activities
would be confined), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1032 (1999). But see Lee v. International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 830 (1992) (per curiam opinion striking down port author-
ity's ban on leafletting); Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 575
(1987) (holding that even if an airport terminal were deemed a nonpublic forum, a sweeping ban
on "all First Amendment activities" in the terminal is facially invalid under the overbreadth
doctrine "because no conceivable governmental interest would justify such an absolute prohibi-
tion of speech").
66. For example, in Heffron v. International Societyfor Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452
U.S. 640 (1981), the Court upheld as a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction on use of
a "limited" public forum a state fair rule that barred selling or distributing any materials on the
fairgrounds except from fixed booths rented to all comers on a first-come, first-served basis.
See id. at 654-55. The Krishnas were unsuccessful in their First Amendment challenge to the
ban from circulating freely throughout the fairgrounds without having to rent a booth because
the Court held that state fairgrounds were not a traditional public forum, but only a "limited"
public forum. See id. at 655.
67. See, e.g., Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727 (holding that postal sidewalks are not public fora,
thereby rejecting the First Amendment challenge to a Postal Service regulation that restricted
speech activities on post office sidewalks, stressing that not every sidewalk falls into the tradi-
425
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and Chicago's municipally-owned pier.69
In divining the requisite intent to create a designated public
forum, the Court will look to the government's "policy and prac-
tice" vis-a-vis the property; 70 it will likewise inquire whether
tional public forum category, and distinguishing postal sidewalks by observing that they do not
function as a "public passageway," but merely provide access to the post office from its adjacent
parking lot).
68. See, e.g., Daniel v. City of Tampa, 38 F.3d 546, 550 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that a
public housing complex is a nonpublic forum), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1132 (1995).
69. In ChicagoACORNv. Metropolitan Pier& Exposition Authority, 150 F.3d 695 (7th Cir.
1998)(Posner, J.), the court held that Chicago's municipally-owned pier, formerly a naval
facility but now converted into a recreational and commercial center with pedestrian thorough-
fares lined by shops and restaurants, an outdoor amusement park, an indoor shopping mail, and
a convention hall, was, in its entirety, a nonpublic forum. See id. at 698. When the Democratic
National Convention was held there in 1996, the plaintiffs, a collection of political advocacy
groups, sought access to the pier in order to engage in a range of expressive activities, namely
leafletting, soliciting signatures for petitions, giving speeches, carrying signs and banners, all to
advocate an increase in the minimum wage, but the pier's governmental owner turned them
away, having rented the entire pier to the Democrats for $1. See id. at 697-98. The court held
that the government was free to rent the pier on a first-come, first-served, viewpoint-neutral
basis, and during the period of such a rental, other speakers may be excluded insofar as they seek
to engage in any expressive activity other than leafletting. See id. at 700-01. However, as per
International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 830 (1992), the pier's pedes-
trian thoroughfares and its indoor mall, even though they constitute a nonpublic forum, must be
left open for leafletting by other speakers. See id. at 703.
70. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,802 (1985).
This factor, the government's "policy and practice" toward a given forum, proved pivotal in three
recent cases involving advertising space on municipally-owned buses. Compare Children of the
Rosary v. City of Phoenix, 154 F.3d 972, 979 (9th Cir. 1998) (retired Supreme Court Justice
Byron R. White, sitting by designation) (holding that where a city had consistently limited bus
advertisements to speech that proposed a commercial transaction, the advertising space consti-
tuted a nonpublic rather than a designated public forum so that the city did not violate the First
Amendment in rejecting a proposed advertisement by an anti-abortion group), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 1804 (1999), with New York Mag. v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 136 F.3d 123, 130-32
(2d Cir.) (holding that where a transit authority had accepted not only commercial but also
political advertising on its buses, the advertising space constituted a designated public forum;
thus, the transit authority violated the First Amendment in rejecting an advertisement critical of
the mayor), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 68 (1998), and United Food & Commercial Workers Union
v. Southwest Ohio Reg'l Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 351, 358 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that
where a transit authority had accepted bus advertisements reflecting a wide array of political and
public-issue speech, such behavior manifested an intent to designate an open forum; thus, the
transit authority violated the First Amendment when it rejected a pro-union advertisement as too
controversial), and Christ's Bride Ministries v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242,
249,255 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that where a transit authority's stated policy was to "promot[e]
'awareness' of social issues and 'provid[e] a catalyst for change"' in setting aside spaces for
posters in its subway and rail stations, those spaces constituted a designated public forum; thus,
the transit authority violated the First Amendment when it stripped those spaces of anti-abortion
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the property is by nature "compatib[le] with expressive
activity."71 As the Court observed in Cornelius, "We will not
find that a public forum has been created in the face of clear
evidence of a contrary intent, nor will we infer that the govern-
ment intended to create a public forum when the nature of the
property is inconsistent with expressive activity."
These factors help to explain the results in some of the
Court's most famous public forum cases. The government's
"policy and practice" toward its property was decisive in
Widmar,7 Conrad,74 Lehman,5 and Perry, 6 while the property's
posters), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 797 (1999)).
71. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
72. Id. at 803.
73. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.263, 267-70, 277 (1981) (holding that where a state
university had an express policy of making its meeting facilities available to registered student
groups, those facilities constituted a designated public forum and the university was not free to
exclude students from the forum based on their desire to hold religious meetings).
74. In Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 547 (1975), a municipal
board charged with managing a city auditorium and a city-leased theater refused to permit the
staging in either facility of the rock musical "Hair" because it asserted that the production would
not be "in the best interest of the community." Id. at 554 n.7. The Court held that the board's
refusal to permit the performance was a prior restraint that violated the First Amendment because
it was effected under a scheme that gave unfettered discretion to the board and afforded appli-
cants no procedure for promptjudicial review because it found that the municipal auditorium and
city-leased theater here "were public forums designed for and dedicated to expressive activities."
Id. at 555.
75. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (upholding a city's
refusal to accept any political advertising for placement in or upon the city's rapid transit vehi-
cles; in holding that advertising spaces in and upon a city's transit system vehicles do not consti-
tute a public forum, the Court ruled that the city's decision to preclude all political advertising
by advancing reasonable governmental objectives of minimizing "chances of abuse, the appear-
ance of favoritism, and the risk of imposing upon a captive audience" did not offend the First
Amendment). See supra note 70 for recent cases, following in Lehman's wake, that address the
public forum status of advertising space on buses.
76. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-49 (1983)
(holding that teacher mailboxes and interschool mail system constituted a nonpublic forum, so
that granting access to the exclusive bargaining representative of the teachers union, and thereby
denying access to a rival union, did not violate the First Amendment rights of the rival union).
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free speech "compatibility" proved pivotal in Lee," Greer,78
Cornelius,79 and Adderly. 0
In Conrad and Widmar, respectively, the Court deemed
a municipal auditorium and a university meeting center to be
designated public fora, because in each case the government
had affirmatively dedicated the facilities to specific expressive
uses."1 Perry and Lehman, by contrast, featured well-established
policies disfavoring, respectively, access to a school district's
internal mail system and access to advertising spaces on city
transit vehicles.82 The Court deemed each, accordingly, a
nonpublic forum.
The second factor-inquiring whether the affected property
is by nature "compatib [le] with expressive activity"8 -explains
the results in Lee, Cornelius, Greer, and Adderly, where public
forum status was denied to an airport terminal, a federal work-
place charity drive, a military base, and jailhouse grounds,
respectively.8 4 Each of these cases turned on the Court's declared
"reluctan[ce]" to recognize a designated forum "where the princi-
pal function of the property would be disrupted by expressive
77. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 682-83 (holding that airport terminals are nonpublic fora and
rejecting a challenge by a group of Hare Krishnas to the port authority's ban on soliciting money
inside the terminals; the regulatory scheme satisfied the reasonableness test given the burden and
inconvenience that passengers would face and the fact that soliciting is permitted on the side-
walks outside the terminal buildings).
78. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838-40 (1976)(holding that military bases are
nonpublic fora, thereby rejecting a challenge to a base regulation that banned all speeches and
demonstrations of a partisan political nature).
79. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806-11
(1985) (distinguishing between public and nonpublic fora, the Court held that a charity drive
aimed at federal employees is a nonpublic forum, and ruled that the federal government did not
violate the First Amendment rights of legal defense and political advocacy organizations by
excluding them from participation in the drive).
80. See Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39,44-48 (1966) (rejecting a First Amendment defense
to trespass convictions of student civil rights protesters who entered upon jailhouse grounds,
blocked vehicular traffic, and refused to leave where there was no evidence that any protesters
had ever previously been permitted to gather in the jailhouse curtilage and where there was no
evidence that defendants' message, rather than their physical intrusion, prompted their arrest).
81. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802-03 (analyzing Conrad and Widmar).
82. See id. at 803-04.
83. Id. at 802.
84. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 682-83; Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806-11; Greer, 424 U.S. at 838-40;
Adderly, 385 U.S. at 44-48.
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activity." 5
D. Content-Based Restrictions on Public Forum
Expression
"It is axiomatic," the Supreme Court has stressed, "that
the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive
content or the message it conveys."86 In regulating speech, the
government may not favor one speaker over another;87 discrimi-
nation against speech because of its message "is presumed to
be unconstitutional."88
When the government targets not subject matter but, even
more narrowly, particular views on a given subject, the First
Amendment violation "is all the more blatant."89 Viewpoint
discrimination is thus "an egregious form of content discrimina-
tion."9 ° Accordingly, the government "must abstain from regulat-
ing speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion
or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restric-
tion."91
Impermissible content-based restrictions appear in a variety
of guises; they may be grouped into five discrete categories:
(1) where the government categorically suppresses or
favors a particular topic or message92-as, for
85. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804.
86. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845-46 (1995)
(finding viewpoint discrimination in a designated public forum, the Court held that a student
religious journal was entitled to the same subsidy from student activity funds that the university
consistently furnished to secular student journals); accord Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96.
87. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828; accord Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,804 (1984).
88. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828; accord Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,
641 (1994).
89. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829; accord R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391
(1992).
90. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
91. Id.; accord Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
92. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,334 (1988). In Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980),
the Court struck down, as a content-based restriction on public forum speech, a statute that
banned the picketing of residences or dwellings but exempted from its prohibition the picketing
of any place of employment involved in a labor dispute. See id. at 457, 471. The lawsuit
stemmed from plaintiffs' arrest under the statute for protesting the racial integration policies of
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example, in Boos v. Barry,93 where a District of
Columbia statute banned the display of any sign
criticizing a foreign government within 500 feet of its
embassy;
9 4
(2) where the government serves as a content-conscious
gatekeeper, selectively blocking access to a forum
based on the speaker's intended message95-as, for
Chicago's mayor by picketing on the sidewalk before his home. See Carey, 447 U.S. at 457.
On its face, the Act accords preferential treatment to the expression of views on one particular
subject; information about labor disputes may be freely disseminated, but discussion of all other
issues is restricted. The permissibility of residential picketing under the [Act] is thus dependent
solely on the nature of the message being conveyed.
Id. at 460-61. In Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), the Court struck
down, as a content-based restriction on public forum speech, an ordinance that prohibited all
picketing within 150 feet of a school, except for picketing of any school involved in a labor
dispute. See id. at 97-98.
93. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
94. See id. at 318-19 (striking down the provision as a content-based restriction on political
speech).
95. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,758,769-70 (1995)
(holding that a state could not constitutionally bar the Ku Klux Klan from erecting a cross in a
traditional public forum (i.e., the Ohio Statehouse grounds), where the grounds were open to all
prospective speakers and where the government, even in denying the Klan a permit, granted a
rabbi's application to erect a menorah in the very same location); Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393-94 (1993) (involving viewpoint discrimina-
tion in denying access to a "nonpublic" forum) (school district opened its facilities for af-
ter-hours use by community groups for a broad range of social, civic, and recreational purposes,
the school district unconstitutionally denied access to a church group that sought to exhibit a film
series addressing family values and child-rearing from a "Christian perspective"); Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (involving content-based discrimination in denying access
to designated public forum) (state university that made its meeting facilities generally available
to registered student groups violated the First Amendment by closing those facilities to a regis-
tered student group desiring to use them for religious worship and religious discussion);
Mahoney v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 1452, 1459-1460 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (involving content-based
discrimination in a public forum) (National Park Service could not ban speech because it might
be offensive to the organizers of a public event); Eagon v. Elk City, 72 F.3d 1480, 1487-88
(10th Cir. 1996) (involving content-based discrimination in public forum) (affirming the trial
court's grant of summary judgment to the First Amendment plaintiffs, Teenage Republican Club
members, whose sign was excluded a from city's Christmas in the Park event under a policy that
banned from the event any signs conveying a "partisan message"); Congregation Lubavitch v.
City of Cincinnati, 997 F.2d 1160, 1167 (6th Cir. 1993) (involving viewpoint discrimination in
resricting access to a traditional public forum) (in order to discourage holiday displays by the
KKK and a Jewish organization, the City of Cincinnati enacted an ordinance that banned over-
night displays in Fountain Square by private groups but permitted such displays by public
groups, and then proceeded to "co-sponsor" certain heretofore private displays (e.g., an
Oktoberfest celebration), thereby excepting favored groups from the newly-minted ban while
leaving disfavored groups like the Klan under its sway); Women Strike for Peace v. Morton, 472
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example, in Mahoney v. Babbitt,9" where the
National Park Service sought to prevent
anti-abortion protesters from displaying banners
along the route of President Clinton's inaugural
parade;
97
(3) where the government subjects unpopular speakers
to a higher fee for using a frum 98-as, for example,
F.2d 1273, 1274-76 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (involving an anti-war group who fought with the Interior
Department for three years in a futile effort to secure a permit to erect a temporary display in the
Ellipse (comprised of II styrofoam tombstones) commemorating those who died in Vietnam;
the government kept denying the plaintiffs a permit, each time offering a different reason, and
all the while allowing more extensive displays to be erected in the Ellipse for the annual Christ-
mas pageant; here, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the grant of injunctive relief, and permitted the
plaintiffs to erect their display in the Ellipse but not in that portion of the park occupied by the
Christmas pageant). In Bledsoe v. City ofJacksonville Beach, 20 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (M.D. Fla.
1998), the court struck down as a content-based restriction on access to traditional public forum
a city's permit scheme for rallies at outdoor pavilion. See id. at 1324. Under this permit scheme,
which allowed only those events that advertised the city, promoted the city, or promoted "family
values," the plaintiff marijuana advocacy group was barred from using the pavilion. Id. at 1324.
Noting that this permit scheme "actually requires [city officials] to consider the content of the
proffered speech," the court observed that "[t]his type ofcontent[-based] idea filtering, although
quaint in a Mayberry R.F.D. aspirational way, takes on an Orwellian aspect when applied in the
real world." Id.; see also ACT-UP v. Walp, 755 F. Supp. 1281, 1289 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (holding
that police, in their effort to shield the governor from criticism and thwart planned protest by
AIDS activists, violated the First Amendment by closing the state legislature's public gallery for
first time ever during the governor's annual address because the gallery closure constituted a
content-based restriction on access to a "limited" public forum).
96. 105 F.3d 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
97. See id. at 1457. "[T]he government granted itself a permit for the sidewalks from which
it then sought to ban the 'inconsistent' First Amendment protected activity of [the protesters]."
Id. Siding with the protesters, the D.C. Circuit flatly refused "[to] permit the government to
destroy the public forum character of the sidewalks along Pennsylvania Avenue by the ipse dixit
act of declaring itself a permittee" because "the government here is attempting to ban, on a
viewpoint-determined basis, First Amendment activity from a quintessential public forum." Id.
at 1457-58. The court concluded that the government cannot possibly justify its five-month
suspension of demonstration permits along Pennsylvania Avenue merely "in order to protect the
President or the inaugural celebrants from dissenters for a few hours on a single day"). Id. at
1459.
98. See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 137 (1992). In Central
Florida Nuclear Freeze Campaign v. Walsh, 774 F.2d 1515 (11th Cir. 1985), a nonprofit
anti-nuclear organization's First Amendment challenge of an Orlando ordinance that required
persons wishing to demonstrate in city streets and parks to prepay the amount of costs for addi-
tional police protection, to be determined at a police chief's discretion, was struck down both
facially and as applied. Id. at 1525. The court found that
[t]he principle of equality of expression, inherent in the First Amendment, means that in the context
of a public forum, the government must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard.
It forbids content discrimination and denies the government the power to determine which messages
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in Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement,99 where,
under a local permit scheme, the fee for police
protection could be increased if the speaker was
likely to generate controversy; 100
(4) where the government withholds a service or subsidy
to which the speaker would otherwise be entitled if
not for his message-as, for example, in Rosenberger
v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia,'01
where a student religious journal was denied the
same subsidy for printing costs that the university
furnished to all other student publications; 0 2 and
(5) where the government alters the speaker's intended
message as the price for use of a forum'° 3-as, for
shall be heard and which suppressed.
Walsh, 774 F.2d at 1525; see also Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Mayor
of Thurmont, 700 F. Supp. 281, 291 (D. Md. 1988) (holding that town officials unconstitution-
ally denied the KKK a parade permit where, inter alia, the KKK was required to pay cost of
police protection).
99. 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
100. See id. at 134, 137 (striking down an ordinance permitting a government administrator
to vary the fee for assembling or parading to reflect the estimated cost of maintaining public
order, and holding that the ordinance unconstitutionally required the administrator to examine
the content of the prospective speaker's message and to charge a higher fee for controversial
viewpoints because "[s]peech cannot be financially burdened, any more than it can be punished
or banned, simply because it might offend a hostile mob").
101. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
102. See id. at 831. In holding that the university policy withholding the subsidy from student
religious journals was viewpoint discrimination in a limited public forum, the Court noted:
[T]he University does not exclude religion as a subject matter but selects for disfavored treatment
those student journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints. Religion may be a vast area
of inquiry, but it also provides, as it did here, a specific premise, a perspective, a standpoint from
which a variety of subjects may be discussed and considered. The prohibited perspective, not the
general subject matter, resulted in the [subsidy denial].
Id. (emphasis added).
103. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 558
(1995); City of Cleveland v. Nation of Islam, 922 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ohio 1995). Minister Louis
Farrakhan, gearing up for his Million Man March, sought to lease the Cleveland Convention
Center for a "men only" meeting, but city officials refused. Id. The court, issuing declaratory
and injunctive relief granting Farrakhan the access he sought, held that the city, which had twice
granted the Billy Graham Crusade single-gender access to the very same facility, could not
withhold comparable access to Farrakhan; and, consistent with Hurley, the city could not invoke
public accommodations laws to force Farrakhan to admit females, since doing so would effec-
tively alter the content and character of his speech, given the Nation of Islam's 60-year religious
tradition of holding separate men-only and women-only sermons. Id.; see also New York
County Bd. of Ancient Order of Hibernians v. Dinkins, 814 F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
432 [Vol. 45
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example, in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian
& Bisexual Group,'04 where, as the price for securing '
their permit, the private organizers of a St. Patrick's
Day parade were compelled by the government to
include a contingent of gay and lesbian marchers,
whose very presence would impart a message that
the organizers did not wish to convey."°5
E. Regulating the Time, Place, and Manner of
Public Forum Expression
As explained above," 6 restrictions on the time, place, and
manner of public protest are examined under less exacting
scrutiny than that reserved for content-based regulation. 107
(where a private sponsor of a St. Patrick's Day Parade refused to allow a gay and lesbian organi-
zation to march in the parade under its own banner, the New York City Human Rights Commis-
sion intervened, and concluded that the parade was a public accommodation, ruling that the
sponsor had violated the city's human rights ordinance by excluding the gay and lesbian group;
when the city ordered the sponsor to admit the gay rights group as a precondition to securing its
parade permit, the sponsor sought and received injunctive relief from the district court judge,
who ruled that the city's order was a content-based alteration of the sponsor's message and thus
offended the First Amendment); Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Mayor
of Thurmont, 700 F. Supp. 281,289 (D. Md. 1988) (holding that town officials unconstitution-
ally denied the KKK a parade permit where licensing officials were vested with unfettered
discretion, the Klan was required to pay the cost of police protection, and issuance of the permit
hinged on a never-before-imposed "nondiscrimination condition" that effectively entitled blacks
to march in the Klan's parade because "the KKK's message of white separatism would be
destroyed if blacks were to march with them.... Allowing blacks to march with the KKK would
change the primary message which the KKK advocates").
104. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
105. See id. at 578-79. Massachusetts could not invoke its public accommodations law to
force the private organizers of the parade to include a contingent of gay and lesbian marchers
who would impart a message that the organizers did not wish to convey. See id. at 580-81. The
Court found that compelling the inclusion of this group effectively altered the expressive content
of the organizers' parade, thereby violating the First Amendment, and that the "selection of
contingents to make [up] a parade" is entitled to full First Amendment protection, no less than
the editorial compilation of viewpoints on a newspaper's opinion page. Id. at 570. Finally, the
Court concluded that the government, by injecting itself into the selection of contingents for a
privately-sponsored parade, was using the public accommodations law "to limit speech in the
service of orthodox expression. The Speech Clause has no more certain antithesis." Id. at 579.
106. See supra section IIC.
107. To survivejudicial scrutiny, such restrictions must be "'justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech,"' must be "'narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmen-
tal interest,"' and must"' leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the informa-
tion."' Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
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Such restrictions come in many forms-imposing limits on the
noise level of speech,0 8 imposing caps on the number of protest-
ers who may use a given forum,"0 9 barring early-morning or
late-evening demonstrations, °" 0 and restricting the size or place-
ment of signs on government property."' Such regulations are
frequently upheld"12 and represent a common part of the regula-
108. In Ward, the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge by a rock concert promoter to
New York City's use guidelines for its bandshell in Central Park. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 803.
The guidelines were upheld as a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction because they
were designed to limit the noise level of bandshell concerts by requiring the performers to use
a sound system and sound technician furnished by the city; the technician, while deferring to the
performers as to sound mix, retained sole control over sound volume. See id.; see also Grayned
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 120-21 (1972) (upholding as a reasonable time, place, and
manner restriction an anti-noise ordinance prohibiting a person while on grounds adjacent to a
school building from willfully making a noise or diversion that tends to disturb classes in ses-
sion); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting the use
on city streets of sound trucks emitting "loud and raucous" noises); Stokes v. City of Madison,
930 F.2d 1163, 1165, 1173 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding the arrest of demonstrators protesting
U.S. policy toward El Salvador when they attempted to use sound amplification equipment to
address a rally without first having obtained the requisite permit for use of such equipment; the
court upheld the sound amplification ordinance as a reasonable time, place, and manner restric-
tion); Medlin v. Palmer, 874 F.2d 1085, 1090 (5th Cir. 1989) (upholding as a legitimate time,
place, and manner regulation a noise ordinance prohibiting the use of any hand-held amplifier
within 150 feet of an abortion clinic or other medical facility).
109. See, e.g., Blasecki v. City of Durham, 456 F.2d 87,94 (4th Cir.) (upholding an ordinance
that prohibited more than 50 people from assembling in a small downtown park), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 912 (1972).
110. See, e.g., Nationalist Movement v. City of Cumming, 92 F.3d 1135, 1140 (11 th Cir.
1996) (upholding an ordinance banning Saturday morning parades as a reasonable time, place,
and manner restriction), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1058 (1997); Abernathy v. Conroy, 429 F.2d
1170, 1174 (4th Cir. 1970) (upholding an ordinance that limited parades to the hours between
8:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m.); Friedrich v. City of Chicago, 619 F. Supp. 1129, 1142-45 (N.D. Ill.
1985) (holding, inter alia, that a provision banning street performances during a narrow span of
hours on Friday and Saturday nights in a narrow sector of the city's entertainment district did
not violate the First Amendment or the Equal Protection rights of street performers, since the ban
applied only during periods when the area was most crowded and when performers, especially
breakdancers, had drawn crowds large enough to force pedestrians into the street).
I 11. See, e.g., United States v. Musser, 873 F.2d 1513, 1518 (D.C. Cir.) (rejecting a First
Amendment challenge to a federal regulation prohibiting unattended signs in a local park), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 983 (1989); White House Vigil for the ERA Comm. v. Clark, 746 F.2d 1518,
1534-35, 1538-39, 1541 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (upholding as reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions on demonstrations taking place on the White House sidewalk regulations that limited
the size, construction, and placement of signs on the sidewalk; restricted, but did not prohibit,
demonstrations within the "center zone" of the sidewalk; and prohibited the placement, except
momentarily, of parcels upon the sidewalk).
112. Section IVB offers examples of permissible and impermissible time, place, and manner
regulations.
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tory landscape in most cities.
Time, place, and manner analysis is governed by a
three-part test, requiring separate inquiry into three distinct
issues: (1) whether the regulation is truly content neutral; (2)
whether the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest; and (3) whether the regulation leaves open
sufficient alternative channels of communication.l"3 In the next
three subsections, those issues are addressed in turn.
1. Assessing "Content Neutrality"
The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality
-in speech cases generally and in time, place, and manner cases
particularly is whether the government "has adopted a regulation
of speech because of disagreement with the message it con-
veys."" 4 The controlling factor is the government's purpose
or intent. 1 5 "A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to
the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an
incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others." 1 6
Government regulation of expressive activity is content neutral
so long as it is "'justified without reference to the content of
the regulated speech.'
' 7
Employing these standards, courts have held that the follow-
ing speech restrictions-even though they imposed a greater
hardship upon particular speakers or messages-were nonethe-
less content neutral:1 8
113. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288, 293 (1984); accord United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
114. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; accord Clark 468 U.S. at 295.
115. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; Paulsen v. County of Nassau, 925 F.2d 65, 70 (2d Cir.
1991).
116. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-48
(1986)).
117. Id. at 791-92 (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at 293); accord Heffron v. International Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981).
118. For a speech restriction thatflunked the content neutrality test, see Boos v. Barry, 485
U.S. 312 (1988), in which the Supreme Court struck down a District of Columbia statute that
criminalized the display of any sign criticizing a foreign government within 500 feet of its
embassy. See Boos, 485 U.S. at 334. The Court held that the statute's display clause was
content-based because its sole justification was "to protect the dignity of foreign diplomatic
personnel by shielding them from speech that is critical of their governments." Id. at 321. This
435
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(1) a noise regulation limiting the decibel level at
Central Park concerts-even though the restriction
proved especially burdensome for rock musicians-
where the government's stated purpose was to
preserve the quietude of adjacent property;"9
(2) a National Park Service ban on camping in Lafayette
Park and the Mall-even though its enforcement
against homeless advocates prevented them from
sleeping overnight in "tent cities" near the White
House-where the ban's underlying purpose was to
maintain Washington's parks "in an attractive and
intact condition";120
(3) a regulation banning the overnight maintenance of
any "props" on the U.S. Capitol grounds-even
though it effectively thwarted a plan by homeless
advocates to erect, as part of a seven-day vigil, a
500-pound clay statue of a man, woman, and child
huddled over a steam grate-where the overnight
ban was justified as affording the government
meaningful day-to-day control over the Capitol
justification, rather than invoking the "'secondary effects' of picket signs in front of embassies,"
like congestion, traffic, security, or visual clutter, focused "only on the content of the speech and
.[its] direct impact [upon] listeners"; thus, the statute "must be considered content-based" be-
cause it "regulates speech due to its potential primary impact." Boos, 485 U.S. at 321.
Similarly, in Johnson v. Box, 63 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 1995), the court addressed police enforce-
ment of distinct "pro" and "anti" areas for demonstrators voicing their views about President
Clinton during a visit to New York City. See id. at 156. Plaintiff, who bore a sign (reading
"Mr. Clinton: STOP CAMPAIGNING AND LEAD!") that he regarded as offering "constructive
criticism," was arrested when he refused to be placed in the "anti" area, asserting that the "anti"
area afforded less favorable access to the President, and that being placed there, in the midst of
"professional Marxists," effectively radicalized and thus altered his message of constructive
criticism. Id. at 156, 159 n.2 (discussing the content neutrality analysis in Boos).
119. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 803 (upholding as a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction
bandshell guidelines designed to limit the noise level of Central Park concerts by requiring the
performers to use a sound system and sound technician furnished by the city; the technician,
while deferring to the performers as to sound mix, retained sole control over sound volume).
120. Clark, 468 U.S. at 294-96,299 (stressing that "[t]o permit camping-using these areas
as living accommodations-would be totally inimical" to the stated governmental purpose, and
holding that the expressive nature of plaintiffs' proposed overnight sleeping does not render the
camping ban any less a legitimate time, place, and manner regulation).
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grounds;.. and
(4) an order banning all expressive activity within a
sector of the San Juan National Forest closed for
logging activity-even though the ban's impact was
entirely one-sided, since only environmentalists
sought to protest among the trees-where the
government justified its ban as protecting "health
and safety and... property.'
22
These cases illustrate that speech restrictions will be
deemed "content neutral," even if they impinge more severely
on a particular speaker or message, so long as the government
can justify its regulation as serving purposes that have nothing
to do with the content of speech. 1
2 3
121. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Kerrigan, 865 F.2d 382, 387 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (upholding an overnight ban as a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation, even
though its enforcement against plaintiffs required them to dismantle the statue every evening and
reconstruct it every morning-a task so onerous that their plan to employ the statue was effec-
tively foiled).
122. United States v. Fee, 787 F. Supp. 963,969 (D. Colo. 1992). In Fee, nine environmental
protesters were convicted for willfully defying a special order of the National Forest Service that
closed a portion of the San Juan National Forest for logging activities, where the defendants
entered the closed sector of the forest to protest the cutting of ancient trees. See id. at 970. The
court rejected the protesters' First Amendment defense, and upheld the special order which
banned all expressive activity within the closed sector during a 90-day period of active logging
as a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction. See id. at 968. The order had been precipi-
tated by prior protests in which demonstrators occupied a tree for 12 days, locked themselves to
a cattle guard, blocked motor vehicles, rolled logs into the road, and surrounded both loggers and
trees to prevent cutting; moreover, the special order left protesters free to demonstrate inside the
national forest at the entrance to the logging area. See id at 969.
123. Closely related to this theme are two strands of precedent that directly implicate the
question of content neutrality: the "secondary effects" doctrine and the O'Brien doctrine.
Under the secondary effects doctrine, a restriction on speech will be deemed content-neutral,
even though its language is content-discriminatory, so long as the government's regulatory aim
is unrelated to the speech's communicative impact. See Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc.,
427 U.S. 50, 54-55, 71 n.34 (1976) (upholding Detroit's "Anti-Skid Row Ordinance," a zoning
restriction on the location of adult theaters that forced their dispersal in order to avert the cre-
ation of "red light" districts) (first broaching the secondary effects doctrine).
In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), the Court upheld a zoning
ordinance that required the concentration of adult movie theaters in order to avoid the spread of
blight. See id at 54-55. While conceding that "the ordinance treats theaters that specialize in
adult films differently from other kinds of theaters," the Court upheld the ordinance because it
"is aimed not at the content of the films shown ... but rather at the secondary effects of such
theaters on the surrounding community." Id. at 47 (emphasis added). Since the regulatory aim
of the Renton ordinance was directed at the crime and declining property values that frequently
437
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2. Assessing the Requisite "Narrow Tailoring"
To be upheld under the First Amendment, a time, place,
and manner restriction must be "'narrowly tailored to serve
a significant governmental interest.m124 Though this requirement
is technically comprised of two discrete components-narrow
tailoring to advance a significant governmental interest-the
latter factor is rarely dispositive. The state can always identify,
and judges seldom question, the presence of a "significant"
governmental interest. 125 Invariably, then, these disputes turn
on the presence or absence of narrow tailoring. 12' And, the
narrow tailoring requirement is by no means stringently en-
forced. The Supreme Court has stressed that time, place, and
manner restrictions need not be the least restrictive or least
accompany adult theaters, not the sexually explicit content of the films they exhibit, the ordi-
nance "is completely consistent with our definition of 'content-neutral' speech regulations as
those that 'are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech."' Renton, 475
U.S. at 48 (emphasis added) (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)).
For purposes of this Article, it is important to stress that the secondary effects doctrine has had
little impact on the right to engage in public protest. The government invoked the doctrine
unsuccessfully in Boos, where it sought to justify a ban on the display of any sign criticizing a
foreign government within 500 feet of its embassy. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320-21
(1988). The government argued that the ban was content-neutral because "the real concern is
a secondary effect, namely, our international law obligation to shield diplomats from speech that
offends their dignity." Id. at 320. The Court rejected this argument and invalidated the ban
under strict scrutiny, holding that "[Ijisteners' reactions to speech are not the type of 'secondary
effects' we referred to in Renton." Id. at 321.
Like the secondary effects doctrine, the O'Brien doctrine erects a shield of content neutrality
when the government regulates expressive activity for reasons other than its communicative
impact. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968). Under O'Brien, where the
government regulates conduct that has a communicative quality, the regulation will nevertheless
survive a First Amendment challenge if the governmental justification for restricting the conduct
is important and is unrelated to the suppression of ideas. See id. 377. In O'Brien, the Court
upheld a federal statute criminalizing the burning of draft cards, nothwithstanding a legislative
history that revealed an overriding impulse to punish such conduct precisely because of its
anti-war message, and the government justified the prohibition as furthering its administration
of the Selective Service system. See id. at 385-86.
124. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at 293).
125. See, e.g., Clark, 468 U.S. at 296 (readily recognizing a "significant" governmental
interest in maintaining Washington's parks "in an attractive and intact condition," and thereby
upholding a broad ban on camping in Lafayette Park and the Mall).
126. Bear in mind, of course, that we are here discussing but one of three distinct prongs of
time, place, and manner analysis. This discussion merely asserts that satisfaction of one such
prong, not the outcome of these cases as a whole, turns largely on the question of narrow tailor-
ing.
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intrusive means of achieving the government's end; rather, "the
requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied 'so long as the.
regulation promotes a substantial government interest that
would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation." 2 7
This relaxed conception of narrow tailoring is vividly re-
flected in the cases. Regulations that fail this test invariably
feature broad restraints on expressive activity 2S-imposing,
for example, sweeping prohibitions on parades, 129 demonstra-
tions, 131 labor picketing,' abortion picketing, 3 2 residential
127. Ward, 491 U.S. at 798-99 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689
(1985)).
128. See, e.g., Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 697-99 (2d Cir. 1996) (enjoining
enforcement of an ordinance that prohibited visual artists from exhibiting or selling their work
in public places without a general vendors license, and holding that the ordinance was not
narrowly tailored, but served instead as "a de facto bar preventing visual artists from exhibiting
and selling their art in public areas of New York," because it placed an exceedingly low ceiling
on the number of available permits, creating a waiting list so long that even the City conceded
that plaintiffs' prospects of securing a license were non-existent), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2408
(1997).
129. See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. City of Valdosta, 861 F. Supp.
1570, 1580-83 (M.D. Ga. 1994) (striking down as facially overbroad legislative restrictions on
demonstrations, picketing, leafletting, and parades and striking down an outright ban on parades
in residential zones); Sixteenth of Sept. Planning Comm., Inc. v. City of Denver, 474 F. Supp.
1333 (D. Colo. 1979) (striking down as impermissibly broad a time, place, and manner restric-
tion on parades in downtown Denver; the regulation banned parades anywhere within the
seven-square-block central business district on all workdays from 7:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.).
130. See, e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 514, 518 (1939) (striking down ordinances that,
inter alia, imposed a flat ban on public distribution of printed materials, and required a permit,
issued at the uncontrolled discretion of the public safety director, for all public meetings and
demonstrations); Valdosta, 861 F. Supp. at 1580-81 (striking down a ban on public assemblies
in all public and quasi-public places other than parks-a prohibition that swept within its ambit
all demonstrations on streets, roads, highways, sidewalks, driveways, and alleys).
131. See. e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104 (1940) (striking down a sweeping ban
on labor picketing); Nash v. Chandler, 848 F.2d 567, 574 (5th Cir. 1988) (striking down on
overbreadth grounds a "mass picketing" statute imposing a numerical cap of two picketers within
50 feet of any entrance to a targeted establishment); Howard Gault Co. v. Texas Rural Legal Aid,
Inc., 848 F.2d 544, 566-67 (5th Cir. 1988) (striking down the same statute challenged in Nash).
132. See, e.g., Edwards v. City of Santa Barbara, 150 F.3d 1213, 1215 (9th Cir. 1998) (up-
holding an ordinance that banned picketing within an eight-foot fixed buffer zone outside
medical centers and places of worship, but striking down for lack of narrow tailoring an ordi-
nance that created an eight-foot "floating" buffer zone surrounding any patient or worshipper
within 100 feet of a medical center or place of worship), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1142 (1999);
Sabelko v. City of Phoenix, 120 F.3d 161, 162, 165 (9th Cir. 1997) (striking down for lack of
narrow tailoring an ordinance that imposed an eight-foot "floating" buffer zone around persons
entering or exiting abortion clinics); Olmer v. City of Lincoln, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1100-03
(D. Neb. 1998) (striking down for lack of narrow tailoring an ordinance aimed at anti-abortion
439
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picketing,133 door-to-door leafletting, 134 or public handbilling "5
protesters, which banned focused picketing outside places of worship during scheduled services).
133. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486-88 (1988) (addressing an ordinance that
imposed an outright ban on picketing "before or about" any residence, the Court held that
residential streets are no less traditional public fora than their downtown counterparts, and
therefore must be judged under the same stringent standards that govern restrictions on public
forum speech, but saved the ordinance from its apparently fatal overbreadth by imposing a
narrowing construction that prohibits only "focused" picketing conducted solely in front of a
single, targeted residence). The Court's narrowing construction features illustrations of permissi-
ble picketing that would seem generally immune from time, place, and manner prohibition:
"[g]eneral marching through residential neighborhoods," "walking a route in front of an entire
block of houses," door-to-door proselytizing, and door-to-door leafletting. Id.; see also
Kirkeby v. Furness, 52 F.3d 772, 776 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that anti-abortion protesters were
entitled to preliminary injunction barring enforcement of a Fargo, North Dakota ordinance that
banned picketing within 200 feet of a residential dwelling and authorized year-long, neighbor-
hood-wide "no-picketing zones"); Vittitow v. City of Upper Arlington, 43 F.3d I 100, 1107 (6th
Cir. 1995) (striking down a city's outright ban on residential picketing, refusing to issue a saving
construction of the ordinance based on counsel's representations as to how it would be enforced,
and reversing the district court's effort to save the ordinance by issuing a narrowing injunction),
cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1121 (1995); Pursely v. City of Fayetteville, 820 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1987)
(striking down ordinance that imposed an outright ban on all residential picketing).
In contrast, the court in Douglas v. Brownell, 88 F.3d 1511 (8th Cir. 1996), upheld, as satisfy-
ing the narrow tailoring requirement, a residential picketing ordinance that banned demonstra-
tions not only in front of the targeted residence but in front of the homes on either side of it. See
id. at 1519-20. When confronted with plaintiffs' assertion that this ordinance banned more
speech than that authorized by Frisby, the Eighth Circuit responded that Frisby established
neither a bright-line nor a de minimus standard, and that, in any event, Frisby involved an
injunctive restriction on speech which is subject (as the Supreme Court announced in Madsen
v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 764-65 (1994)) to more stringent scrutiny than
the ordinance at issue here. See Douglas, 88 F.3d at 1519-20.
134. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 149 (1943) (striking down outright
a ban on all door-to-door leafletting).
135. See, e.g., Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 417 (1943) (striking down outright a ban on
all leafletting on city streets); Hague, 307 U.S. at 514, 518 (striking down ordinances that, inter
alia, imposed a flat ban on public distribution of printed materials, and required a permit issued
at the uncontrolled discretion of the public safety director for all public meetings and demonstra-
tions); Krantz v. City of Forth Smith, 160 F.3d 1214, 1222 (8th Cir. 1998) (striking down for
lack of narrow tailoring an ordinance that banned placing handbills on unattended vehicles
parked on public property), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2397 (1999); Gerritsen v. City of Los An-
geles, 994 F.2d 570, 580 (9th Cir. 1993) (striking down as invalid time, place, and manner
restrictions on public forum speech a city's outright ban on handbill distribution in specified
areas of public park and its permit scheme for handbill distribution in all other areas of the park);
Henderson v. Lujan, 964 F.2d 1179, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (striking down for lack of narrow
tailoring a National Park Service regulation banning all leafletting on the sidewalks surrounding
the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, where the sidewalks, even at their closest, were more than 100
feet from the Memorial's wall); Valdosta, 861 F. Supp. at 1581-83 (striking down legislative
restrictions on demonstrations, picketing, leafletting, and parades and an outright ban on picket-
ing and handbilling in streets, alleys, roads, highways, or driveways).
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Absent this type of broad-based ban on a traditional 13 6 form
of expressive activity, courts routinely uphold time, place, and
manner restrictions as satisfying the requirement of narrow
tailoring. 137
3. Assessing the Sufficiency of "Alternative
Channels" of Communication
To be valid under the First Amendment, a time, place, and
manner restriction must "'leave open ample alternative channels
for communicati[ng]"' the speaker's message."'3  Though a speech
136. Where the regulation targets an unconventional mode of expressive activity, courts will
readily uphold even a sweeping prohibition. See, e.g., Roulette v. City of Seattle, 97 F.3d 300,
306 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge brought by homeless advocates,
street musicians, and other political organizations, the court upheld a prohibition against sitting
or lying on sidewalks between 7:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m.); ACORN v. City of Phoenix, 798 F.2d
1260, 1273 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding an ordinance that banned soliciting funds from the
occupants of motor vehicles stopped at intersections).
137. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796-802 (1989) (upholding, as
satisfying, inter alia, the narrow tailoring requirement, New York City's use guidelines for its
bandshell in Central Park; the guidelines were designed to limit the noise level of bandshell
concerts by requiring the performers to use a sound system and sound technician furnished by
the city; the technician, while deferring to the performers as to sound mix, retained sole control
over sound volume); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640, 654-55 (1981) (upholding as satisfying, inter alia, the narrow tailoring requirement a state
fair rule that barred selling or distributing any materials on the fairgrounds except from fixed
booths rented to all comers on a first-come, first-served basis based on an unsuccessful First
Amendment challenge by Hare Krishnas who sought to circulate freely throughout the fair-
grounds without having to rent a booth); Nationalist Movement v. City of Cumming, 92 F.3d
1135, 1140 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (upholding as narrowly tailored an ordinance that banned Saturday
morning parades), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1053 (1997); Stokes v. City of Madison, 930 F.2d
1163, 1165-66, 1170-71 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding the arrest of demonstrators protesting U.S.
policy toward El Salvador when they attempted to use sound amplification equipment to address
a rally without first having obtained the requisite permit for use of such equipment, the court
found the sound amplification ordinance was narrowly tailored); Medlin v. Palmer, 874 F.2d
1085, 1090-92 (5th Cir. 1989) (upholding as narrowly tailored a noise ordinance prohibiting the
use of any hand-held amplifier within 150 feet of any abortion clinic or other medical facility);
United States v. Musser, 873 F.2d 1513, 1517-18 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding as narrowly
tailored a federal regulation prohibiting unattended signs in Lafayette Park), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 983 (1989); White House Vigil for the ERA Comm. v. Clark, 746 F.2d 1518, 1520, 1555
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (upholding as narrowly tailored certain regulations that governed demonstra-
tions on the White House sidewalk such as limiting the size, construction, and placement of signs
there; restricting, but not prohibiting, demonstrations within the "center zone" of the sidewalk;
and banning the placement, except momentarily, of parcels upon the sidewalk).
138. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288, 293 (1984). In applying this requirement, it must be remembered that "one is not to
have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it
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restriction may run afoul of this requirement if it precludes
"forms of expression that are much less expensive than feasible
alternatives,"13 9 the basic test for gauging the sufficiency of
alternative channels is whether the speaker is afforded "a forum
that is accessible and where the intended audience is expected
to pass."'4 ° In performing this analysis, a court should take
account of(1) the speaker's intended audience and (2) the extent
to which her chosen location contributes to her message.1
4
'
A speech restriction does not leave open ample alternative chan-
nels if the speaker is left unable to reach her intended audi-
may be exercised in some other place." Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
139. City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 n.30 (1984);
accord Bay Area Peace Navy v. United States, 914 F.2d 1224, 1229 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990); City
of Watseka v. Illinois Public Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547, 1558 (7th Cir. 1986), aff'd mem.,
479 U.S. 1048 (1987). See, e.g., Martin, 319 U.S. at 146 ("Door-to-door distribution of circu-
lars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people.").
However, the Supreme Court has stressed that its "special solicitude" for inexpensive forms
of communication "has practical boundaries." Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812-13 n.30
("That more people may be more easily and cheaply reached by sound trucks... is not enough
'to insulate that method of communication from regulatory restrictions' when easy means of
publicity are open.") (citing Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1949)); Metromedia, Inc.
v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 549-50 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (declaring
a ban on graffiti constitutionally permissible even though some creators of graffiti may have no
equally effective alternative means of public expression).
140. Students Against Apartheid Coalition v. O'Neil, 660 F. Supp. 333, 339 (W.D. Va.
1987); accord Bay Area Peace Navy, 914 F.2d at 1229.
141. See Million Youth March, Inc. v. Safir, 18 F. Supp. 2d 334, 347-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(holding that New York City violated the First Amendment in denying a permit request by the
Nation of Islam to hold a massive rally in Harlem, urging that the rally be held instead on
Randall's Island--stressing that the Randall's Island alternative was constitutionally inadequate
because it thwarted plaintiff's access to its target audience, the residents of Harlem, and because
holding the rally in Harlem was part and parcel of plaintiff's message, a message that focused
on ways to improve the lives of African-Americans); accord Nationalist Movement v. City of
Boston, 12 F. Supp. 2d 182, 191-93 (D. Mass. 1998) (holding that city officials violated the
First Amendment in denying a parade permit to plaintiff organization, a self-styled
"pro-democracy, pro-majority" group viewed by its critics as racist, anti-Semitic, and anti-gay,
because the city flunked the alternative channels requirement when it required the plaintiff to
hold its parade in downtown Boston rather than the plaintiff's selected site in South Boston,
stressing that the downtown alternative was constitutionally inadequate because it thwarted
plaintiff's access to its target audience in South Boston and because plaintiff's selected site, the
route of the traditional St. Patrick's Day Parade, was part and parcel of its pro-majority message:
"To change the [parade's] location, however, was to change the character of the message...
[T]he specific place where a message is communicated may be important to the message and,
consequently, of constitutional significance itself.").
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ence. 142 Thus, a restriction may be invalid if it deprives speakers
of"a uniquely valuable or important mode of communication,"143
or if it "threaten [s]" their "ability to communicate effectively." 144
Speech restrictions that failed to provide sufficient alterna-
tive channels are exemplified in Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
Movement, Students Against Apartheid, and Bay Area Peace
Navy.1
45
In Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Movement, a civil rights
organization sought to march through a white neighborhood,
its previous foray there having been curtailed when bystanders
pelted the procession with rocks, bricks, and explosive devices.
46
City officials denied the plaintiffs a permit for a second march
through the same neighborhood, proposing instead an alternate
142. See Bay Area Peace Navy, 914 F.2d at 1229; accord Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
at 812. "While the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to employ every conceivable
method of communication at all times and in all places, a restriction on expressive activity may
be invalid if the remaining modes of communication are inadequate." Id. at 812 (citations
omitted).
143. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812.
144. Id.
145. In Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1251
(1997), the court enjoined the enforcement of an ordinance that prohibited visual artists from
exhibiting or selling their work in public places without a general vendors license. See id. at
697-98. The court held that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored, but served instead as "a
de facto bar preventing visual artists from exhibiting and selling their art in public areas of New
York," because it placed an exceedingly low ceiling on the number of available permits, creating
a waiting list so long that even the City conceded that plaintiffs' prospects of securing a license
were non-existent. See id. Addressing the availability of alternative channels, the court held
that the City's proposal that plaintiffs sell their artwork from homes, restaurants, museums, or
galleries was a constitutionally inadequate substitute for sidewalk sales:
Displaying art on the street has a different expressive purpose than gallery or museum shows;
it reaches people who might not choose to go into a gallery or museum or who might feel excluded
or alienated from these forums. The public display and sale of artwork is a form of communication
between the artist and the public not possible in the enclosed, separated spaces of galleries and
museums.
Furthermore, to tell [the plaintiffs] that they are free to sell their work in galleries is no remedy
for them.... [They] are interested in attracting and communicating with the man or woman on the
street who may never have been to a gallery and indeed who might never have thought before of
possessing a piece of art until induced to do so on seeing the [the plaintiffs'] works. The sidewalks
of the City must be available for [the plaintiffs] to reach their public audience. The City has thus
failed to meet the requirement of demonstrating alternative channels for [the plaintiffs'] expression.
Id. at 698.
146. See Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Movement, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 419 F. Supp. 667,
672 (N.D. 11. 1976).
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route through an all-black neighborhood. 147 Since the whole
point of the plaintiffs' march was to publicize and protest a
pattern of violence against blacks attempting to reside in or
travel through the specified neighborhood, the court held that
the city's proposal for an alternate route-plaintiffs away from
that neighborhood and away from their intended audience-was
constitutionally inadequate as an alternative channel of commu-
nication. 14
In Students Against Apartheid, student protesters success-
fully challenged the University of Virginia's lawn-use regula-
tions, under which they had been barred from erecting symbolic
shanties to protest South African apartheid and to urge the
University's governing body to adopt a divestment policy toward
South Africa. 149 The students' intended audience was the Univer-
sity's governing body, 50 whose on-campus meetings were con-
fined to the Rotunda.' 5 ' But the University would permit the
erection of shanties only in those areas "beyond earshot or clear
sight of the Rotunda."'52 By making their shanties-and thus
their message-invisible to the governors ensconced in the
Rotunda, this restriction thwarted the students' ability to reach
their intended audience. Accordingly, the court struck it down
as failing to afford alternative channels of communication.' 53
In Bay Area Peace Navy, the Ninth Circuit held that a
seventy-five-yard security zone established around the viewing
stand and vessels in a naval parade violated the First Amend-
ment rights of demonstrators who, by sailing in small boats
past the onlooking dignitaries, hoped to present an anti-war
message with banners and signs.'54 The court concluded that
the government's suggested alternatives (passing out pamphlets
147. See Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Movement, Inc., 419 F. Supp. at 672, 674.
148. See id. at 673-74.
149. See Students Against Apartheid Coalition v. O'Neil, 660 F. Supp. 333, 335-37 (W.D.
Va. 1987).
150. See id. at 339.
151. See id. at 337, 339-40.
152. Id. at 339.
153. See id. at 339-40.
154. See Bay Area Peace Navy v. United States, 914 F.2d 1224, 1225-26, 1231 (9th Cir.
1990).
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or demonstrating on land) could not substitute for a water-borne
procession past the viewing stand-because the Peace Navy's
intended audience (the invited dignitaries who occupied that
stand) was not accessible from land-based positions.15'
In contrast to the foregoing decisions, the speech restrictions
in Taxpayers for Vincent, ACORN, and Fee were upheld as afford-
ing sufficient alternative channels of communication.156 In
Taxpayers for Vincent, a political candidate unsuccessfully
challenged an ordinance that banned the posting of signs on
public property and thus effectively proscribed his practice of
attaching campaign signs to utility pole crosswires.'57 Holding
that the property covered by the ordinance (which included
lampposts, curbstones, fire hydrants, and tree trunks)'58 was
not a public forum,159 the Court ruled that the ordinance satisfied
the reasonableness test as a content-neutral restriction on visual
clutter. 6 ° In reaching this result, the Court concluded that
alternative channels of communication were readily available
to the plaintiff; he remained free to speak and distribute litera-
ture in precisely the same public locations where posting signs
was prohibited, 6 ' and nothing in the record indicated that
sign-posting was uniquely superior to these alternative modes
of expression.'6 2
In ACORN, the Ninth Circuit upheld an ordinance that
banned soliciting funds from the occupants of motor vehicles
stopped at intersections. 16 3 In arriving at this result, the court
concluded that the ordinance left open ample alternative avenues
for communication: the plaintiffs were free not only to use the
155. See Bay Area Peace Navy, 914 F.2d at 1229. The court likewise rejected the govern-
ment's suggestion that the Peace Navy could feasibly demonstrate beyond the 75-yard security
zone by "purchas[ing] larger boats capable of handling larger banners." Id. at 1229 n.3.
156. See City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 817 (1984);
ACORN v. City of Phoenix, 798 F.2d 1260, 1273 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Fee, 787 F.
Supp. 963, 969-70 (D. Colo. 1992).
157. See Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 792-93.
158. Seeid. at 792 n.1.
159. See id. at 814-15.
160. Seeid. at 816-17.
161. See id. at 812.
162. See Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U:S. at 812.
163. ACORN v. City of Phoenix, 798 F.2d 1260, 1273 (9th Cir. 1986).
445
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"myriad and diverse" fundraising methods employed by other
organizations-including sidewalk solicitation, door-to-door
canvassing, and direct mail-but were also free under the ordi-
nance to approach halted vehicles with leaflets, so long as they
did not ask for money. 16 4
In Fee, nine environmental protesters were convicted of
willfully defying a special order of the National Forest Service
that closed a sector of the San Juan National Forest to permit
logging activity.'65 The defendants had entered the closed sector
of the forest to protest the cutting of ancient trees there.'66
Rejecting the protesters' First Amendment defense, the court
upheld the special order-which banned all expressive activity
within the closed sector during a ninety-day period of active
logging-as a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction. 67
The order had been precipitated by prior protests in which
demonstrators occupied a tree for twelve days, locked themselves
to a cattle guard, blocked motor vehicles, rolled logs into the
road, and surrounded both loggers and trees to prevent cutting. 18
In upholding the order, the court concluded that it left open
sufficient alternative channels by which the protesters could
communicate their message. 169 Though the protesters wanted
to demonstrate "where the trees were endangered," 7 they had
been permitted to take up position inside the forest, at the very
point where the road entered the logging area.' This, the court
held, was constitutionally sufficient; it afforded these speakers
the requisite platform by which to convey their outrage at the
felling of ancient trees. 172
The guiding principle that reconciles these cases is that
a speech restriction will be struck down as failing to afford
sufficient alternative channels of communication only if it largely
164. See ACORN, 798 F.2d at 1271.
165. See United States v. Fee, 787 F. Supp. 963, 964-65 (D. Colo. 1992).
166. See id. at 965.
167. See id. at 968-70.
168. See id. at 964, 969.
169. See id. at 969-70.
170. See Fee, 787 F. Supp. at 969.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 969-70.
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impairs a speaker's capacity to reach her intended audience.
F. Sharing the Unique Forum: The Problem of
Counter-Demonstration
As the foregoing cases suggest, protesters may come to
identify one particular place as uniquely suited to conveying
their message. The attraction of such a place sometimes pro-
duces a distinct First Amendment problem: protesters with
opposing views on the same subject clamoring to occupy the
same forum at the same time. That problem-in a word, the
problem of counter-demonstration-is the subject of this section.
In the context of any public controversy, it is often the case
that one forum is particularly symbolic of, or singularly relevant
to, the debate. Demonstrators protesting government policy,
for example, have stationed themselves in the park opposite
the White House,173 along the route of a presidential
motorcade,' 74 in the shadow of the Republican National Conven-
tion,175 outside a foreign embassy,'76 in the audience at a gover-
nor's inauguration speech,'77 and in front of a mayor's home."7
In Cox v. Louisiana,79 civil rights activists marched on
the courthouse where their brethren werej ailed.' 80 Holocaust
survivors have stood in vigil before the home of a Nazi death
173. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 289 (1984).
174. See Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 901 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
930 (1975).
175. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 397 (1989).
176. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 333-34 (1988).
177. See ACT-UP v. Walp, 755 F. Supp. 1281, 1284 (M.D. Pa. 1991).
178. See Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 111 (1969); New Alliance Party v.
Dinkins, 743 F. Supp. 1055, 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
179. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
180. See id. at 539-42. At oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court, the prosecution
unwittingly supplied an illustration of the "unique forum" concept when citing testimony ad-
duced at trial:
The trial judge went to great lengths in asking [one of the defendant protesters] on the witness
stand, "Why the courthouse? Why did you come down here? Why not on the old State Capitol
grounds or some other part of town, some public park? Why here?" And [the defendant] says,
"Here's where they were arrested and we came to protest it; we came here."
MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ORAL ARGUMENTS MADE BEFORE THE
SUPREME COURT SINCE 1955 112 (Peter Irons & Stephanie Guitton eds., 1993) (remarks of
Ralph Roy, counsel for the State of Louisiana, at oral argument in Cox v. Louisiana).
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camp guard; 8 ' Vietnam War protesters have picketed Army
recruiting stations;'82 environmentalists have occupied ancient
trees slated for cutting; 8 3 and, as we have seen so often, protest-
ers on both sides of the abortion debate have confronted each
other at clinics' and doctors' homes. 8 5
In all of these cases, protesters identified a forum that
was itself resonant with meaning-a forum whose unique connec-
tion to the controversy amplified their message, lent it gravity,
or imbued it with poignancy. The existence of a unique forum
sometimes results in conflicting demands by rival groups for
access to that forum-and, ultimately, a desire to share that
forum, to communicate a message in simultaneous opposition
to one's rival." 6
This counter-demonstration scenario is incidentally ad-
dressed in a number of decisions-featuring heckling, 8 7 hostile
181. See Seven Hills v. Aryan Nations, 667 N.E.2d 942, 945 (Ohio 1996).
182. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 519 n. 1 (1972); Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S.
564, 565 (1970).
183. See United States v. Fee, 787 F. Supp. 963, 965 (D. Colo. 1992).
184. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 362 (1997); Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 757-58 (1994).
185. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 476 (1988).
186. See generally Kevin Francis O'Neill & Raymond Vasvari, Counter-Demonstration as
Protected Speech: Finding the Right to Confrontation in Existing First Amendment Law, 23
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 77 (1995) (critiquing extant cases and offering a proposed analysis).
187. For example, in In re Kay, 464 P.2d 142 (Cal. 1970), the California Supreme Court
addressed the constitutional right to heckle by invoking the First Amendment to impose a nar-
rowing construction upon California's "disturbing a lawful meeting" statute, thereby overturning
the convictions of farmworkers who registered their disapproval of a congressman's labor policy
by engaging in rhythmical clapping and shouting for five to ten minutes during his campaign
speech in a city park. See id. at 145-47, 150.
Audience activities, such as heckling, interrupting, harsh questioning, and booing, even though they
may be impolite and discourteous, can nonetheless advance the goals of the First Amendment...
. An unfavorable reception, such as that given Congressman Tunney in the instant case, represents
one important method by which an officeholder's constituents can register disapproval of his
conduct and seek redress of grievances. The First Amendment contemplates a Debate of important
public issues; its protection can hardly be narrowed to the meeting at which the audience must
passively listen to a single point of view. The First Amendment does not merely insure a market-
place of ideas in which there is but one seller.
Id. at 147 (citations omitted).
In Iowa v. Hardin, 498 N.W.2d 677 (Iowa 1993), the Iowa Supreme Court upheld the disor-
derly conduct conviction of a heckler who intentionally disrupted a speech by President George
Bush during a Republican fundraising rally. See id. at 678. The court distinguished In re Kay,
observing that the defendant's disruptive behavior occurred in an auditorium filled with persons
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audiences,'" conflicting demonstrations' 9 and parades, 190 the
who had paid for the opportunity to hear the President's speech, that the disruption effectively
halted the program, and that the defendant was removed and arrested only after twice being
asked to cease his heckling. See Hardin, 498 N.W.2d at 678, 681.
In City of Spokane v. McDonough, 485 P.2d 449 (Wash. 1971), the Washington Supreme
Court held that a disorderly conduct ordinance could not be enforced to punish an attendee at
an outdoor rally who shouted "warmonger" at Vice Presidential candidate Spiro T. Agnew and,
flashing the peace sign at him, yelled: "What the hell do you think this means?" Id. at 454. For
a collection of cases on this issue, see Eve H. Lewin Wagner, Note, Heckling: A Protected Right
or Disorderly Conduct?, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 215 (1986).
188. For example, in Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 11 (1969), the Court overturned
the disorderly conduct convictions of civil rights protesters whose march to and picketing before
a mayor's residence produced a hostile reaction by onlookers. See id. at 113. "These facts
disclosed by the record point unerringly to one conclusion, namely, that when groups with
diametrically opposed, deep-seated views are permitted to air their emotional grievances, side
by side, on city streets, tranquility and order cannot be maintained even by the joint efforts of
the finest and best officers and of those who desire to be the most law-abiding protesters of their
grievances." Id. at 117 (Black, J., concurring).
189. For example, in Shamloo v. Mississippi State Board of Trustees ofInstitutions ofHigher
Learning, 620 F.2d 516, 523 (5th Cir. 1980), Iranian students brought a challenge to university
regulations requiring that on-campus demonstrations be scheduled in advance with university
officials. See id. at 519. The court upheld the regulations but struck down a provision that
vested officials with the power to disapprove all but "wholesome" activities. See id. at 523. In
doing so, the court observed that it had previously upheld advance registration requirements,
which the court described as "a reasonable method to avoid the problem of simultaneous and
competing demonstrations." Id.
In Bayless v. Martine, 430 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1970), the court upheld a university regulation
requiring 48-hour advance reservation for on-campus meetings. See id. at 878. The require-
ment of reserving the Student Expression Area 48 hours in advance was a reasonable method by
which the problem of simultaneous and competing demonstrations could be avoided. See id.
While a university could be required under appropriate circumstances to permit both the Stu-
dents for a Democratic Society and the Young Americans for Freedom to demonstrate, no one
could reasonably contend that the Constitution required the college to permit such demonstra-
tions to take place at the same time and in the same area. See id.
In Partisan Defense Committee v. Ryan, 841 F. Supp. 247 (C.D. II1. 1994), state officials
granted the plaintiff a permit to conduct a counter-demonstration on the north steps of the
Illinois State Capitol building while the KKK would be holding a rally on the east steps; the
plaintiff sought, but was denied, permission to point his sound system in the KKK's direction
in order to drown out their speech. See id. at 248, 250.
In A Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 362 F. Supp. 1161 (D.D.C. 1973), aft'd, 516 F.2d 717
(D.C. Cir. 1975), the court upheld Interior Department regulations governing demonstrations on
the White House sidewalk and in Lafayette Park permitting simultaneous demonstrations but
requiring that the protest groups supply their own marshals.
190. Supreme Court dicta on this question may be found in Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S.
104 (1972), where the Court stated that "two parades cannot march on the same street simulta-
neously, and government may allow only one." Id. at 115-16. In Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
U.S. 569 (1941), the Supreme Court observed, in dicta, that one virtue of licensing schemes is
that they serve "to prevent confusion by overlapping parades or processions." Id. at 576; see
also Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Martin Luther King Jr. Worshippers, 735 F. Supp. 745, 751
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administrative segregation of rival protest contingents,1 91 and
a dissenter's infiltration of a forum previously secured by a
permittee192 -but only one case has squarely decided how the
(M.D. Tenn. 1990) (holding that a city did not violate the First Amendment when it denied the
KKK a parade permit to march on Martin Luther King Day where, on a first-come, first-served
basis, the City had already issued a permit for a parade that very day by a civil rights organiza-
tion); We've Carried the Rich for 200 Years, Let's Get Them Off Our Backs-July 4th Coalition
v. City of Philadelphia, 414 F. Supp. 611, 612-14 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (refusing to allow two mas-
sive parades to be conducted simultaneously within 12 blocks of each other in downtown Phila-
delphia on the date of the Bicentennial and upholding the city's denial of parade permit to
plaintiffs, "an amalgam of self-styled dissidents," who sought to conduct a massive counter-
demonstration in close proximity to the Bicentennial's "officially sponsored" celebrations, the
latter featuring a six to eight hour parade with 50,000 participants, a speech by the U.S. Presi-
dent, and an estimated throng of 300,000 spectators). Though this opinion evinces little enthusi-
asm for any right to counter-demonstrate, it can best be explained by the huge number of people
involved and the physical impossibility of juxtaposing two massive events in one place.
191. In Johnson v. Bax, 63 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 1995), the court addressed police enforcement
of distinct "pro" and "anti" areas for demonstrators voicing their views about President Clinton
during a visit to New York City. See id. at 154, 156. The plaintiff, who bore a sign reading "Mr.
Clinton: STOP CAMPAIGNING AND LEAD!" that he regarded as offering "constructive criticism,"
was arrested when he refused to be placed in the "anti" area, asserting that the "anti" area af-
forded less favorable access to the dignitary, and that being placed there in the midst of"profes-
sional Marxists" effectively radicalized and thus altered his message of constructive criticism.
Id. at 156. The court did not reach the constitutionality of these forum regulation measures,
ruling that genuine issues of material fact precluded summaryjudgment against the plaintiff. See
id. at 160.
In Olivieri v. Ward, 801 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1987), the court
held that advocates and opponents of gay rights who sought access to the same unique forum,
the sidewalk in front of St. Patrick's Cathedral, in order to raise their voices in response to New
York City's annual Gay Pride Parade, were entitled to equal recognition of their First Amend-
ment rights and equal time in the desired forum for conducting their demonstrations. See id. at
608. In striking down a police order "freezing" the sidewalk in front of the Cathedral and
thereby banning any demonstrations or pedestrian traffic there during the Gay Pride Parade, the
Second Circuit imposed an injunctive scheme that afforded each of the two rival groups a sepa-
rate thirty-minute time slot in which to protest before the Cathedral, housed in a protective pen.
See id.; see also Fischer v. City of St. Paul, 894 F. Supp. 1318, 1323, 1328-29 (D. Minn. 1995)
(upholding the police segregation of pro-choice and pro-life demonstrators outside a Planned
Parenthood clinic during a ten-day Operation Rescue campaign, including a police order fencing
off the clinic's front sidewalk and banning all public access to it except by Planned Parenthood
invitees seeking entrance to the clinic) (holding that the police restrictions here, which gave
anti-abortion protesters three different vantage points from which to protest-on the sidewalk
in front of property adjacent to the clinic, in a specially blocked off lane of traffic directly across
the street from the clinic, and authorization for one protester to stand at the clinic's driveway
entrance to hand out literature-were narrowly tailored to serve significant government interests
and left open alternative channels of communication).
192. Schwitzgebel v. City of Strongsville, 898 F. Supp. 1208, 1211, 1219 (N.D. Ohio 1995)
(rejecting First Amendment claims by two AIDS activists who, while attending a campaign
speech by President George Bush in a traditional public forum, were ejected and arrested after
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First Amendment governs the right to protest in the same public
forum, at the very same time, as speakers with whom one dis-
agrees.
In that case, City of Seven Hills v. Aryan Nations,' the
Ohio Supreme Court rejected a flat ban on counter-demonstra-
tions. 194 It struck down an injunction that barred the simulta-
neous presence in one particular forum of demonstrators with
opposing views on one particular topic.'95 The forum was the
residential street of John Demjanjuk, an alleged Nazi death
camp guard.'96 The topic was Demjanjuk's recent readmission
to the United States, following his release by Israeli prison
authorities.'97 The injunctive ban on counter-demonstrations
was issued at the behest of city officials in the town where
silently unfurling signs critical of Bush's policy on AIDS), affd mere., 97 F.3d 1452 (6th Cir.
1996), cert. denied sub. nom. DeLong v. City of Strongsville, 522 U.S. 827 (1997).
In Hollandv. Wilson, 737 F. Supp. 82 (M.D. Ala. 1989), the City of Montgomery, Alabama,
issued a permit to the Southern Poverty Law Center for the downtown unveiling and dedication
of a civil rights monument, an event that was expected to attract a crowd of between 10,000 and
20,000 spectators, the court held the City did not violate the First Amendment when it denied
the KKK a permit to protest at the same time and place. See id. at 83, 85. Though the court may
have relied on questionable grounds in reaching this result-the mutual antagonism of the two
groups, the possibility of violence, and the police chiefs self-serving testimony that public
safety could not be guaranteed-the principal basis for its decision was that the KKK had no
right of access to a forum that the Southern Poverty Law Center had already reserved by means
of a permit, and that the City had issued the permit on a first-come, first-served basis. See id.
at 83-85.
Similarly, in Sanders v. UnitedStates, 518 F. Supp. 728 (D.D.C. 1981), the court rejected civil
rights claims by a plaintiff who asserted that his First Amendment freedoms had been violated
when, for the purpose of publicizing what he believed were three mysterious deaths in South
Carolina, he ventured without a permit onto the Ellipse in Washington, D.C. while an annual
event was being held, and, after placing three small signs beneath the South Carolina Christmas
tree and standing beside the tree with a larger sign, he was arrested. See id. at 729-30. The
court noted that
more fundamental ... is the interest in guaranteeing citizens the right to participate in events or
demonstrations of their own choosing without being subjected to interference by other citizens. A
physical intrusion into another event for the purpose of interjecting one's own convictions or beliefs
is by definition an interference, regardless of how insubstantial or insignificant it might appear. As
such, it is an interference with the rights of other citizens to enjoy the event or demonstration in
which they have chosen to participate, and in an area reserved for them.
Id. at 730.
193. 667 N.E.2d 942 (Ohio 1996).
194. See id. at 949.
195. See id
196. See id. at 945.
197. See id.
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Demjanjuk had taken up residence. 9 ' They were alarmed when,
in the days immediately surrounding his return from Israel,
Demjanjuk's street became the scene of separate demonstrations
by Holocaust survivors and the Ku Klux Klan.'99 Fearing the
potential for violence if such groups were to air their diametri-
cally opposing views at the same time in the same place, the
city secured an injunction that banned the simultaneous pres-
ence of speakers with conflicting viewpoints.0 0
This ban directly interfered with the intended expression
of the Holocaust survivors-who sought, by means of their very
presence, to contradict the message of Holocaust revisionism
advanced by the Klan. 20 ' But the city, arguing in support of
the ban, asserted that the proposed counter-demonstration
posed an unacceptable risk of violence. 2  The city's theory of
the case, reduced to its essence, advanced a "'spontaneous com-
bustion' thesis, in which the admixture of opposing groups may
be regarded, a priori, as the recipe for an explosion." 20 3 Thus,
the city argued that the incompatible nature of these groups
made violence the probable result of any counter-demon-
stration-and that counter-demonstration invariably poses
an unacceptable risk of violence because it always features the
juxtaposition of antagonistic groups.20 4
The Ohio Supreme Court rejected these arguments.2 5 Under
the First Amendment, it observed, the suppression of speech
generally requires an imminent, not merely an abstract, threat
of violence.20 6  It held that the injunctive ban on
198. See Seven Hills, 667 N.E.2d at 945.
199. See id.
200. See id. The injunction decreed that protests could be staged seven days a week, but
stated that no more than 30 demonstrators could use the forum at any one time. See id. Prospec-
tive picketers were required to register in advance with the Seven Hills Law Department in order
to protest during one of two time slots (either from 10:00 a.m. to noon or from 2:00 p.m. to 4:00
p.m.). See Seven Hills, 667 N.E.2d at 945. In addition, groups with differing opinions regarding
the Demjanjuk affair were prohibited simultaneous access to the forum. See id.
201. See O'Neill & Vasvari, supra note 186, at 99.
202. See id, at 96.
203. Id. at 95.
204. See id. at 94-96.
205. See Seven Hills, 667 N.E. 2d at 949.
206. See id. at 947-48.
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counter-demonstrations could be sustained only under the
Brandenburg test (permitting the suppression of provocative
speech only if intended and likely to produce imminent lawless
action), and found that the record offered insufficient proof
of imminent or even likely violence (because none of the protest-
ers had engaged in violence, threatened violence, been arrested,
or violated any police or court order).20 7
Though it remains unclear whether dissenters may freely
infiltrate a forum previously secured by a permittee, ° a Seven
Hills endorses an affirmative right to engage in
counter-demonstration and sharply limits the power to enjoin
this unique form of expressive activity.
G. "Private" Public Fora: Free Speech in Shopping
Malls and the Influence of State Constitutions
Certain privately-owned spaces-in particular, the common
areas of shopping malls-bear many of the same qualities that
characterize traditional public fora. As one judge has observed:
Shopping malls . . . function as public gathering
centers. When one thinks about how a shopping mall
actually functions, the enclosed common areas within the
mall are comparable to the town square of yesteryear
surrounded by downtown stores. One commentator has
described shopping malls as the "'new downtowns,' in
which members of the public may not only shop, but also
stroll, sit, meet friends, and participate in community
activities as they once did in downtown business
districts."
By opening their shopping malls to the public, the
owners of shopping malls have a reduced expectation of
privacy. And citizens, because of the public nature of a
mall, have a heightened expectation that they are
207. See Seven Hills, 667 N.E. 2d at 948 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969)).
208. See supra note 192.
453
HeinOnline  -- 45 Loy. L. Rev. 453 1999
Loyola Law Review
permitted to engage in some forms of speech activities. 09
Although attractive to prospective speakers, shopping malls
have been a less than hospitable venue for speech-related activi-
ties.21 ° Their owners have vigorously resisted the notion that
these spaces constitute a public forum, and the resulting con-
flicts have produced a burgeoning body of precedent.2 1 ' These
cases raise a single issue: To what extent is there a constitu-
tional right of access for speech-related activities in
privately-owned spaces that resemble traditional public fora?
There is no such right under the federal Constitution. In
a 1972 shopping mall case, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
the First Amendment serves only to restrain governmental
restrictions on speech.212 But enterprising lawyers sought access
under an alternative theory, invoking the free speech clauses
of state constitutions. These clauses serve as a viable alternative
because, in construing their own constitutions, state court judges
are free to find greater protection for individual liberty than
that found by federal judges in the U.S. Constitution.2" 3 This
is true even where the state and federal charters have similar
or identical language.
214
State free speech provisions may be grouped into three
categories: (1) those that emulate the exclusively negative
language of the federal First Amendment (i.e., "Congress shall
make no law . . . ,,);211 (2) those that confer speech rights in
209. Eastwood Mall, Inc. v. Slanco, 626 N.E.2d 59 (Ohio 1994) (rejecting a free speech right
of access to privately-owned shopping malls under article 1, section 11 of the Ohio Constitu-
tion); id. at 67 (Wright, J., dissenting) (quoting Note, Private Abridgment of Speech and the
State Constitutions, 90 YALE L.J. 165, 168 (1980)).
210. See infra notes 223-32 and accompanying text.
211. See infra notes 219-32.
212. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972).
213. See City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982); PruneYard
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
214. See Aladdin's Castle, 455 U.S. at 293; Prune Yard, 447 U.S. at 81.
215. Twelve states, along with the District ofColumbia, feature exclusively negative language
of the sort employed in the First Amendment: D.C. CoNST. art. I, § 1; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 4;
IND. CONST. art. I, § 9; Ky. CONST. art. I, § 8; MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 10; MASS.
CONST. part 1, art. 16; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 14; OR. CONST. art. 1, § 8; R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 21;
S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 2; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 15; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 7.
454 [Vol. 45
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sweeping affirmative language;216 and (3) those that combine
affirmative and negative clauses.2 1
These affirmative expressions, whether or not coupled with
a negative clause, provide a striking contrast to the federal
charter. Pennsylvania's provision is a good example: "The free
communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable
rights of man, and every citizen may freely speak, write, and
print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that
right."21 8 Absent from this language is any suggestion that its
sole purpose is to restrain the government. Thus, affirmative
phrasing in a state free speech clause raises the possibility that
it reaches not merely governmental but also private regulation
of speech.
This argument has met with mixed results. California,219
Colorado,22  Massachusetts, 221 and New Jersey222 have deemed
their speech clauses sufficiently broad to confer a limited right
of expressive access to privately-owned shopping malls. Ten
216. There are 18 states with speech clauses phrased in solely affirmative language: ALASKA
CONST. art. 1, § 5; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 6; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 6; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 4;
DEL. CONST. art. I, § 5; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 9; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 4; KAN. CONST. art. I, §
11; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 13; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 5; N.H. CONST.
part I, art. 22; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 4; PA. CONST. art. I, § 7; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 5; TENN.
CONST. art. 1, § 19; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 20.
217. Twenty states feature speech provisions that combine affirmative and negative clauses:
ALA. CONST. art. I, § 4; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 2; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 10; FLA. CONST. art. I,
§ 4; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, 5; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 7; LA. CONST. art. I, § 7; ME. CONST. art.
I, § 4; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 5; MO. CONST. art. I, § 8; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 7; NEV. CONST.
art. 1, § 9; N.J. CONST. art. I, part 6; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 17; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8; OHIO
CONST. art. I, § 11; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 22; TEx. CONST. art. I, § 8; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 13;
VA. CONST. art. I, § 12; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 3.
218. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 7. Virtually identical language may be found in article II, section
6 of the Arkansas Constitution and art. I, section 19 of the Tennessee Constitution.
219. See Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal. 1979).
220. See Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55, 59 (Colo. 1991). But see Rouse v. City
of Aurora, 901 F. Supp. 1533, 1540-41 (D. Colo. 1995) (rejecting a claim under the Colorado
Constitution, the district court held that a strip mall sidewalk is not a public forum, distinguish-
ing Bock on the grounds that a strip mall does not resemble the "downtown business district" to
which Bock had likened modem indoor shopping malls).
221. See Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, Inc., 445 N.E.2d 590, 595 (Mass. 1983).
222. See New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650
A.2d 757,761 (N.J. 1994); see also State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615,633 (N.J. 1980) (recognizing
comparable speech-related access to the campus of a private university).
455
HeinOnline  -- 45 Loy. L. Rev. 455 1999
Loyola Law Review
other states-Arizona,223 Connecticut,224 Georgia, 25 Iowa,226
Michigan,227 New York,228 Ohio,229 Pennsylvania,230 Washington,23 1
and Wisconsin 232-have demurred.
At the century's end, our traditional public fora (sidewalks,
parks, and public squares) where speech enjoys the greatest
protection, are less and less the crossroads of the community,
less and less the setting where we encounter our fellow citizens
on foot. 233 Meanwhile, our day-to-day lives are increasingly
carried out in new environments for pedestrian traffic234-spaces
that are privately owned and thus afford no federal constitu-
tional access for speech activity.235 As the trend toward privat-
ization of "public" space continues, the battle for speech-related
access to that space will continue as well-and, since the First
Amendment has no application in this private sphere, the battle
will be waged entirely on a state-by-state basis.
223. See Fiesta Mall Venture v. Meacham Recall Comm., 767 P.2d 719,723 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1988).
224. See Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs., 469 A.2d 1201, 1210 (Conn. 1984).
225. See Citizens for Ethical Gov't, Inc. v. Gwinnett Place Assocs., 392 S.E.2d 8, 9-10 (Ga.
1990).
226. See State v. Lacey, 465 N.W.2d 537, 540 (Iowa 1991).
227. See Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 378 N.W.2d 337, 358 (Mich. 1985).
228. See SHAD Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 488 N.E.2d 1211, 1213 (N.Y. 1985).
229. See Eastwood Mall, Inc. v. Slanco, 626 N.E.2d 59, 61 (Ohio 1994).
230. See Western Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co.,
515 A.2d 1331, 1339 (Pa. 1986).
231. See Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic Policy Comm., 780 P.2d 1282,
1292 (Wash. 1989).
232. See Jacobs v. Major, 407 N.W.2d 832, 848 (Wis. 1987).
233. See generally, VARIATIONS ONA THEMEPARK: THENEWAMERICAN CITYANDTHEEND
OF PUBLIC SPACE (Michael Sorkin ed., 1992) (tracing the increasing privatization of "public"
space that is not actually public, including malls, amusement parks, plazas, and other "variations
on a theme park" that herald "the end of public space").
234. See Michael Southworth & Peter M. Owens, The Evolving Metropolis: Studies of
Community, Neighborhood, and Street Form at the Urban Edge, J. OF THE AM. PLAN. ASS'N,
June 22, 1993, at 284 (observing the increasing privatization of public space, coupled with
trends in urban design that "preclude the possibility of a pedestrian-oriented environment");
Witold Rybczynski, The New Downtowns: Shopping Malls, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May
1993, at 98 (surveying the history of shopping malls, tracing their development as "the new
downtowns," and illustrating the growing obsolescence of traditional public fora).
235. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972).
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H. Government Efforts to "Privatize" Tradi-
tional Public Fora
We move now from the foregoing problem (turning private
spaces into public fora) to its opposite (turning public fora into
private spaces). At issue here is the power of government to
divest certain spaces, even temporarily, of their status as tradi-
tional public fora-either "privatizing" them or transforming
them into nonpublic fora. The cases in this area are few and
their results are mixed, but the implications for public protest
are enormous.
There are two strands of precedent in this area: (1) govern-
mental efforts to relegate a traditional public forum to the status
of a nonpublic forum;2 3 6 and (2) governmental issuance of a
permit by which a traditional public forum is turned over to
a private actor, who then enjoys the power to effect even view-
236. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983) (striking down a statutory prohibition
against leafletting or displaying signs on U.S. Supreme Court's sidewalk and holding that a
traditional public forum cannot be transformed by government fiat into a nonpublic forum, the
Court concluded that the sidewalk lining its perimeter must be treated as a public forum, and
held that the sweeping ban on expressive activity there could not be justified as a reasonable
place restriction).
In Irish Subcommittee v. Rhode Island Heritage Commission, 646 F. Supp. 347 (D.R.I. 1986),
the court struck down, as content-based restrictions on public forum speech, a state commis-
sion's regulations prohibiting the display or distribution of any political paraphernalia, including
political buttons, pins, hats, and pamphlets, at the Rhode Island Heritage Day festivities. See id.
at 352-53. The court rejected the argument that the festival as a whole, which was situated on
the statehouse grounds, or its booths, from which the plaintiffs distributed their political para-
phernalia, lacked the status of a traditional public forum, and noted that "[t]o allow the govern-
ment to limit traditional public forum property and thereby create within it a nonpublic forum
would destroy the entire concept of a public forum." Id. at 353-54.
In contrast, in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Hodel, 623 F. Supp. 528 (D.D.C.
1985), a public advocacy group was rebuffed by the National Park Service in its request to
include a controversial statue depicting a homeless man sleeping on a steam grate in the Christ-
mas Pageant of Peace, a "national celebration event," held annually on the Ellipse in Washing-
ton, D.C. See id. at 533. The court narrowly defined the "relevant forum" as the Pageant (i.e.,
the event), not the Ellipse (i.e., the land on which the event was staged), and concluded that,
since the Pageant was a nonpublic forum, the Park Service was free to select only "traditional"
Christmas displays for inclusion in the event, and that the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights
would not be violated if they were permitted to erect their statue on the Ellipse, but outside the
Pageant boundary. Id. at 534-35. Because the Ellipse is unquestionably a traditional public
forum, identifying the Pageant as the "relevant forum" enabled the court to conclude that a
public forum had been converted, partially by virtue of a permit, into a nonpublic forum. Id.
457
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point-based exclusions of citizens seeking access to that forum.23 7
As for the first line of precedent-governmental efforts
to transform a traditional public forum into a nonpublic forum-
the most famous example is United States v. Grace,238 where
Congress attempted just such a transformation of the sidewalk
bordering the Supreme Court.2 39 Treating the sidewalk as if
it were bereft of public forum status, Congress imposed an
outright ban there on leafletting and displaying signs. 240 The
Supreme Court struck the statute down. 24' Holding that a tradi-
tional public forum cannot be transformed by government fiat
237. See Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 200 (6th Cir. 1996) (rejecting First
Amendment claims by a high school student who was stripped of her "Clinton for President"
button as a precondition for admission to an outdoor speech, in a traditional public forum, by
incumbent candidate George Bush and holding that a municipality can lease its town commons
to a private political organization, here the Bush-Quayle '92 Campaign, for the purpose of
holding a campaign rally, and the organization can in turn make attendance at its rally condi-
tioned upon surrendering any visible expression of support for the opposing candidate), cert.
denied, 520 U.S. 1251 (1997); Bishop v. Reagan-Bush '84 Comm., No. 86-3287, 1987 WL
35970 (6th Cir. May 22, 1987) (reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the
defendants--comprising the Cincinnati police, Secret Service agents, and local and national
members of the Reagan-Bush campaign committee-who had excluded plaintiffprotesters from
attending a campaign rally in Cincinnati's Fountain Square unless they surrendered all signs
critical of the Reagan Administration); Schwitzgebel v. City of Strongsville, 898 F. Supp. 1208,
1215-19 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (rejecting First Amendment claims by two AIDS activists who, while
attending a campaign speech by President George Bush in a traditional public forum, were
ejected and arrested after silently unfurling signs critical of Bush's policy on AIDS) (flatly
rejecting the contention that, in granting the Bush Campaign a permit to conduct its rally on the
Strongsville Commons, a traditional public forum, the Commons were thereby converted into
a nonpublic forum during the President's speech-but holding that government has the power
to eject counter-demonstrators from even a traditional public forum if their expression impinges
upon that of a speaker already ensconced there by means of a permit), aJ'd mem., 97 F.3d 1452
(6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 88 (1997).
In Mahoney v. Babbit, 105 F.3d 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1997), the National Park Service attempted
to privatize sidewalks lining the route of President Clinton's inaugural parade to thwart
anti-abortion protesters who sought to display banners there; however, the court sided with the
protesters. See id. at 1458. The court flatly refused "[to] permit the government to destroy the
public forum character of the sidewalks along Pennsylvania Avenue by the ipse dixit act of
declaring itself a permittee." Id. The court observed that the government "granted itself a permit
for the sidewalks from which it then sought to ban the 'inconsistent' First Amendment activity"
of the anti-abortion protesters, and concluded that "there is no authority for the proposition that
the government may by fiat take a public forum out of the protection of the First Amendment by
behaving as if it were a private actor." Id. at 1457.
238. 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
239. See id. at 172.
240. See id. at 176.
241. See id. at 184.
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into a nonpublic forum,242 the Court concluded that the sidewalk
lining its perimeter must be treated as a public forum,2 43 and
the sweeping ban on expressive activity there could not be justi-
fied as a reasonable place restriction.2 44
Grace makes clear that the government has no power to
"demote" a given forum from public to nonpublic status.245 But
a second line of precedent-involving the power of a permittee
to "privatize" a traditional public forum-has produced conflict-
ing decisions. Specifically, this second line of precedent involves
the governmental issuance of a permit by which a private actor
is given temporary control over a traditional public forum-
control that includes the power to effect even viewpoint-based
exclusions of other citizens. Most of these cases involve efforts
by presidential campaigns to stifle dissent at outdoor rallies.248
In these scenarios, the campaign committee (a private actor)
secures a permit from a municipality to use a traditional public
forum (usually a public square) as the venue for a speech by
the candidate.2 47 The committee then treats the forum as if
it were private property, excluding citizens who oppose the
candidate and making attendance at the rally conditioned upon
surrendering any visible expression of support for the candidate's
rival.248
242. See Grace, 461 U.S. at 180.
243. See id This conclusion is consistent with the Court's subsequent holding in Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,480-81 (1988), that sidewalks do not lose their public forum status when
they reach the tree-lined enclaves of suburbia.
244. See Grace, 461 U.S. at 182-83.
245. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990), does not hold otherwise. In concluding
that post office sidewalks do not constitute a traditional public forum, Kokinda was not address-
ing a "demotion" scenario; the case did not involve an effort to relegate a forum from public to
nonpublic status. See id. at 727. Instead, Kokinda stressed that post office sidewalks had never
attained traditional public forum status in the first place because they did not function in the
same way as "public" sidewalks in serving as a traditional bastion of public discourse. See id.
Thus, Kokinda does not contradict the holding in Grace.
246. See, e.g., Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 195 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
520 U.S. 1251 (1997); Bishop v. Reagan-Bush '84 Committee, No. 86-3287, 1987 WL 35970
(6th Cir. May 22, 1987); Schwitzgebel v. City of Strongsville, 898 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio
1995), affd mem., 97 F.3d 1452 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 88 (1997).
247. See, e.g., Sistrunk, 99 F.3d at 196; Bishop, 1987 WL 35970, at *1; Schwitzgebel, 898
F. Supp. at 1212.
248. See Sistrunk, 99 F.3d at 196; Bishop, 1987 WL 35970, at * 1; Schwitzgebel, 898 F. Supp.
at 1212-13.
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Whether a public forum may be "privatized" in this way
has divided the courts. Emblematic of the split are two cases
that stem from the same campaign rally-with one court endors-
ing and the other rejecting a "privatization" thesis. Sistrunk
and Schwitzgebel both involve an October 28, 1992 campaign
speech by George Bush. 249 The outdoor rally was staged in a
traditional public forum, the Strongsville Commons, that Bush
campaign officials purported to control by virtue of a one-dollar
permit issued by the city. 2 0 In both cases, the plaintiffs sought
to engage in silent dissent, only to be censored in ways that
would never be permissible in a traditional public forum.251
The Sistrunk plaintiff, a high school student, was stripped of
her "Clinton for President" button as the price for access to
the Commons.252 In Schwitzgebel, two men were ejected and
arrested after silently unfurling signs critical of Bush's policy
on AIDS. 253 Though both courts agreed that dissenters may
be excluded from such a rally,254 they split on the "privatization"
thesis, with Sistrunk endorsing 255 and Schwitzgebel rejecting 256
it.
Sistrunk held that the First Amendment does not prevent
a municipality from granting a permittee "exclusive use" of
a traditional public forum.257 Unfortunately, the opinion is
less than clear about its theoretical underpinnings; left unan-
swered is whether the public nature of the forum is altered by
the permit, or whether the "exclusive use" enjoyed by the
permittee is simply a necessary concomitant of its expressive
"autonomy. ' 258 In any event, the upshot of Sistrunk is that a
permittee is free to use a traditional public forum as if it were
private property-engaging in viewpoint-based censorship that
249. See Sistrunk, 99 F.3d at 196; Schwitzgebel, 898 F. Supp. at 1212.
250. See Sistrunk, 99 F.3d at 196; Schwitzgebel, 898 F. Supp. at 1212.
251. See Sistrunk, 99 F.3d at 196; Schwitzgebel, 898 F. Supp. at 1212-13.
252. See Sistrunk, 99 F.3d at 196.
253. See Schwitzgebel, 898 F. Supp. at 1212-13.
254. See Sistrunk, 99 F.3d at 198-200; Schwitzgebel, 898 F. Supp. at 1216-19; see infra note
262 (critiquing the Schwitzgebel analysis).
255. See Sistrunk, 99 F.3d at 198.
256. See Schwitzgebel, 898 F. Supp. at 1215-16.
257. See Sistrunk, 99 F.3d at 198.
258. See id. at 200.
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would be legally impermissible even in a nonpublic forum.259
Schwitzgebel, by contrast, expressly rejected the notion
that a permit in any way alters the First Amendment status
of a traditional public forum.260 Concluding that the city's issu-
ance of a permit to the Bush Campaign did not, even temporarily,
relegate the Commons from public to nonpublic status, the court
observed:
To allow the government to transform a traditionally
public forum into a non-public forum is to allow the
government to suspend, if only temporarily, the existence
of an historically protected arena used to safeguard the
communication of thoughts between free citizens. In
essence, public fora serve as bulwarks protecting the right
of all persons, especially those who have no access to any
other outlet, to speak their minds freely. Courts must not
allow the government to overcome the bastions protecting
such an important right through so simple an exercise as
the granting of a permit.26'
Thus, held the court, a permittee's ejection of dissenting
voices from a traditional public forum must be analyzed under
the same First Amendment standards that normally apply to
restrictions on public forum speech.262
259. In a nonpublic forum, speech restrictions are analyzed under a reasonableness test, unless
they are viewpoint-based. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,
46(1983).
260. See Schwitzgebel, 898 F. Supp. at 1215-16.
261. Id. at 1216.
262. See id. at 1216-17. Given the profoundly speech-protective language quoted above, it
is ironic that the Schwitzgebel court arrived at a speech-restrictive conclusion-finding no First
Amendment violation in ejecting, arresting, and jailing two citizens who peacefully and silently
expressed their disagreement with the policies of a presidential candidate at an outdoor campaign
speech in a traditional public forum. See id. at 1213, 1219. To achieve this result, the
Schwitzgebel court performed a tortured time, place, and manner analysis-identifying a signifi-
cant governmental interest in preventing the "cacophony" of conflicting messages (a curious
choice of words, since the plaintiffs were holding their banner in silence), and concluding
(improbably) that ejecting rival viewpoints from a traditional public forum does not offend the
content-neutrality requirement. See id. at 1217, 1219. Thus, even though they disagree on the
power of government to divest a space of its public forum status, Sistrunk and Schwitzgebel
arrive at the same result: when a speaker, by means of a permit, is ensconced in a traditional
public forum, that forum is magically transformed into a "no dissent" zone.
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In the wake of Sistrunk and Schwitzgebel, it remains unclear
how to analyze viewpoint-based exclusions by public forum
permittees. Does the issuance of a permit transform such a
space from public to nonpublic forum? There is no consensus
on the answer to that question-and, without the answer, there
is no way to determine the appropriate level ofjudicial scrutiny.
Though a recent case suggests that permit issuance does nothing
to diminish the First Amendment status of a traditional public
forum, 263 the law on this question remains far from settled.
III. THE FOUR REGULATORY CONTEXTS AND
THEIR CORRESPONDING PLAYERS: LEG-
ISLATORS, ADMINISTRATORS, JUDGES,
AND POLICE
The remaining sections in this Article correspond to the
four regulatory contexts in which speech may be restricted.
Legislators, administrators, judges, and police each play a dis-
tinct role in the First Amendment landscape. And for each there
exists a distinct body of precedent. This Article will address
in turn the precedent governing legislative power to regulate
speech,264 administrative control over permits and fees,265
263. In Mahoney v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1997), the National Park Service
attempted to privatize sidewalks lining the route of President Clinton's inaugural parade, with
a view toward thwarting anti-abortion protesters who sought to display banners there. See id.
at 1457. "The government granted itself a permit for the sidewalks from which it then sought
to ban the 'inconsistent' First Amendment-protected activity" of the anti-abortion protesters.
Id. In siding with the protesters, the court flatly refused to "permit the government to destroy
the public forum character of the sidewalks along Pennsylvania Avenue by the ipse dixit act of
declaring itself a permittee." Id. at 1458. "[T]here is no authority for the proposition that the
government may by fiat take a public forum out of the protection of the First Amendment by
behaving as if it were a private actor." Id. at 1457. Mahoney appears distinguishable from
Sistrunk and Schwitzgebel in one important respect: the latter cases involve private permittees,
while Mahoney involves the government itselfoccupying a public forum and excluding citizens
based on the viewpoint of their intended expression. In this sense, Mahoney is the easier case;
while the censorship in Sistrunk and Schwitzgebel was carried out by private actors with govern-
ment acquiescence, the censorship in Mahoney was committed directly and affirmatively by the
state. Lurking here-but so far avoided by the courts (see, e.g., Sistrunk, 99 F.3d at 197--is
the question of state action: Is the First Amendment even implicated when a private permittee
ejects other speakers from a forum?
264. Section IV-infra notes 268-408 and accompanying text.
265. Section V-infra notes 409-474 and accompanying text.
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speech-restrictive injunctions imposed by the judiciary, 26 6andthe role of police as a regulatory presence on the street.267
IV. LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON PUBLIC
FORUM SPEECH
When a legislative body restricts public forum speech, it
acts in one of three ways: restricting access to the forum,26 8
restricting use of the forum,26 9 or restricting the speaker's mes-
sage.27 ° In this section, the Article addresses in turn each of
those three modes of regulation.
A. Restricting Access to the Forum: Permits
and Fees
Restrictions on public forum access are usually imposed
by means of a licensing scheme that requires a prospective
speaker to secure a permit and pay a fee. 271 The Supreme Court
has long acknowledged that requiring permits and fees as a
precondition to speaking, parading, or assembling in a tradi-
tional public forum is a prior restraint on speech.272 Though
any prior restraint bears a "heavy presumption" against its
validity, 273 the Court has recognized that the government, in
order to regulate competing uses of public fora, may require
permits and fees of those wishing to hold a march, parade, or
rally.
274
The constitutionality of any such licensing scheme will
266. Section VI-infra notes 475-513 and accompanying text.
267. Section VII-infra notes 514-570 and accompanying text.
268. See Section IVI.
269. See Section IV2.
270. See Section IV3.
271. See generally Eric Neisser, Chargingfor Free Speech: User Fees and Insurance in the
Marketplace of ideas, 74 GEO. L.J. 257 (1985); David Goldberger, A Reconsideration of Cox
v. New Hampshire: Can Demonstrators. Be Required to Pay the Costs of Using America's
Public Forums?, 62 TEX. L. REv. 403 (1983).
272. See, e.g., Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992);
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
U.S. 268, 271 (1951).
273. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
274. Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 130 (citing Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574-76 (1941)
which upheld a licensing scheme that required prospective paraders to secure a permit and pay
a fee of up to $300).
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hinge on two basic inquiries. The first goes to the degree of
discretion that the scheme vests in the licensing official.27
The second goes to the barrier of cost that the fee creates for
prospective speakers.276 This section will address the "cost
barrier" cases; the "unfettered discretion" cases appear below,
in the section on Administrative Discretion and Procedure.2 7
Municipal licensing schemes typically require a prospective
speaker not only to obtain a permit before using a public forum
but also to pay some sort of fee in connection with that permit.278
License fees have been imposed on a broad range of expressive
280 281 iactivities,279 including marches, parades, assemblies in
275. The Supreme Court has consistently struck down licensing schemes that vested unfet-
tered discretion in the licensing authority. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486
U.S. 750, 759-60 (1988). This includes schemes that allowed the licensor to vary the fee based
on the controversial nature of the speaker's message or its potential for inspiring a hostile re-
sponse. See Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 134. The Court will treat as"a species of unbridled discretion"
any failure by a licensing scheme to place limits on the time frame within which the
decisionmaker must issue the license. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 223-24
(1990) (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1965)).
276. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 113-15 (1943) (rejecting the applica-
tion of a peddler's license fee to sidewalk and house-to-house sales of religious literature by
Jehovah's Witnesses); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576-78 (1941) (upholding a
parade permit scheme that authorized the imposition of fees as high as $300); Northeast Ohio
Coalition for the Homeless v. City of Cleveland, 105 F.3d 1107, 1110-11 (6th Cir. 1997)
(rejecting a First Amendment challenge, brought by indigent vendors of homeless and Nation
of Islam "street" newspapers, to city's imposition of a flat, fifty-dollar-per-vendor license fee,
charged as a precondition to the sidewalk sale of plaintiffs' newspapers), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
335 (1997).
277. Section V-infra notes 409-474 and accompanying text.
278. See Neisser, supra note 271, at 258-60 & nn.1-3; Goldberger, supra note 271, at 404
& nn.6-9. Even when the government imposes a permit requirement with no accompanying fee,
the courts do not necessarily uphold the scheme. Compare United States v. Kistner, 68 F.3d
218, 219-20, 222-23 (8th Cir. 1995) (upholding a permit requirement imposed by the National
Park Service as a prerequisite to distribution of printed matter within a national park when the
defendant, who was passing out religious pamphlets at the base of the Arch in St. Louis, refused
to obtain the requisite permit, even though such permits were routinely processed in 35 minutes,
without any fee, and were available every day on the Arch grounds), with Community for Cre-
ative Non-Violence v. Turner, 893 F.2d 1387, 1389, 1392 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (striking down, for
lack of narrow tailoring, a transit authority regulation requiring an advance permit, obtainable
without a fee, for any person seeking to engage in any "free speech activity" in the above-ground
plazas of Washington's subway system).
279. Though the focus in this Article is on public forum expression, speech-related permit
fees have also been imposed on legislative lobbying and the operation of adult theaters and
bookstores. See, e.g., Bayside Enters., Inc. v. Carson, 470 F. Supp. 1140, 1149 (M.D. Fla. 1979)
(upholding a $400 fee, imposed after a previously imposed fee had been invalidated, on the
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ground that the city had met its burden of proving that the fee was reasonable and was designed
to further valid, nonspeech-related interests of the city); Bayside Enters., Inc. v. Carson, 450 F.
Supp. 696,705 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (striking down an ordinance requiring that adult bookstores pay
a $1200 license fee on the ground that the city had failed to demonstrate that the fee was neces-
sary to cover the reasonable costs of the licensing system and was used for no other purpose);
Chemline, Inc. v. City of Grand Prairie, 364 F.2d 721, 727-28 (5th Cir. 1966) (upholding a
license fee of $25 for the issuance of a motion picture display license and a $10 fee for each
annual renewal where the fee was imposed to defray the expense of investigation and the issu-
ance of the license); Moffett v. Killian, 360 F. Supp. 228, 231 (D. Conn. 1973) (striking down
a $35 registration fee for lobbying activity imposed at the beginning and end of each legislative
session); Marks v. City of Newport, 344 F. Supp. 675, 678-79 (E.D. Ky. 1972) (striking down
a provision in a licensing scheme for bookstores and theaters that required licensees to post a
$10,000 bond conditioned on not possessing or displaying any obscene material).
280. For example, in Eastern Connecticut Citizens Action Group v. Powers, 723 F.2d 1050
(2d Cir. 1983), the court struck down the state transportation department's $750,000 liability
insurance requirement and its $200 administrative fee for a proposed march along abandoned
railroad bed in which plaintiffs sought to express their belief that a proposed interstate highway
should be replaced by rail transportation. See id. at 1056. The court struck down the administra-
tive fee because the amount could not be justified as confined to defraying the state's administra-
tive expenses. See id. at 1056-57. The court struck down the liability insurance requirement
because an earlier march by the same group had produced no injuries or claims against the state,
and the group had made numerous diligent efforts to minimize both the risk of harm to marchers
and the threat of damage to adjoining property. Id.
In Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978), the Seventh
Circuit declared unconstitutional an array of ordinances enacted by the Village of Skokie with
a view toward prohibiting Nazi marches-including a provision that required $300,000 in
liability insurance as a precondition to marching. See id. at 1206-08, 1211.
281. For example, in Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), the Court upheld a parade
permit scheme that authorized the imposition of fees as high as $300. See id. at 576-77.
In Stonewall Union v. CityofColumbus, 931 F.2d 1130 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
899 (1991), the court rejected a challenge by a gay rights organization to an ordinance govern-
ing parades; the plaintiffs argued unsuccessfully that the ordinance violated the Constitution by
imposing "user fees" far in excess of a nominal sum as a precondition to the exercise of First
Amendment freedoms. See id. at 1137. The ordinance required organizers of any prospective
parade to apply in advance for a permit, pay a filing fee of $85, and then prepay the cost of
"traffic control," a cost that resulted here, according to conflicting testimony, in an assessment
of either $672.50 or $1090.70. See id. at 1131-32 & n.l. The court held that the fees autho-
rized by the ordinance were neither excessive nor unreasonable and that the ordinance was not
constitutionally invalid for failing to provide an indigency exception, since the public sidewalks
remained a free and entirely acceptable alternative forum for "indigent paraders." See id. at
1134-35. The court further held that the provision requiring prepayment of "traffic control"
costs did not confer unfettered discretion upon the licensing official because it contained a range
of objective criteria for computing the fee, including time, date, route length, number of partici-
pants, and the number of vehicles. See id.
Additionally, in United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. City of Valdosta, 861 F. Supp.
1570, 1584 (M.D. Ga. 1994), the court struck down as facially overbroad a range of legislative
restrictions on demonstrations, picketing, leafletting, and parades, but upheld a requirement that
a parade permit fee be based on the cost to the city in providing necessary traffic and crowd
control. See id. at 1584. The court distinguished Central Florida Nuclear Freeze Ca'mpaign v.
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public parks,2"2 the sidewalk sale of newspapers... and religiousliterature,284 charitable solicitations,285 the operation of sound
Walsh, 774 F.2d 1515 (11 th Cir. 1985), and, without mentioning it, Forsyth, on the grounds that
this permit scheme did not allow traffic and crowd-control costs to be fixed on a case-by-case
basis; instead, they were pre-set "from time to time" by the mayor and city council. United
Food, 861 F. Supp. at 1584. Thus, the court upheld the provision because "there is no indication
that any individual involved in the permit process is allowed to alter the pre-set fee in response
to a particular speaker's views." Id.
In Gay & Lesbian Services Network Inc. v. Bishop, 841 F. Supp. 295 (W.D. Mo. 1993), the
court found that assessing parade sponsors the cost of traffic control was a permissible compo-
nent of a parade permit fee, so long as no fee for crowd control was included; to the extent that
crowd control costs vary depending upon hostility toward the speaker, such fees run afoul of
Forsyth. See id. at 297. By severing the offending crowd-control fee, the court here saved a
Kansas City Police Department policy governing parade permits that it earlier struck down on
Forsyth grounds. See Gay & Lesbian Servs. Network, Inc. v. Bishop, 832 F. Supp. 270 (W.D.
Mo. 1993).
Finally, in Houston Peace Coalition v. Houston City Council, 310 F. Supp. 457 (S.D. Tex.
1970), the court struck down a liability insurance requirement for parades because it bestowed
unfettered discretion upon the city attorney to grant or withhold parade permits consistently
declined for plaintiffs' anti-war parade, voicing a policy to discourage politically-motivated
parades and to limit parades to noncontroversial themes. See id. at 461-63.
282. See, e.g., Invisible Empire Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of W. Haven, 600 F.
Supp. 1427, 1435 (D. Conn. 1985) (granting injunctive relief to the KKK in its facial challenge
to an ordinance restricting expressive activity in public parks and striking down the challenged
permit scheme, inter alia, for failure to include an indigency exception); Collin v. O'Malley, 452
F. Supp. 577, 580 (N.D. Il. 1978) (denying motion for stay pending appeal of unpublished
orders and opinions enjoining Chicago from enforcing against Nazi demonstrators first
$100,000/$300,000 public liability and $50,000 property damage insurance for public assembly
in park and then $10,000/$50,000 public liability and $10,000 property damage insurance).
283. See, e.g., Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless v. City of Cleveland, 105 F.3d
.1107, 1108, 1111 (6th Cir. 1997) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge brought by indigent
vendors of homeless and Nation of Islam "street" newspapers to a city's imposition of a flat,
$50-per-vendor peddler's license fee, charged as a precondition to the sidewalk sale of plain-
tiffs' newspapers), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 931 (1997); Hull v. Petrillo, 439 F.2d 1184, 1185-86
(2d Cir. 1971) (rejecting enforcement of a peddler's licensing ordinance against sidewalk sales
of the Black Panther Party's newspaper where the scheme imposed a flat, annual,
$15-per-vendor fee as a precondition to sidewalk newspaper sales); Gall v. Lawler, 322 F. Supp.
1223, 1224, 1226 (E.D. Wis. 197 1) (striking down a "transient merchant" license fee of $100
per day assessed against those who engaged in sidewalk sales of an "underground" newspaper).
284. See, e.g., Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 577 (1944) (rejecting the impo-
sition of a flat $ 1-per-day or $15-per-year peddler's license fee as a precondition to sidewalk
and house-to-house sales of religious literature by Jehovah's Witnesses); Murdock v. Pennsyl-
vania, 319 U.S. 105, 117 (1943) (rejecting the imposition of a flat peddler's license fee, with
fixed rates of $1.50 per day, $7 per week, $12 per two weeks, and $20 per three weeks, as a
precondition to sidewalk and house-to-house sales of religious literature by Jehovah's Wit-
nesses); Busey v. District of Columbia, 138 F.2d 592, 593-94, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1943) (striking
down a $5 peddler's license fee applied to the sidewalk sale of religious literature by Jehovah's
Witnesses because the government had not met its burden of establishing that the fee did not
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trucks,286 and the display of political signs.287
Such a fee is constitutionally permissible if it is directly
linked to, and serves to defray, the administrative expenses
incurred by the government in regulating the speaker's expres-.
exceed expenses of licensing and regulation).
285. See, e.g., Dayton Area Visually Impaired Persons, Inc. v. Fisher, 70 F.3d 1474, 1478,
1490 (6th Cir. 1995) (affirming the denial of preliminary injunctive relief to nonprofit organiza-
tions and professional contribution solicitors who challenged provisions of the Ohio Charitable
Solicitation Act that imposed a $25,000 bonding requirement on professional solicitors and
required non-exempt charities to pay a sliding-scale registration fee of $50 to $200 based on the
amount of contributions they received), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1135 (1996); National Awareness
Foundation v. Abrams, 50 F.3d 1159, 1163-64, 1166-67 (2d Cir. 1995) (upholding a New York
statute that required professional fundraisers to register with the state and pay an annual fee of
$80, where the parties stipulated that the registration fees received by the state exceed its admin-
istrative costs, but that the fees are less than the combined costs of administration and enforce-
ment); Center for Auto Safety, Inc. v. Athey, 37 F.3d 139, 140-41, 144-46 (4th Cir. 1994)
(upholding provision in Maryland's charitable solicitations law that required charities annually
to pay a sliding scale registration fee of $50 to $200 based on the nationwide level of contribu-
tions received in the previous year), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1036 (1995); Fernandes v. Limmer,
663 F.2d 619, 632-33 (5th Cir. 1981) (invalidating a $6-per-day permit fee for solicitation at
an airport where the government "did not demonstrate a link between the fee and the costs of the
licensing process"); Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification of World Christianity v. Hodge, 582 F.
Supp. 592, 604 (N.D. Tex. 1984) (striking down a $10 permit fee for each person in a charitable
organization who solicits funds because of the city's failure to demonstrate a link between the
fee and the costs of licensing process); Streich v. Pennsylvania Comm'n on Charitable Orgs.,
579 F. Supp. 172, 177 n.3, 180 (M.D. Pa. 1984) (upholding a provision in Pennsylvania's
charitable solicitations law that required charities annually to pay a sliding-scale registration fee
of $10 to $100 based on the level of contributions received in the previous year); International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Griffin, 437 F. Supp. 666, 674 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (strik-
ing down a $10-per-day permit fee for distributing literature and soliciting funds).
286. NAACP v. City of Chester, 253 F. Supp. 707, 714-15 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (striking down
a $25-per-day fee for permit to operate a sound truck after the city offered no evidence linking
the fee and the cost of enforcing the ordinance); Pennsylvania v. Winfree, 182 A.2d 698, 703
(Pa. 1962) (sustaining a $25-per-day permit fee for the use of the sound truck because of the
city's showing that the amount of the fee was reasonable given the costs of regulating such
activity); United States Labor Party v. Codd, 527 F.2d 118, 119-20 (2d Cir. 1975) (upholding
a $5 fee for the issuance of a daily permit to use a bullhorn and sustaining the fee because the
sum it collected was much less than the administrative costs associated with enforcing the
licensing scheme).
287. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360, 1371 & n.31 (9th Cir. 1976) (strik-
ing down a $1-per-sign nonrefundable inspection fee imposed on the temporary display of
political campaign signs; observing that the ordinance effectively required "a $500 fee for
inspecting 500 identical political posters," the court concluded that "[t]he absence of apportion-
ment suggests that the fee is not in fact reimbursement for the cost of inspection but an unconsti-
tutional tax upon the exercise of First Amendment rights"), cert. denied sub nom., Leipzig v.
Baldwin, 431 U.S. 913 (1977).
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sive activity."' More controversial are fees that appear to defray
nothing more than the cost of their own collection, 8 9 or that
force speakers to pay police,2 90 insurance,29 1 or cleanup 292 costs
288. Compare Codd, 527 F.2d at 119-20 (upholding a $5-per-day permit fee for the use of
sound amplification equipment because the sum collected by this fee was much less than the
administrative cost associated with enforcing the licensing scheme), and Chemline, Inc. v. City
of Grand Prairie, 364 F.2d 721, 727-28 (5th Cir. 1966) (upholding a $25 fee for the issuance of
a motion picture display license because the fee was imposed to "defray the expense of
investigat[ing] and issu[ing the] license"), with Eastern Conn. Citizens Action Group v. Powers,
723 F.2d 1050, 1056 (2d Cir. 1983) (striking down the imposition of a $200 permit fee against
prospective marchers because the size of the fee could not be justified as confined to defraying
the state's administrative expenses), andFernandes, 663 F.2d at 632-33 (invalidating a $6-per
-day permit fee for solicitation at an airport where the government "did not demonstrate a link
between the fee and the costs of the licensing process"), cert. dismissed, 458 U.S. 1124 (1982).
But see Coalitionfor the Homeless, 105 F.3d at 1107 (upholding the imposition of a flat, $50
-per-vendor peddler's license fee against the indigent vendors of homeless and Nation of Islam
"street" newspapers, even though the city could identify administrative expenses totaling only
$43. per permit), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 931 (1997).
289. See, e.g., Coalition for the Homeless, 885 F. Supp. 1029, 1033-34 (N.D. Ohio 1995)
(striking down a peddler's licensing scheme in part because the $50-per-vendor fee imposed by
the ordinance served almost exclusively to defray nothing more than the cost of its own collec-
tion), rev'd, 105 F.3d 1107 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 931 (1997).
290. See, e.g., Stonewall Union v. City of Columbus, 931 F.2d 1130, 1131-32 & n.l, 1139
(6th Cir. 1991) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge by a gay rights organization to a parade
permit scheme that required, inter alia, the prepayment of police "traffic control" costs which
resulted, according to conflicting testimony, in an assessment of either $672.50 or $1,090.70),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 899 (1991); United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. City of Val-
dosta, 861 F. Supp. 1570, 1580-84 (M.D. Ga. 1994).
In United Food, the court struck down, as an impermissible time, place, and manner restriction,
a range of legislative restrictions on demonstrations, picketing, leafletting, and parades, but
upheld a requirement that a parade permit fee be based on the cost to the city in providing
necessary traffic and crowd control. See id. at 1584. The court thus distinguished Central
Florida Nuclear Freeze Campaign v. Walsh, 774 F.2d 1515 (11th Cir. 1985), and, without
mentioning it, Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992), on the grounds
that the United Food permit scheme did not allow traffic and crowd-control costs to be fixed on
a case-by-case basis; instead, they were pre-set "from time to time" by the mayor and city
council; thus, the United Food court upheld the provision because "there is no indication that
any individual involved in the permit process is allowed to alter the pre-set fee in response to
a particular speaker's views." United Food, 861 F. Supp. at 1584; see also Gay & Lesbian
Servs. Network, Inc. v. Bishop, 841 F. Supp. 295 (W.D. Mo. 1993) (assessing parade sponsors
the cost of traffic control was a permissible component of parade permit fee, so long as no fee
for crowd control was included; to the extent that crowd control costs vary depending upon
hostility toward the speaker, such fees run afoul of Forsyth) (by severing the offending
crowd-control fee, the court saves a Kansas City Police Department policy governing parade
permits that it earlier struck down, 832 F. Supp. 270 (W.D. Mo. 1993), on Forsyth grounds).
291. See, e.g., Eastern Conn. Citizens Action Group, 723 F.2d at 1057 (invalidating a state
transportation department's $750,000 liability insurance requirement and $200 administrative
fee for a political march along an abandoned railroad bed); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th
468 [Vol. 45
HeinOnline  -- 45 Loy. L. Rev. 468 1999
1999] Disentangling the Law of Public Protest
associated with the forum's use. Likewise unsettled is just how
heavy these pecuniary burdens may be. The Supreme Court
has offered no real guidance on any of these questions since
the 1940s, when it decided a cluster of cases involving license
fees for parading and leafletting.293 In the intervening years,
the Court has almost entirely neglected the stibject of public
forum user fees 294 -leaving the lower courts to fend for them-
selves. The result is a less than coherent body of precedent.
Cir.) (declaring unconstitutional an array of ordinances enacted by the Village of Skokie with
aview toward prohibiting Nazi marches, including a provision that required $300,000 in liability
insurance as a precondition to marching), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978); Collin v. O'Malley,
452 F. Supp. 577, 578-80 (N.D. Il1. 1978) (denying a motion for a stay pending the appeal of
unpublished orders and opinions enjoining Chicago from enforcing against Nazi demonstrators
a $100,000/$300,000 public liability and $50,000 property damage insurance for public assem-
bly in park and then $10,000/$50,000 public liability and $10,000 property damage insurance
requirement); Houston Peace Coalition v. Houston City Council, 310 F. Supp. 457, 461-63
(S.D. Tex. 1970) (striking down a liability insurance requirement for parades because it be-
stowed unfettered discretion upon the city attorney to grant or withhold parade permits).
292. See, e.g., Goldberger, supra note 271, at 404 & n.8.
293. See, e.g., Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 577 (1944) (rejecting the appli-
cation of a flat peddler's license fee as a precondition to sidewalk and house-to-house sales of
religious literature by Jehovah's Witnesses); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 116-17
(1943) (same); Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103, 104 (1943) (same); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
U.S. 569, 576-77 (1941) (upholding a parade permit scheme that authorized the imposition of
fees as high as $300).
294. The Court has offered only the most fleeting elaboration on the meaning of its user fee
precedents. In Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 123, the Court struck down an ordinance permitting a
government administrator to vary the fee for assembling or parading to reflect the estimated cost
of maintaining public order. See id. at 137. The Court held that the ordinance unconstitutionally
required the administrator to examine the content of the prospective speaker's message and to
charge a higher fee for controversial viewpoints. See id. The Court observed that Murdock
"does not mean that an invalid fee can be saved if it is nominal, or that only nominal charges are
constitutionally permissible. . . . The tax at issue in Murdock was invalid because it was unre-
lated to any legitimate state interest, not because it was of a particular size." Id. In Jimmy
Swaggert Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990), the Court held that the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment do not prevent a state from imposing a generally
applicable sales and use tax on the distribution of religious materials by a religious organization.
See id. at 386-92. The Court observed that the constitutional flaw in the Murdock and Follett
ordinances was that, by imposing a flat license tax "as a precondition" to the exercise of First
Amendment freedoms, "they operated as prior restraints." Id. at 387 (emphasis added). In
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983),
the Court upheld a newspaper's First Amendment challenge to a state use tax on ink and paper
products used in the production of periodical publications. See id. at 593. The Murdock and
Follett fees were invalid because they were "unrelated to the receipts or income of the speaker
or to the expenses of administering a valid regulatory scheme," and because they were imposed
"as a condition of the right to speak." Id. at 587 n.9 (emphasis added).
469
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Any examination of permit fees must start with the seminal
decisions of the 1940s. Among these, the principal authority
is Cox v. New Hampshire,29 5 which approved charging fees to
demonstrators in order to recoup government expenses caused
by speech activity. 96 Cox rejected a First Amendment challenge
by Jehovah's Witnesses to a licensing scheme that required
demonstrators to obtain a permit and pay a fee of up to $300
before marching on public streets or sidewalks.297 The Court
upheld the fee requirement, which authorized sliding scale
adjustments depending on the size of the procession, because
it allowed the government to recoup only those expenses directly
attributable to the applicant's speech activities.2 9 Two years
earlier, in Schneider v. New Jersey,299 the Court had rejected
the notion that a speech activity might be banned if it generated
excessive cleanup costs for the government.0 0 Following in
Schneider's wake, Cox suggested that the government, while
powerless to ban speech activities due to their costs, might
nevertheless shift those costs back to the speakers who generated
them. 30 1
But in the years immediately following Cox, the Court
emphatically restricted the power of government to foist user
fees on public forum speakers. In Murdock v. Pennsylvania,30 2
295. 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
296. See Goldberger, supra note 271, at 404-05.
297. See Cox, 312 U.S. at 571 &n.I.
298. See id. at 577. The court suggested that, to be valid, such a fee must be levied to recoup,
and should not exceed, "the expense incident to the administration of the Act and to the mainte-
nance of public order in the matter licensed." Id. (quoting State v. Cox, 16 A.2d 508, 513 (N.H.
1940)).
299. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
300. See id. at 162. In Schneider, the government attempted to justify broad restrictions on
leafletting on the grounds that they were necessary to prevent littering. See id. at 154-55. The
Court rejected this argument, holding that cleanup costs could not justify a ban on the distribu-
tion of leaflets. See id. at 162. The Court stressed that
the purpose to keep the streets clean and of good appearance is insufficient to justify an ordinance
which prohibits a person rightfully on a public street from handing literature to one willing to
receive it. Any burden imposed upon the city authorities in cleaning and caring for the streets as
an indirect consequence of such distribution results from the constitutional protection of the free-
dom of speech and press.
Id.
301. See Cox, 312 U.S. at 577.
302. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
470 [Vol. 45
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and in Follett v. Town of McCormick, °S the Court struck down
the assessment of a flat peddler's license fee imposed as a pre-
condition to sidewalk and house-to-house sales of religious
literature by Jehovah's Witnesses. Identifying the constitutional
flaw in this type of regulatory scheme and distinguishing it
from the permit fee upheld in Cox, the Murdock Court observed:
[Tihe issuance of the permit [here] is dependent on the
payment of a license tax. And the license tax is fixed in
amount and unrelated to the scope of the [applicants'
expressive activities] or to their realized revenues. It is
not a nominal fee imposed as a regulatory measure to
defray the expenses of policing the activities in question.
It is in no way apportioned. It is a flat license tax levied
and collected as a condition to the pursuit of activities
whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the First Amendment.
Accordingly, it restrains in advance those constitutional
liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends to
suppress their exercise. That is almost uniformly
recognized as the inherent vice and evil of this flat license
tax.
304
Unfortunately, the Court has rarely bothered to elaborate
on this language in the intervening decades.3"5 The most that
may be gleaned from this passage and the Court's subsequent
pronouncements are three characteristics that distinguish a
flat license tax from the permit fee approved in Cox: A license
tax of the sort struck down in Murdock and Follett is (1)
unapportioned and unrelated either to the government's regula-
tory expenses or to the scope of the licensee's expressive
activity;3°6 and it is exacted (2) in advance of, and (3) as a condi-
303. 321 U.S. 573 (1944).
304. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 113-14 (footnote omitted).
305. See supra note 294.
306. What makes the Murdock and Follett fees unconstitutional, and what distinguishes them
from the fee upheld in Cox, is that they were "unrelated to the receipts or income of the speaker
or to the expenses of administering a valid regulatory scheme." Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co.
v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 587 n.9 (1983). Thus, it wasn't the size of the
MurdockFolletl fees that made them unconstitutional but their lack of any linkage either to the
government's regulatory expenses or to the scope of the speakers' expressive activities. See
Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 137 (1992) (observing that Murdock
"does not mean that an invalid fee can be saved if it is nominal, or that only nominal charges are
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tion precedent to, permitting the applicant to speak.. 7
Even in striking down the challenged fees in Murdock and
Follett, the Supreme Court was careful to stress the continued
vitality of Cox, observing that First Amendment freedoms are
by no means immune "from all financial burdens of govern-
ment,""'8 and that municipalities retain the power to collect
reasonable fees "imposed as a regulatory measure to defray
the expenses of policing [expressive] activit[y]"3' 9 and "protecting
those on the streets and at home against the abuses of
solicitors."3 1
Never squarely addressed by these cases is the question
of fee affordability. What if a fee is set so high as to be finan-
cially oppressive to ordinary citizens? What if a demonstrator
claims that he cannot afford to pay a given fee? Can the size
of a fee, by itself, offend the First Amendment? On these ques-
tio.ns, Cox and its progeny afford no express guidance. 311 At
most, they offer hints. Murdock312 and Follett both evince a
genuine concern that First Amendment freedoms not be condi-
tioned on a citizen's ability to pay. Murdock cautioned that
itinerant preachers might be especially vulnerable to the "cumu-
lative effect" of fee requirements as they traveled from town
to town, 13 and that the financial resources of a religious organi
constitutionally permissible.... The tax at issue in Murdock was invalid because it was unre-
lated to any legitimate state interest, not because it was of a particular size" (emphasis added)).
307. See Jimmy Swaggert Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 387 (1990)
(observing that the constitutional flaw in the Murdock and Follett ordinances was that, by
imposing a flat license tax "as a precondition" to the exercise of First Amendment freedoms,
"they operated as prior restraints"); see also Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 587 n.9. (holding
invalid the Murdock and Follett fees because, inter alia, they were imposed "as a condition of
the right to speak" (emphasis added)).
308. Follett, 321 U.S. at 578.
309. Murdock, 319U.S. at 114.
310. Id. at 116-17.
311. See Goldberger, supra note 271, at 407-08.
312. See Murdock, 319 U.S. at 11 (stating that "[flreedom of speech, freedom of the press,
[and] freedom of religion are available to all, not merely to those who can pay their own way");
Follett, 321 U.S. at 576 (stating that "[flreedom of religion is not merely reserved for those with
a long purse").
313. See Murdock, 319 U.S. at 115. In Murdock, the Court stated that
[iltinerant evangelists moving throughout a state or from state to state would feel immediately the
cumulative effect of [fee] ordinances as they become fashionable.... This method of disseminating
religious beliefs can be crushed and closed out by the sheer weight of the toll or tribute which is
472 [Vol. 45
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zation might be seriously depleted by imposing charges for its
expressive activities. 14 Though Murdock spoke in passing of
"nominal" fees as constitutionally acceptable,1 the Supreme
Court has since asserted that the flaw in the Murdock fee was
not its size (i.e., its failure to'be "nominal") but its'lack of any
linkage to the government's regulatory expenses. 1 Neverthe-
less, Schneider makes clear that the government cannot ban
speech just because it poses administrative expenses3 7 and,
since there is no effective difference between banning speech
and making it financially unaffordable, Schneider suggests that
the government cannot fix public forum user fees at exorbitant
levels.318
Taken together, Cox, Schneider, Murdock, and Follett stand
for a basic principle: "[Tihe state may recoup the actual costs
of governmental services that are generated by the use of public
property for speech activities, so long as the charge is not so
great as to appear to the judiciary to be oppressive or completely
preclusive of speech."1 9 This principle accurately describes
the approach that lower courts have taken in the decades since
Cox. 3 " They have been largely consistent in requiring a linkage
exacted town by town, village by village.
Murdock, 319 U.S. at 115.
314. See id. at 112-14.
315. See Murdock, 319 U.S. at 113-14 (describing the challenged assessment, the Murdock
Court observed: "It is not a nominal fee imposed as a regulatory measure to defray the expenses
of policing the activities in question.").
316. See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 137(1992); see also supra
note 306.
317. See Schneider, 308 U.S. at 162; see also supra note 300 and accompanying text. Nor
can the government unduly restrict the number of available permits. See Bery v. City of New
York, 97 F.3d 689 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 125 (1997).
In Bery, the court enjoined enforcement of an ordinance that prohibited visual artists from
exhibiting or selling their work in public places without a general vendors license. See id. at
697-98. The court held that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored, but served instead as "a
de facto bar preventing visual artists from exhibiting and selling their art in public areas of New
York," because it placed an exceedingly low ceiling on the number of available permits, thereby
creating a waiting list so long that even the city conceded that plaintiffs' prospects of securing
a license were non-existent. Id. Moreover, the city had at its disposal, but had refrained from
using, regulatory provisions governing the time, place, and manner of vending that would serve
to ease the problem of sidewalk congestion. See id
318. See Goldberger, supra note 271, at 410.
319. Id. at409-10.
320. See id. at 410 & n.42.
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between any fee and the regulatory expenses it purportedly
defrays,32 ' but (due to the lack of Supreme Court guidance) they
have been inconsistent on the question of fee affordability.22
The lower courts are split on whether a licensing scheme must
contain an indigency exception, 23 and a fee has been upheld
even where it was undisputed that the applicants could not
afford to pay it. 3 2 4 Given the confusion that its silence has
produced, the Supreme Court should not wait another five de-
cades before addressing the cost barriers erected by public forum
permit fees.
B. Restricting Use of the Forum: Examples of
Permissible and Impermissible Time, Place,
and Manner Regulation
Under the First Amendment, restricting what a speaker
may say is qualitatively different than restricting how, when,
321. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
322. See Goldberger, supra note 271, at 411 & n.43. For example, a federal district court
struck down a license fee remarkably similar to the one invalidated in Murdock: a flat fee,
imposed under a peddler's licensing scheme and exacted as a precondition to the sidewalk sale
of "street" newspapers by the homeless and the Nation of Islam. Northeast Ohio Coalition for
the Homeless v. City of Cleveland, 885 F. Supp. 1029, 1030-31, 1034 (N.D. Ohio 1995), revd,
105 F.3d 1107 (6th Cir. 1997). On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held that the very same fee was
valid. See Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless v. City of Cleveland, 105 F.3d 1107 (6th
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 931 (1997). Likewise, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
upheld a $25-per-day sound truck permit fee and placed the burden of proving unreasonableness
on the party challenging the fee. See Commonwealth v. Winfree, 182 A.2d 698 (Pa. 1962). But
a different court held that an identical fee was invalid and placed the burden of proving reason-
ableness on the city. See NAACP v. City of Chester, 253 F. Supp. 707 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
323. Compare Stonewall Union v. City of Columbus, 931 F.2d 1130, 1136-37 (6th Cir.)
(holding that a parade permit ordinance was not constitutionally invalid for failing to provide an
indigency exception, since the public sidewalks remained a free and entirely acceptable alterna-
tive forum for "indigent paraders"), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 899 (1991), with Central Fla. Nuclear
Freeze Campaign v. Walsh, 774 F.2d 1515, 1523-24 (1 th Cir. 1985) (striking down a permit
fee ordinance governing demonstrations in city streets and parks, in part because the scheme
lacked an indigency exception), and Invisible Empire Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of
W. Haven, 600 F. Supp. 1427, 1435 (D. Conn. 1985) (granting injunctive relief to the KKK in
its facial challenge to an ordinance restricting expressive activity in public parks and striking
down the permit scheme, inter alia, for failure to include an indigency exception).
324. Coalition for the Homeless, 105 F.3d at I 110-1111 (upholding a $50-per-vendor
license fee against indigent vendors of homeless and Nation of Islam "street" newspapers, even
in the face of the district court's finding, 885 F. Supp. at 1034, that it was an undisputed fact that
the plaintiffs could not afford to pay the fee), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 931 (1997).
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or where she may say it. 25 Legislation targeting the use of a
forum-governing the time, place, or manner of expressive
activity-is subject to less exacting scrutiny than controls on
expressive content. 2 ' Unlike the strict scrutiny reserved for
content-based restrictions,3 27 an intermediate test is used for
time, place, and manner regulations, 28 Under this test, the
regulation must be "'justified without reference to the content
of the regulated speech,"' must be "'narrowly tailored to serve
a significant governmental interest,"' and must "'leave open
ample alternative channels for communicati [ng]' the message.329
As we have already shown, 330 these three requirements
are not as stringent as their language might suggest. The stan-
dard for content neutrality will be satisfied even where the
regulation burdens some speakers or messages more than
others. 33' The test for narrow tailoring is even more relaxed;
the government need only show that its regulation promotes
a substantial state interest "'that would be achieved less effec-
tively absent the regulation.' 3 2 The "ample alternative chan-
nels" requirement, though sometimes vigorously applied, 333
usually turns on whether the speaker is effectively thwarted
in reaching her audience. 34
Given the comparatively relaxed application of these stan-
325. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828-29 (1995).
326. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995).
327. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 761 (the government may regulate expressive content in a public
forum "only if such a restriction is necessary, and narrowly drawn, to serve a compelling state
interest").
328. See id.
329. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
330. See supra section lIE.
331. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (stating that "[a] regulation that serves purposes unrelated to
the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers
or messages but not others") (citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-48
(1986)).
332. Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
333. See, e.g., Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 698 (2d Cir. 1996); Bay Area Peace
Navy v. United States, 914 F.2d 1224, 1229 (9th Cir. 1990); Students Against Apartheid Coali-
tion v. O'Neil, 660 F. Supp. 333, 339-40 (W.D. Va. 1987); Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Move-
ment, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 419 F. Supp. 667, 673-74 (N.D. I11. 1976).
334. See Bay Area Peace Navy, 914 F.2d at 1229.
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dards, it is not surprising that courts have upheld a broad range
of legislative restrictions on the time, place, and manner of
public forum speech: restricting the time33 and location 33 6 of
parades; the site337 and number of participants 38 in demonstra-
tions; the use of public sidewalks; 3 9 the decibel level of
speeches, 340 sound trucks,3 4' and band shells;342 and the size,
343
335. See, e.g., Nationalist Movement v. City of Cumming, 92 F.3d 1135, 1140 (1Ith Cir.
1996) (upholding an ordinance banning Saturday morning parades as a reasonable time, place,
and manner regulation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1058 (1997); Abernathy v. Conroy, 429 F.2d
1170, 1175 (4th Cir. 1970) (upholding an ordinance that limited parades to the hours between
8:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m.).
336. See, e.g., Hamer v. Musselwhite, 376 F.2d 479, 481 (5th Cir. 1967) (upholding an
ordinance banning parades on the four streets surrounding the city's courthouse square).
337. See, e.g., Hale v. Department of Energy, 806 F.2d 910,916-18 (9th Cir. 1986) (rejecting
a First Amendment challenge by nuclear weapons protesters to Energy Department regulations
governing demonstrations at the Nevada Nuclear Weapons Test Site, and upholding as reason-
able time, place, and manner restrictions precipitated by past abuses and trespasses by
demonstrators regulations limiting demonstrations to a designated parking and demonstration
area, and requiring a 30-day advance application for a permit, including the submission of any
leaflets or handbills to be distributed).
338. See, e.g., Blasecki v. City of Durham, 456 F.2d 87,94 (4th Cir.) (upholding an ordinance
that prohibited more than 50 people from assembling in a small downtown park), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 912 (1972); Davis v. Francois, 395 F.2d 730, 735 (5th Cir. 1968) (striking down an
ordinance that absolutely limited the number of picketers to two, regardless of the time, place,
or circumstances).
339. See, e.g., Roulette v. City of Seattle, 97 F.3d 300, 302-05 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a
First Amendment challenge brought by homeless advocates, street musicians, and other political
organizations, the Ninth Circuit here upheld a prohibition against sitting or lying on sidewalks
between 7:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m.); White House Vigil for the ERA Comm. v. Clark, 746 F.2d
1518, 1542 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (upholding as reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on
demonstrations taking place on the White House sidewalk regulations that, inter alia, restricted,
but did not prohibit, demonstrations within the "center zone" of the sidewalk); Friedrich v. City
of Chicago, 619 F. Supp. 1129, 1142-45 (N.D. Il1. 1985) (denying a First Amendment and Equal
Protection challenge by breakdancers and other street performers to a Chicago ordinance regulat-
ing sidewalk entertainment in which the court held, inter alia, that a provision banning street
performances during a narrow span of hours on Friday and Saturday nights in a narrow sector
of city's entertainment district did not violate the First Amendment rights of street performers,
since the ban applied only during periods when the area was most crowded and when performers,
especially breakdancers, had drawn crowds large enough to force pedestrians into the street).
340. See, e.g., Stokes v. City of Madison, 930 F.2d 1163, 1166 (7th Cir. 1991); Medlin v.
Palmer, 874 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1989). In Stokes, demonstrators protesting U.S. policy toward
El Salvador were arrested when they attempted to use sound amplification equipment to address
a rally without first having obtained the requisite permit for the use of such equipment; the court
upheld the sound amplification ordinance as a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction.
See Stokes, 930 F.2d at 1166-67. The ordinance, which governed speeches and demonstrations
for the State Street Mall/Capitol Concourse in Madison, Wisconsin, imposed a two-tier regula-
tory structure on the use of sound amplification: depending upon the time of day when the rally
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number, 344 construction,3 45 and placement3 46 of signs.
Time, place, and manner regulations have been invalidated
only where: (1) they targeted particular messages for suppres-
sion (and thereby violated the content neutrality requirement);147
(2) they imposed sweeping restrictions on valued forms of expres-
sive activity (and thereby violated the narrow tailoring require-
ment); 48 or (3) they seriously impaired a speaker's capacity
to reach her intended audience (and thereby violated the alterna-
was to be held, the applicant was required to secure either a $20.00 street use permit or an
electrical permit costing $5.00 plus 15 cents per hour. See Stokes, 930 F.2d at 1166-67. In
Medlin, the court upheld as a legitimate time, place, and manner regulation a noise ordinance
prohibiting the use of any hand-held amplifier within 150 feet of any abortion clinic or other
medical facility. See Medlin, 874 F.2d at 1091-92.
341. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77,88-89 (1949) (upholding an ordinance prohib-
iting the use on city streets of sound trucks emitting "loud and raucous" noises).
342. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 802 (1989) (rejecting a First
Amendment challenge by a rock concert promoter to New York City's use guidelines for its band
shell in Central Park; the guidelines, upheld as a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction,
were designed to limit the noise level of band shell concerts by requiring the performers to use
a sound system and a sound technician furnished by the city; the technician, while deferring to
the performers as to sound mix, retained sole control over sound volume).
343. See, e.g., White House Vigil, 746 F.2d at 1541 (upholding, as reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions on demonstrations taking place on the White House sidewalk, regulations
that limited, inter alia, the size of signs on the sidewalk).
344. See, e.g., Thomas v. United States, 696 F. Supp. 702, 705 (D.D.C. 1988) (rejecting a
vagueness challenge by anti-nuclear protesters to federal regulations governing protests in
Lafayette Park, and observing that the challenged provisions, restricting, inter alia, the number
of signs to be employed by protesters, were valid time, place, and manner restrictions).
345. See, e.g., White House Vigil, 746 F.2d at 1532-34 (upholding, inter alia, restrictions on
the construction of signs to be employed by protesters using the White House sidewalk).
346. See, e.g., City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 817
(1984) (denying a political candidate's challenge to an ordinance that banned the posting of
signs on public property and thus effectively proscribed the candidates practice of attaching
campaign signs to utility pole crosswires); United States v. Musser, 873 F.2d 1513, 1518-19
(D.C. Cir.) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a federal regulation prohibiting unattended
signs in Lafayette Park), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 983 (1989).
347. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321, 334 (1988) (striking down a District of
Columbia statute that criminalized the display of any sign criticizing aforeign government within
500 feet of its embassy, and holding that the statute's display clause was content-based because
its sole justification was "to protect the dignity of foreign diplomatic personnel by shielding them
from speech that is critical of their governments").
348. See, e.g., Henderson v. Lujan, 964 F.2d 1179, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (striking down for
lack of narrow tailoring a National Park Service regulation banning all leafletting on the side-
walks surrounding the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, where the sidewalks, even at their closest,
were more than 100 feet from the Memorial's wall).
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tive channels requirement).349
C. Restricting the Speaker's Message: The
Many Guises of Content-Based Regulation
Where legislation is employed to restrict the content of
public forum speech, the government acts in one of two ways:
(1) directly restricting expressive content by targeting particular
topics or viewpoints; or (2) restricting content indirectly by
punishing a speaker for the reaction produced by a controversial
message. In either context, a court will subject the restriction
to heightened scrutiny. The reason for distinguishing between
direct and indirect restrictions on speech is that each context
has given birth to distinct bodies of precedent.
1. Regulating Content Directly: Restricting
Political Expression, Flag Desecration, and
Other Topics or Perspectives
Direct regulation of expressive content is presumptively
unconstitutional. 30  Examples of direct regulation include:
(1) statutes prohibiting the expression of certain
political views: criticizing a foreign government near
349. See, e.g., Students Against Apartheid Coalition v. O'Neil, 660 F. Supp. 333, 339-40
(W.D. Va. 1987) (granting injunctive relief to student protesters who challenged a university's
lawn-use regulations, under which they had been barred from erecting symbolic shanties to
protest South African apartheid and to urge the university's governing body to adopt a divest-
ment policy toward South Africa and holding that the alternative channels of communication
offered by the university-erecting the shanties "beyond earshot or clear sight of the
Rotunda"-were constitutionally inadequate because they thwarted students' ability to reach
their intended audience: the university's governing body, which met on campus only four times
a year and gathered only in the Rotunda).
350. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S 819, 828
(1995); accord Turner Broad. Sys., Inc' v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994). "It is axiomatic,"
the Supreme Court has stressed, "that the government may not regulate speech based on its
substantive content or the message it conveys." Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828; accord Police
Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,96 (1972). "If there is a bedrock principle underlying
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
414(1989). To survive judicial review, a content-based restriction on public forum speech must
satisfy strict scrutiny; it will be struck down unless shown to be "necessary, and narrowly drawn,
to serve a compelling state interest." Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515
U.S. 753, 761 (1995).
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its embassy,"5' soliciting votes near a polling place,352
expressing opposition to organized government,353
advocating illegal conduct to achieve political
reform,354 calling for the government's overthrow,355
351. See, e.g., Boos, 485 U.S. at 318-19 (striking down a District of Columbia statute that
criminalized the display of any sign criticizing a foreign government within 500 feet of its
embassy and holding that the provision is a content-based restriction on political speech in a
traditional public forum).
352. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992). In a rare example of a con-
tent-based restriction on public forum speech surviving strict scrutiny, the Court upheld a
Tennessee statute prohibiting the solicitation of votes and the display or distribution of campaign
materials within 100 feet of a polling place entrance, concluding that this restriction was nar-
rowly tailored to serve the compelling state interest in preventing voter intimidation and election
fraud. See id. Justice Scalia, in his concurrence, asserted that strict scrutiny was not the appro-
priate standard here; the statute should have been sustained as a viewpoint-neutral regulation
of a non-public forum: "Because restrictions on speech around polling places on election day
are as venerable a part of the American tradition as the secret ballot, [the challenged statute] does
not restrict speech in a traditional public forum, and the 'exacting scrutiny' that the plurality
purports to apply is inappropriate." Id. at 214 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
353. See, e.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359,369-70 (1931) (overturning the convic-
tion of a Youth Communist League member by striking down statute that criminalized the
display of any "red flag, banner, or badge [employed] as a sign, symbol, or emblem of opposition
to organized government").
354. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,449 (1969); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353 (1937) (invoking the First Amendment to reverse a criminal syndicalism conviction of a
defendant who had merely assisted in the conduct of a public meeting held under the auspices
of the Communist Party); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 387 (1927) (reversing a criminal
syndicalism conviction for insufficiency of evidence where the defendant, found merely in
possession of the preamble to the constitution of the Industrial Workers of the World, was
prosecuted for membership in and allegedly organizing activities for the organization that
advocated "class struggle"); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (sustaining the
criminal syndicalism conviction of a woman who merely attended the convention of, and sought
to help organize, a new political party, the California branch of the Communist Labor Party).
In Brandenburg, the Court struck down Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Act and set aside a Ku
Klux Klansman's conviction thereunder because the Act punished the mere advocacy of using
violence to achieve political change. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449. The Court held that
the First Amendment forbids criminalizing subversive advocacy "except where such advocacy
is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action." Id. at 447. The Supreme Court also overruled a case that had upheld a criminal
syndicalism statute featuring language very similar to Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Act. See id.
at 449 (overruling Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927)).
355. See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229-30 (1961) (limiting further the
Smith Act by precluding prosecution for mere membership in the Communist Party, requiring
instead some "active," "knowing" participation in illegal ends); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S.
298, 318-19 (1957) (undercutting sharply the Dennis decision and effectively halting further
prosecutions under the Smith Act by stressing that, consistent with the First Amendment, a
subversive advocacy conviction cannot be based on speech that urges followers merely to believe
something; it must urge them to do something, to take some specific, concrete action); Dennis
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or urging obstruction of the government's war
effort;35
6
(2) statutes governing treatment of the American flag:
affirmatively requiring its display,357 or punishing its
misuse,35 alteration,359 or desecration;360 and
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516 (1951) (sustaining convictions of the national leaders of the
Communist Party by upholding the constitutionality of the Smith Act, which criminalized
conspiring to advocate the government's overthrow); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672
(1925) (sustaining the defendant's criminal anarchy conviction for printing and circulating a
leaflet, entitled "The Left Wing Manifesto," that called for "revolutionary mass action").
356. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,624 (1919) (upholding the Espionage
Act convictions of several defendants who, in opposition to U.S. military intervention against
the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, printed and distributed on the streets of New York City
certain leaflets urging that production of ordnance and ammunition for the war effort be cur-
tailed); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216-17 (1919) (upholding an Espionage Act
conviction and I 0-yearjail sentence based on the anti-war sentiments expressed by a defendant
in a public speech; though the defendant's remarks did not directly oppose U.S. involvement in
World War I, he expressed a general abhorrence of war and praised individuals who had resisted
or obstructed the draft); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 210 (1919) (sustaining Espio-
nage Act conviction for preparing and publishing anti-war articles in Missouri's
German-language newspaper); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,52-53 (1919) (upholding
an Espionage Act conviction of the Socialist Party General Secretary who, in opposition to U.S.
intervention in World War I, mailed to draft-aged men leaflets that urged resistance to the draft,
denounced conscription, and impugned the motives of those backing the war effort).
357. See, e.g., Cobb v. Beame, 402 F. Supp. 19, 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (enjoining the enforce-
ment of an ordinance that required the display of an American flag at all assemblies and parades
in an action brought by U.S. Labor Party officials after they were arrested at party rallies for
failure to have an American flag on display).
358. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,408,414 (1974) (involving a successful
as-applied challenge to a flag misuse statute under which the defendant college student was
prosecuted for displaying from his apartment window an American flag, hung upside down, with
a peace symbol attached, in order to protest U.S. intervention in Cambodia and the killing of
students at Kent State); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 568, 582 (1974) (striking down as void
for vagueness a flag misuse statute that criminalized publicly treating the American flag con-
temptuously, since the statute offered no basis for determining what sort of conduct fell within
its prohibition, and thereby left police, courts, and juries free to enforce it under their own
preferences for treatment of the flag).
359. See, e.g., Long Island Vietnam Moratorium Comm. v. Cahn, 437 F.2d 344,345-46,350
(2d Cir. 1970) (striking down a New York flag-alteration statute used by local prosecutors to
discourage the dissemination of a defendants' buttons and decals, which superimposed a peace
sign on the American flag), affd mem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974).
360. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 312, 319 (1990) (invoking strict
scrutiny to strike down the Flag Protection Act, a federal statute that criminalized the desecration
of American flags); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,420 (1989) (holding that, in striking down
a Texas flag desecration statute, the defendant's act of burning an American flag during a protest
rally against President Reagan was expressive conduct within the First Amendment's protection,
and that neither ofthe state's asserted interests-preventing breaches ofthe peace and preserving
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(3) statutes targeting particular types or topics of
speech: fightingwords,361 hate speech,362 anonymous
the flag as a symbol of national unity-could justify criminalizing the defendant's conduct);
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576,579 (1969) (overturning a conviction under New York's flag
desecration statute because, due to the statute's language, the defendant's conviction may have
been based solely or partly on the words he uttered-where he publicly burned an American flag
when he learned that civil rights leader James Meredith had been shot, declaring: "We don't
need no damn flag... [i]f they let that happen to Meredith, we don't need an American flag.");
Monroe v. State Court of Fulton County, 739 F.2d 568, 570, 576 (11 th Cir. 1984) (anticipating
Texas v. Johnson, this court held that Georgia's flag desecration statute was unconstitutional as
applied to a flag-burner who was protesting U.S. intervention in Iranian affairs); United States
v. Crosson, 462 F.2d 96, 98, 104 (9th Cir.) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a federal
flag desecration statute, and upholding defendant's conviction thereunder, where defendant had
burned a flag to protest U.S. military intervention in Vietnam), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Joyce v. United States, 454 F.2d 971, 977-79, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (affirming defen-
dant's conviction, under a federal flag desecration statute, for tearing up an American flag while
standing along the route of Nixon's first inaugural parade), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 969 (1972);
see also Ohio v. Lessin, 620 N.E.2d 72, 73-74, 79 (1993) (holding that an inciting-to-violence
conviction could not rest on angry crowd reaction to a flag-burner's provocative expression,
thereby overturning the conviction of a Revolutionary Communist Workers' Party member who
had burned an American flag on Cleveland's Public Square to protest the decision by President
George Bush to send troops to Persian Gulf); cf United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
369-70, 386 (1968) (rejecting a First Amendment defense to a conviction for burning draft card;
holding that the Constitution does not bar the government from regulating conduct, even conduct
with expressive qualities, if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of ideas).
361. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,571-72 (1942) (recognizing, as
a category of unprotected speech, those "fighting words" that "by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace," and upholding the defendant's
conviction under a statute that, saved by the narrowing construction of state courts, punished no
more than "fighting words," where the defendant called the city marshal "a God damned racke-
teer" and "a damned Fascist"); cf Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 518-19, 528 (1972) (strik-
ing down, on vagueness and overbreadth grounds, a Georgia statute criminalizing the use of
"opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace," where Georgia
courts had not issued a narrowing construction of the statute limiting its scope to "fighting
words").
362. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d
1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
In R.A. V., the Court struck down an ordinance that, in criminalizing "bias-motivated disor-
derly conduct," singled out for punishment the public display of symbols or graffiti "arous[ing]
anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender."
R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 380, 396. The Court held that the ordinance was fatally flawed because, in
singling out for criminal punishment a particularized list of hateful sentiments and leaving all
others unregulated, it effectuates a form of content-based--and arguably view-
point-based--discrimination. See id. at 391-94.
In Collin, the Seventh Circuit declared an array of ordinances prohibiting Nazi marches
unconstitutional. See Collin, 578 F.2d at 1210. Additionally, as an impermissible content-based
restriction on speech and, separately, on overbreadth grounds, the court struck down a prohibi-
tion against disseminating materials that would promote hatred toward persons on the basis of
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speech, 63 political speech,36 4 labor speech, 65 or
threats upon the President's life.366
2. Regulating Content Directly: The Special
Test for Restrictions on Illegal Advocacy
Within this realm of direct content-based regulation, certain
categories of speech do not enjoy full First Amendment protec-
tion.367 Critical to the study of public protest is the particular
their heritage. See Collin, 578 F.2d at 1202-07.
363. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 337-40, 357 (1995)
(striking down Ohio's prohibition against the distribution of anonymous campaign literature);
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 60-61, 65 (1960) (striking down an absolute ban on the
distribution of anonymous leaflets).
364. See, e.g., Aiona v. Pai, 516 F.2d 892, 893 (9th Cir. 1975) (striking down a statute that
banned the sidewalk use of political signs but did not ban signs bearing other messages).
365. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460-61 (1980) (striking down, as a content-
based restriction on public forum speech, a statute that banned the picketing of residences or
dwellings but exempted from its prohibition the picketing of any place of employment involved
in a labor dispute, where the lawsuit stemmed from the plaintiffs' arrest under the statute for
protesting the racial integration policies of Chicago's mayor by picketing on the sidewalk before
his home). In Carey, the Court stated that
[o]n its face, the Act accords preferential treatment to the expression of views on one particular
subject; information about labor disputes may be freely disseminated, but discussion of all other
issues is restricted. The permissibility of residential picketing under the [Act] is thus dependent
solely on the nature of the message being conveyed.
Id. at 460-61; see also Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 92-94, 102 (1972)
(striking down, as a content-based restriction on public forum speech, an ordinance that prohib-
ited all picketing within 150 feet of a school, except for picketing of any school involved in a
labor dispute); People Acting Through Community Effort v. Doorley, 468 F.2d 1143, 1143-44,
1146 (1 st Cir. 1972) (striking down an ordinance that banned residential picketing but permitted
labor picketing); Davis v. Village of Newburgh Heights, 642 F. Supp. 413,413-414, 415 (N.D.
Ohio 1986) (holding that an ordinance regulating picketing, which applied only to labor picket-
ing, violated the Equal Protection Clause).
366. See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706 (1969) (holding that an anti-war
activist could not be punished for saying, "If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want
to get in my sights is L.B.J.").
367. The Supreme Court employs a two-tiered "categorical" approach to direct restrictions
on expressive content, and will strike down such restrictions as presumptively unconstitutional
unless the regulated utterance belongs to a category of speech defined in advance as being
unworthy of full protection. See R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 383. These "low level" categories of speech
are denied full First Amendment protection because they are "no essential part of any exposition
of ideas," and are of only "slight social value as a step to truth." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). There are seven categories of "low level" speech. Some are
utterly unprotected by the First Amendment, while others are less than fully protected. The
unprotected categories are: (I)'Advocacy of Imminent Lawless Action; (2) Obscenity; (3) Child
Pornography; and (4) Fighting Words. The less than fully protected categories are: (I) Defama-
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ized test that applies to a category of speech known as subversive
advocacy-i.e., the advocacy of illegal conduct.
Throughout much of the 20th century, this category was
so broadly conceived that dissident political speech fell within
its ambit. It was used to criminalize anti-war speech during
World War I,68 protests against U.S. military intervention in
the Bolshevik Revolution,3 69 abstract calls for revolutionary
mass action,3 70 and mere membership in the Communist Party.
3 71
Gradually-through the influence of Justices Louis Brandeis 37
2
and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.373-the scope of this category
was narrowed, such that it came to embrace only imminent,
tory Statements; (2) Commercial Speech; and (3) the Lewd/Profane/Indecent. Speech that falls
within an unprotected category is generally vulnerable to content-based regulation. But con-
tent-based restrictions are not necessarily valid when applied to the less than fully protected
categories; such restrictions are gauged under the particular form of intermediate scrutiny devel-
oped for each category.
368. See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216-17 (1919) (upholding an Espionage Act
conviction and ten-year jail sentence based on the anti-war sentiments expressed by the defen-
dant, a national leader of the Socialist Party, during a public speech); Frohwerk v. United States,
249 U.S. 204, 210 (1919)(sustaining an Espionage Act conviction and a ten-year jail sentence
for preparing and publishing anti-war articles in Missouri's German-language newspaper);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. at 52-53 (upholding an Espionage Act conviction of the
Socialist Party General Secretary who, in opposition to World War I, mailed to draft-age men
certain leaflets urging resistance to the draft, denouncing conscription, and impugning the
motives of those backing the war effort).
369. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,616-18,624 (1919) (sustaining the Sedition
Act convictions of five defendants who distributed leaflets on the streets of New York City
opposing U.S. military intervention in Russia to help overthrow the Bolshevik Revolution; the
leaflets denounced the intervention, advocated solidarity with the Russian workers, and urged
curtailment of the production of ordnance and ammunition to be used in the incursion).
370. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 655 (1925) (sustaining the conviction of the
defendant, a founder of the American Communist Party, under New York's criminal anarchy
law, for writing and disseminating a pamphlet, "The Left Wing Manifesto," that advocated
revolution in the abstract, stressing the need for "revolutionary mass action," but fell short of
urging any specific, immediate illegal action).
371. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,372 (1927), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (sustaining the California Criminal Syndicalism Act conviction of a woman
who merely attended the convention of, and sought to help organize, a new California branch
of the Communist Labor Party).
372. See, e.g., Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (stressing that advocacy
of illegal contduct cannot be criminalized unless the harm it poses is both imminent and serious).
373. See, e.g., Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630-31 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating that advocacy of
illegal conduct may be legitimately suppressed only where it "imminently threaten[s]" the public,
and only where it creates an "emergency that makes it immediately dangerous to leave the
correction of evil counsels to time").
483
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and not merely theoretical, calls for illegal action.374
The prevailing test is contained in Brandenburg v. Ohio,375
which permits punishment only for incitement that is both
intended and likely to produce "imminent lawless action. " s76
Under this standard, the Supreme Court has held that a campus
anti-war protester who joined other demonstrators in blocking
a street could not be punished for declaring, after police dis-
persed the crowd, "We'll take the fucking street later,"3 77 and
that the First Amendment likewise protected the statements
of a civil rights activist who, in a speech urging adherence to
an NAACP boycott, asserted: "If we catch any of you going in
any of them racist stores, we're gonna break your damn neck." 78
In the latter case, the Court held that the boycotter's speech,
however charged with emotion, did not transcend the bounds
of Brandenburg because it did not call for imminent lawless
action. 79 Mere advocacy of illegal conduct down the road is
not enough.80
3. Regulating Content Indirectly: The "Hostile
Audience" Cases
The government regulates content indirectly by punishing
an unpopular speaker for the reaction to his message. This
indirect regulation of expressive content is usually accomplished
374. See Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961) (reversing a conviction for
membership in the Communist Party where the evidence did not establish that the Party had
engaged in illegal advocacy, and stating that "the mere abstract teaching... of the moral propri-
ety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a
group for violent action and steeling it to such action").
375. 395 U.S. 444(1969). In Brandenburg, the Court struck down Ohio's Criminal Syndical-
ism Act, and set aside a Ku Klux Klansman's conviction thereunder, because the Act punished
the mere advocacy of using violence to achieve political change. See id. at 449. The Klansman
was convicted principally on the basis of a speech in which he asserted: "We're not a revengent
organization, but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the
white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there might have to be some revengeance taken." See
id. at 446.
376. Id. at 447. This test supersedes the "clear and present danger" test first adopted in
Schenck. -
377. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 106-07 (1973).
378. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 902 (1982).
379. See id. at 928.
380. See id. at 929.
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by enforcing general prohibitions against undesirable
conduct38 1-statutes proscribing breach of the peace,382 disorderly
381. Though indirect regulation of expressive content is usually effected by means of disor-
derly conduct or breach of the peace statutes, a new variation features the use of public accom-
modations laws. For example, in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group,
515 U.S. 557 (1995), the Court held that Massachusetts could not invoke its public accommoda-
tions laws to force private organizers of the St. Patrick's Day Parade to include a contingent of
Irish gays and lesbians who would impart a message that the organizers did not wish to convey;
compelling the inclusion of this group effectively altered the expressive content of the organiz-
ers' parade, thereby violating the First Amendment. See id. at 573.
Similarly, in City ofClevelandv. Nation ofIslam, 922 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ohio 1995), Minister
Louis Farrakhan, gearing up for his Million Man March, sought to lease the Cleveland Conven-
tion Center for a "men only" meeting but city officials refused. See id. at 56. The court, issuing
declaratory and injunctive relief thereby granting Farrakhan the access he sought, held that the
city, which had twice granted the Billy Graham Crusade single-gender access to the very same
facility, could not withhold comparable access to Farrakhan. See id. at 58. Furthermore, the city
could not invoke public accommodations laws to force Farrakhan to admit females, since doing
so would effectively alter the content and character of his speech, given the Nation of Islam's
60-year religious tradition of holding separate men-only and women-only sermons. See id. at
59.
In New York County Board of Ancient Order of Hibernians v. Dinkins, 814 F. Supp. 358
(S.D.N.Y. 1993), a private sponsor of a St. Patrick's Day Parade refused to allow a gay and
lesbian organization to march in the parade under its own banner. See id. at 362. The New York
City Human Rights Commission intervened and, concluding that the parade was a public accom-
modation, ruled that the sponsor had violated the city's human rights ordinance by excluding the
gay and lesbian group. See id. at 362-63. When the city ordered the sponsor to admit the group
as a precondition to securing its parade permit, the sponsor sought and received injunctive relief
from the district court judge, who ruled that the city's order was a content-based alteration of
the sponsor's message and thus offended the First Amendment. See id. at 365.
382. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (striking down on vagueness and
overbreadth grounds a Georgia statute criminalizing the use of "opprobrious words or abusive
language, tending to cause a breach of the peace," where Georgia courts had not issued a narrow-
ing construction of the statute limiting its scope to "fighting words").
In Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), the Court held that the First Amendment pre-
cluded the defendant's breach-of-the-peace conviction for walking through a courthouse
corridor wearing ajacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft." See id. at 22-23. The defendant's
choice of words could be punished "[n]either upon the theory ... that its use is inherently likely
to cause violent reaction [n]or upon a more general assertion that the States, acting as guardians
of public morality, may properly remove this offensive word from the public vocabulary." Id.
at 22-23. "Surely the State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is gram-
matically palatable to the most squeamish among us.... [O]ne man's vulgarity is another's
lyric." Id. at 25.
In Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966), the Court set aside breach-of-the-peace convic-
tions of civil rights protesters who staged a sit-in at a racially segregated public library, where
their convictions rested upon the same Louisiana statute earlier invalidated in Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536 (1965), since, in the intervening period, the statute had received neither a limiting
construction nor a legislative revision. See id. at 133. "Participants in an orderly demonstration
in a public place are not chargeable with the danger, unprovoked except by the fact of the consti-
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conduct,"'3 disturbing a lawful meeting,8 4 or "annoying"
tutionally protected demonstration itself, that their critics might react with disorder or violence."
Brown, 383 U.S. at 133 n.I.
In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. at 551, the Court set aside a breach-of-the-peace conviction
of a civil rights activist who led a peaceful march by 2000 students to the courthouse where, with
songs, prayers, and speeches, they protested the arrest and incarceration of fellow activists, who
were being held in the adjacentjail. Louisiana's breach-of-the-peace statute was struck down
on overbreadth ground because it "would allow persons to be punished merely for peacefully
expressing unpopular views." Id. "[T]he 'compelling answer ... is that constitutional rights
may not be denied simply because of hostility to their assertion or exercise."' Id. (quoting
Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 535 (1963)).
In Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963), the Court set aside breach-of-the-peace
convictions of 187 civil rights protesters who, after marching peacefully on a sidewalk around
State House grounds, refused a police order to disperse and, after 15 minutes of singing and
speechmaking, were arrested. See id. at 237. The state cannot criminalize "the peaceful expres-
sion of unpopular views." Id.
In Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), the Court reversed a breach-of-the-
peace conviction of a Christian Veterans of America member who made an anti-Semitic and
racially inflammatory speech in an auditorium packed with 800 supporters, while outside, a
crowd of 1000 "angry and turbulent" protesters, deeply hostile to the speaker, strained against
a cordon of police. Id. at 16. As construed by the trial court, the breach-of-the-peace ordinance
"permitted conviction of petitioner if his speech stirred people to anger, invited public dispute,
or brought about a condition of unrest. A conviction resting on any of those grounds may not
stand." Id. at 5.
In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), the Court set aside a breach-of-the-peace
conviction of the defendant, a Jehovah's Witness, who, in the course of his side-walk proselytiz-
ing, incensed passers-by by playing a phonograph record that expressed virulently anti-Catholic
sentiments. See id. at 303. The defendant, whose conduct was neither truculent nor abusive,
could not be convicted for breach of the peace based on the hostile reaction of his audience. See
id. at 310-11.
383. For example, in Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973), the Court held that a campus
anti-war protester who joined other demonstrators in blocking a street could not be punished for
declaring, after police dispersed the crowd, "We'll take the fucking street later." Id. at 107. In
approving the First Amendment defense to a protester's disorderly conduct conviction, the
Court, invoking Brandenburg v. Ohio, held that states may not punish words that amount merely
to advocacy of illegal conduct at some indefinite future time. See id. at 108-09.
In Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564 (1970), the Court set aside the disorderly conduct
convictions of anti-war protesters who inspired a hostile reaction among approximately 100
onlookers while demonstrating at an Army recruiting station, where, due to the trial court's
refusal to issue properjury instructions, the defendants' convictions may have been based solely
on their expression of unpopular views. See id. at 565. "[I]t is firmly settled that under our
Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are
themselves offensive to some of their hearers, or simply because bystanders object to peaceful
and orderly demonstrations." Id. at 567 (quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)
(citations omitted).
In Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969), the Court overturned the disorderly
conduct convictions of civil rights protesters whose march to and picketing before a mayor's
residence produced a hostile reaction by onlookers. See id. at 111-12. The Court held that the
First Amendment barred protesters' convictions where, even though pelted with rocks and eggs,
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pedestrians38 5-as a means of punishing controversial speech.
This line of precedent substantially restricts the govern-
ment's power to punish a speaker for the public disorder pro-
duced by a controversial message. A seminal case in this area
is Terminiello v. City of Chicago,386 where the Supreme Court
they remained peaceful throughout their demonstration and were arrested only after refusing a
police dispersal demand prompted solely by the onlookers' unruliness. See Gregory, 394 U.S.
at 111-12.
In Original Fayette County Civic & Welfare League, Inc. v. Ellington, 309 F. Supp. 89 (W.D.
Tenn. 1970), the district court sustained an overbreadth challenge by civil rights marchers to
Tennessee's disorderly conduct statute, which "limit[ed] the... freedom of speech to language
that is not rude, boisterous, offensive.., or blasphemous."' Id. at 92.
384. In In re Kay, 464 P.2d 142 (Cal. 1970), the California Supreme Courtaddressed the First
Amendment right to heckle by invoking the First Amendment to impose a narrowing construc-
tion upon California's disturbing-a-lawful-meeting statute, thereby overturning the convictions
of farmworkers who registered their disapproval of a congressman's labor policy by "engaging
in rhythmical clapping and shouting for five to ten minutes" during his campaign speech in a city
park. Id. at 145. The court stated that
[udicially-recognized limits on free expression do] not mean, however, that the state can grant to
the police a roving commission to enforce Robert's Rules of Order, since other First Amendment
interests are likewise at stake.
Audience activities, such as heckling, interrupting, harsh questioning, and booing, even though
they may be impolite and discourteous, can nonetheless advance the goals of the First Amendment.
... An unfavorable reception, such as that given Congressman Tunney in the instant case, represents
one important method by which an officeholder's constituents can register disapproval of his
conduct and seek redress of grievances. The First Amendment contemplates a debate of important
public issues; its protection can hardly be narrowed to the meeting at which the audience must
passively listen to a single point of view. The First Amendment does not merely insure a market-
place of ideas in which there is but one seller.
Id. at 147.
In Iowa v. Hardin, 498 N.W.2d 677 (Iowa 1993), the Iowa Supreme Court upheld a disorderly
conduct conviction of a heckler who intentionally disrupted a speech by President George Bush
during a Republican fundraising rally. See id. at 681. In distinguishing In re Kay, the court
observed that the defendant's disruptive behavior occurred in an auditorium filled with persons
who had paid for the opportunity to hear the President's speech, that the disruption effectively
halted the program, and that the defendant was removed and arrested only after twice being
asked to cease his heckling. See id.
In City of Spokane v. McDonough, 485 P.2d 449 (Wash. 1971) the Washington Supreme
Court held that a disorderly conduct ordinance could not be enforced to punish an attendee at
an outdoor rally who shouted "warmonger" at Vice Presidential candidate Spiro T. Agnew and,
flashing a peace sign at him, yelled: "What the hell do you think this means?" Id. at 449. See
generally Eve H. Lewin Wagner, Note, Heckling: A Protected Right or Disorderly Conduct?,
60 S. CAL. L. REv. 215 (1986) (collecting cases and proposing an analytical standard).
385. See, e.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611,611,615 (1971) (striking down an
ordinance that prohibited sidewalk meetings by three or more people conducted "in a manner
annoying to persons passing by" and holding that "public intolerance or animosity" cannot be
the basis for abridging the rights of free assembly and association).
386. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
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reversed a breach-of-the-peace conviction of a widely vilified
speaker whose anti-Semitic and racially inflammatory speech
produced a near riot. Calling his antagonists "slimy scum,"
"snakes," and "bedbugs,"3" 7 the defendant delivered a venomous
speech to an auditorium packed with 800 supporters,3'" while
outside, straining against a cordon of police, "a surging, howling
mob" of 1000 people "hurl [ed] epithets at those who would enter
and tried to tear their clothes off."8 9 At trial, the defendant's
conviction followed ajury instruction that authorized punish-
ment for speech that "stirs the public to anger, invites dispute,
brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance."3 90
The Court held that this instruction violated the First Amend-
ment:
[A] function of free speech under our system of
government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve
its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest,
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even
stirs people to anger .... That is why freedom of speech,
though not absolute, is nevertheless protected against
censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce
a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil
that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or
unrest.39'
Two years later, in an apparent retreat from Terminiello,
the Supreme Court decided Feiner v. New York,392 which upheld
387. See Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 26.
388. Id. at 3.
389. Id. at 16.
390. Id. at 3.
391. Id. 337 U.S. at 4 (citations omitted).
392. 340 U.S. 315 (1951). Feiner involved a college student who, standing atop a soapbox
and using a loudspeaker, gave a streetcomer speech to a crowd of 80 people in which his deroga-
tory remarks about President Truman, the American Legion, the Mayor of Syracuse, and other
local officials inspired a hostile audience reaction. See id. at 316-17. The Court held that the
students' subsequent arrest and conviction could be sustained based on the trial court's findings
that the defendant encouraged his audience to become racially divided into hostile camps, that
the gathering crowd was interfering with traffic, and that the defendant repeatedly refused police
requests to cease talking. See id. at 320-21. In his dissent, Justice Black stated that "[i]t is
neither unusual nor unexpected that some people at public street meetings mutter, mill about,
push, shove, or disagree, even violently, with the speaker. Indeed, it is rare where controversial
topics are discussed that an outdoor crowd does not do some or all of these things." Id. at
488 [Vol. 45
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the disorderly conduct conviction of a college student whose
streetcorner harangue produced racial friction among eighty
onlookers."' 3 But the Court's subsequent decisions-in Edwards
v. South Carolina, 194 Cox v. Louisiana,9 5 and Gregory v. City
of Chicago3 96-have reinforced the vitality of Terminiello, over-
turning the convictions of equally unpopular speakers who
prompted equally hostile reactions by equally sizable crowds.
Feiner's contrary result is attributable to one crucial fact
that sets it apart from the other cases: the speaker encouraged
his audience to become racially divided into hostile camps397-in
other words, he engaged in a mischievous, bad faith effort to
produce violent clashes among his listeners. From a First
Amendment perspective, such behavior is fundamentally differ-
ent from the expression of provocative ideas-different, even,
from the use of exaggeration or vilification in pressing one's
325-26 (Black, J., dissenting.)
393. See Feiner, 340 U.S. at 320-21.
394. 372 U.S. 229 (1963). In Edwards, the Court set aside the breach-of-the--peace convic-
tions of 187 civil rights protesters who, after marching peacefully on a sidewalk around State
House grounds, refused a police order to disperse and, after 15 minutes of singing and
speechmaking, were arrested. See id. at 233. This demonstration, in which the marchers carried
placards reading "Down with segregation," "I am proud to be a Negro," and similar messages,
produced a tense crowd of 200 to 300 onlookers. Id. at 231. The Court held that the state cannot
criminalize "the peaceful expression of unpopular views." Id. at 237.
395. 379 U.S. 536 (1965). In Cox, the Court set aside the breach-of-the--peace conviction
of a civil rights activist who led a peaceful march by 2000 students to a courthouse where, with
songs, prayers, and speeches, they protested the arrest and incarceration of fellow activists who
were being held in the adjacent jail. See id. at 539-40. When the defendant urged his followers
to proceed to the racially segregated lunch counters of nearby establishments, this produced
some "muttering" and "grumbling" among the 100 to 300 white onlookers positioned across the
street. See id. at 543. The demonstration ended in chaos when the defendant refused a police
dispersal order and the officers responded by firing tear gas into the crowd. See id. at 55 1. The
Court struck down, on overbreadth grounds, Louisiana's breach-of-the-peace statute, which,
"as authoritatively interpreted by" the state supreme court, "would allow persons to be punished
merely for peacefully expressing unpopular views." Id. The Court added that "the 'compelling
answer... is that constitutional rights may not be denied simply because of hostility to their
assertion or exercise."' Id. (quoting Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 535 (1963)).
396. 394 U.S. 111 (1969) (overturning the disorderly conduct convictions of 85 civil rights
protesters whose march to and picketing before the mayor's residence produced a hostile reaction
by 1000 onlookers, and holding that the First Amendment barred the protesters' convictions
where, pelted by rocks and eggs, they remained peaceful throughout their demonstration and
were arrested only after refusing a police dispersal demand prompted solely by the onlookers'
unruliness).
397. See Feiner, 340 U.S. at 317.
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beliefs. As the Supreme Court observed in Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut: 398
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political
belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of
one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To
persuade others to his own point of view, the pleader, as
we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification
of men who have been, or are, prominent in church or
state, and even to false statement. But the people of this
nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite
of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties
are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and
right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy.399
The underlying rationale of the hostile audience cases is
to prevent a "heckler's veto" of minority opinions."' The idea
is to give minority viewpoints a chance to enter the marketplace
of ideas and gain adherents.4"' This principle is traceable to
398. 310 U.S. 296(1940). In Cantwell, the Court set aside a breach-of-the-peace conviction
of the defendant, a Jehovah's Witness, who, in the course of his sidewalk proselytizing, incensed
passers-by in playing a phonograph record that expressed virulently anti-Catholic sentiments.
See id. at 303. The Court held that the defendant, whose conduct was neither truculent nor
abusive, could not be convicted for breach of the peace based on the hostile reaction of his
audience. See id. at 310-11.
399. Id. at310.
400. See, e.g., Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
930 (1975). In Glasson, the court sustained a section 1983 action by a solitary anti-Nixon
protester who,while waiting along the route of a Presidential motorcade amid a sea of Nixon
supporters, unfurled a sign that prompted grumbling and muttered threats among the onlookers.
See id. at 902. When she refused a police request to put the sign out of view, they took it from
her and tore it up, to the cheers of the onlookers. See id. The court stated that to permit what
happened here to the plaintiff would be to "incorporate into [the First Amendment] a heckler's
veto which would empower an audience to cut off the expression of a speaker with whom it
disagreed. The state may not rely on community hostility and threats of violence to justify
censorship."
401. See, e.g., Hurwitt v. City of Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995 (N.D. Cal. 1965). In Hurwitt,
the court enjoined city officials from prohibiting a parade intended to protest U.S. military
intervention in Vietnam, even though plaintiffs' previous marches had been disrupted by angry
spectators, who hurled tear gas bombs, broke through a police cordon, ripped banners, and
disabled loudspeakers, and where plaintiffs and their followers had always remained nonviolent.
See id. at 1001. The court rejected the notion that a citizen may be denied the right to speak
based on the likely antagonism that his message would inspire, observing that "under such a
doctrine, unpopular political groups might be rendered virtually inarticulate." Id.
490 [Vol. 45
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James Madison's idea that the need for a Bill of Rights is to
prevent the tyranny of the majority.402 Thus, the First Amend-
ment protects the speaker whose beliefs are so controversial
that they spark audience unrest, but it does not protect the
speaker who, in bad faith, sets out to instigate audience unrest.
Ultimately, the hostile audience cases permit the following
conclusions. Terminiello and its progeny make clear that a
speaker cannot be punished for an angry reaction to his
ideas 4 3-even, per Cantwell, if he resorts to exaggeration or
vilification in pressing his beliefs.40 4 But, under Feiner, such
protection does not extend to the speaker who undertakes a
mischievous, bad faith effort to instigate violent clashes among
his listeners. 4 5 Though Cantwell suggests that speech rights
may necessarily be suspended in the face of an ongoing and
uncontrollable crowd reaction,40 6 the police have an affirmative
duty (as demonstrated below 40 7) to protect the unpopular
speaker.0 8
V. ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION AND PRO-
CEDURE
We turn now from legislative restrictions on public forum
speech to a distinctly different question: To what extent does
the First Amendment restrain the discretion and procedure
of executive branch officials in exerting administrative control
over public demonstrations? We will focus on two discrete topics:
limits on the discretion enjoyed by administrators in issuing
permits and fees for public demonstrations, and limits on the
procedural time frame in which applications to demonstrate
must be entertained.
402. See 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1029 (Bernard Schwartz ed.,
1971) (remarks of June 8, 1789, House of Representatives).
403. See Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4.
404. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 310.
405. See Feiner, 340 U.S. at 317.
406. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 308.
407. See infra section V112.
408. See Sabel v. Stynchcombe, 746 F.2d 728, 731 & n.7 (I 1th Cir. 1984); Glasson v. City
of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899,905-06 (6th Cir.); Wolin v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 392 F.2d 83,94 (2d
Cir. 1968); Downie v. Powers, 193 F.2d 760, 764 (10th Cir. 1951); Hurwitt v. City of Oakland,
247 F. Supp. 995, 1001 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
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A. Limits on Administrative Discretion in
Issuing Permits and Fees
There are two distinct lines of precedent in this area: deci-
sions invalidating permit schemes that vested "unfettered discre-
tion" in the licensing official, and decisions invalidating permit
schemes that allowed the licensor to consider the controversial
nature of a speaker's message or its potential for inspiring a
hostile response.
1. Permit Schemes That Vest "Unfettered Dis-
cretion" in the Licensing Official
Courts have consistently invalidated permit schemes vesting
government officials with "unfettered discretion" to forbid or
allow certain speech activities 4 09-striking down discretionary
409. For example, in City ofLakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988),
the Court struck down an ordinance that afforded the mayor unbridled discretion in granting or
denying permits to place newsracks on public property. See id. at 759, 772. The Court observed
that unbridled licensing schemes pose two major First Amendment risks: "self-censorship by
speakers in order to avoid being denied a license to speak; and the difficulty of effectively
detecting, reviewing, and correcting content-based censorship as applied without standards by
which to measure the licensor's action." Id. at 759. The Court stated that "without standards
to bound the licensor, speakers denied a license will have no way of proving that the decision
was unconstitutionally motivated, and, faced with that prospect, they will be pressured to con-
form their speech to the licensor's unreviewable preference." Id. at 760.
In Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975), a municipal board charged
with managing a city auditorium and a city-leased theater refused to permit the staging in either
facility of the rock musical "Hair," asserting that the production would not be "in the best
interest of the community." Id. at 548. The Court held that the board's refusal to permit the
performance was a prior restraint that violated the First Amendment because it was effected
under a scheme that gave unfettered discretion to'the board and afforded applicants no procedure
for prompt judicial review. See id. at 561.
In Wolin v. Port ofN. Y. Auth., 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968), the Second Circuit afforded injunc-
tive relief to anti-war protesters who sought access to New York City's Port Authority Bus
Terminal for the purpose of expressing their views on Vietnam by distributing leaflets, carrying
placards, and conducting discussions with passers-by. See id. at 94. The Court struck down the
regulations under which plaintiffs were denied access to the Terminal because they vested
unfettered discretion in the licensing official. See id. at 93. The court added that "It]he effect
of the present regulations is to empower a single official to refuse access on his mere opinion that
a denial will prevent inconvenience and disorder. By such devices, official authority can become
,an instrument of arbitrary suppression of opinion on public questions."' Id. (quoting Cox v.
New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 577 (1941)).
In Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958), the Court struck down an ordinance that
492 [Vol. 45
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limits on parades41 and demonstrations,41' sidewalk preaching412
prohibited soliciting union membership without first obtaining a discretionary permit from the
mayor or city council. Staub, 355 U.S. at 325. The Court stated that
an ordinance which, like this one, makes the peaceful enjoyment of [constitutional] freedoms...
contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an official-as by requiring a permit or license which may
be granted or withheld in the discretion of such official-is an unconstitutional censorship or prior
restraint upon the enjoyment of those freedoms.
Stoub, 355 U.S. at 322.
410. For example, in Shuttlesworth v. City ofBirmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) the Court
struck down a parade permit scheme whose administration effectively vested unfettered discre-
tion in licensing officials. Id. at 159. The Court stated that
[e]ven when the use of its public streets and sidewalks is involved ... a municipality may not
empower its licensing officials to roam essentially at will, dispensing or withholding permission to
speak, assemble, picket, or parade according to their own opinions regarding the potential effect of
the activity in question on the welfare, decency, or morals of the community.
Id. at 153.
In Nationalist Movement v. City of Boston, 12 F. Supp. 2d 182 (D. Mass. 1998), the district
court held that city officials violated the First Amendment in denying a parade permit to the
plaintiff organization-a self-styled "pro-democracy, pro-majority" group viewed by its critics
as racist, anti-Semitic, and anti-gay. Id. at 195. The court struck down the parade permit
scheme as affording the city's transportation commissioner unfettered discretion to grant or deny
permits because under this scheme, the commissioner was free to deny a permit whenever, in his
opinion, a parade would "disrupt" a street or require police coverage that would "deny reason-
able police protection" to the rest of the city. Id. at 193-95.
In Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Martin Luther King Jr. Worshippers, 735 F. Supp. 745
(M.D. Tenn. 1990), the court struck down portions of a parade permit ordinance that vested
licensing officials with broad discretion to deny a permit based on the possibility of violence.
See id. at 749-50.
In Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Mayor of Thurmont, 700 F. Supp.
281 (D. Md. 1988), the court held that town officials unconstitutionally denied the KKK a
parade permit because licensing officials were vested with unfettered discretion, the Klan was
required to pay the cost of police protection, and issuance of the permit hinged on a
never-before-imposed "nondiscrimination condition" that effectively entitled blacks to march
in the Klan's parade. Id. at 291. The permit scheme allowed the Board of Commissioners "to
approve or disapprove of parade applications as they see fit." Id at 285.
In Hurwitt v. City of Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995 (N.D. Cal. 1965), the court enjoined city
officials from prohibiting a parade intended to protest U.S. military intervention in Vietnam,
even though plaintiffs' previous marches had been disrupted by angry spectators, including the
Hell's Angels, who hurled tear gas bombs, broke through a police cordon, ripped banners, and
disabled loudspeakers, and where the plaintiffs and their followers had always remained nonvio-
lent. See id. at 1000. The court stated that the potential that the speaker's viewpoint may "stir
the public to anger, invite dispute, and thus create, or appear.., to create, unrest or even distur-
bance" cannot be the basis for withholding a permit. Id. at 1001.
411. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 500 (1939) (striking down ordinances that, inter alia,
imposed a flat ban on public distribution of printed materials, and required a permit, issued at
the uncontrolled discretion of the public safety director, for all public meetings and demonstra-
tions); Shamloo v. Mississippi State Bd. of Trustees, 620 F.2d 516, 518 (5th Cir. 1980) (uphold-
ing challenge to university regulations governing on-campus demonstrations, brought by Iranian
students who had been disciplined for failing to obey them, and upholding a requirement that
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and leafletting,41" rallies in public parks,414 and the use of sound
on-campus demonstrations be scheduled in advance, but striking down a provision that vested
officials with the power to disapprove all but "wholesome" activities); Million Youth March,
Inc. v. Safir, 18 F. Supp. 2d 334, 341-44, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that New York City
officials violated the First Amendment in denying a permit request by the Nation of Islam to hold
a massive rally in Harlem, and enjoining city officials from blocking the rally, thereby striking
down a permit scheme that vested city officials with unfettered discretion to grant or deny a
license to engage in expressive activity); Service Employees Int'l Union v. Port Auth. of N.Y.,
3 F. Supp. 2d 413,420 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (striking down permit scheme governing protests at the
World Trade Center and Port Authority Bus Terminal; the scheme posed the threat of arbitrary
enforcement by vesting licensing officials with the discretion to deny or revoke a permit based
on their opinion that conditions "would cause a danger to persons or property or unreasonably
interfere with pedestrian or vehicular traffic flow, [or] the formation or progress of any line of
persons waiting for service").
412. For example, in Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951), the Court struck down an
ordinance vesting discretionary power in the city police commissioner to control in advance the
right of citizens to speak on religious matters in the streets of New York. See id. at 294-95. In
Furrv. Town of Swansea, 594 F. Supp. 1543 (D.S.C. 1984), a facial challenge was brought by
Anabaptist ministers to an ordinance requiring a permit for sidewalk preaching and public
speaking, the court held that a permit scheme offends the First Amendment by vesting the town
council with unfettered discretion in granting or denying permits. See id. at 1551-52. In regu-
lating sidewalk expression under the ordinance, the town council was free to consider the likely
effect of the proposed gathering on surrounding businesses and was free to impose any restric-
tions that it deemed fit and proper. See id. at 1547-48. In practice, the grant of a permit hinged
on the approval of downtown merchants and, given the general distaste for plaintiffs' preaching,
the only permit that city officials were willing to grant them was for preaching in a vacant lot on
the edge of town. See id. at 1547 n.7 & 1549.
413. See, e.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 164-65 (1939) (striking down ordi-
nances that prohibited leafletting without a license and provided no standards for issuance of
licenses, stating that "we hold a municipality cannot.., require all who wish to disseminate
ideas to present them first to police authorities for their consideration and approval, with a
discretion in the police to say some ideas may, while others may not, be ... disseminate[d]");
Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,452-53 (1938) (striking down an ordinance prohibiting
the distribution of circulars, pamphlets, or literature of any kind without permission from the city
manager, because the ordinance contained no restrictions or limitations on the city manager's
discretion).
414. For example, in Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951), the Court reversed a
disorderly conduct conviction of several Jehovah's Witnesses convicted on the grounds that they
used a public park for Bible talks without first obtaining a permit from city officials, even though
there existed no statute or ordinance imposing a permit requirement. See id. at 273.
In ACORN v. City of Tulsa, 835 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1987), after several plaintiffs were denied
access to a public park where they intended to stage speeches and rallies critical of the Reagan
Administration, they brought a facial challenge to permit the scheme regulating expressive
activity in city's public parks. See id. at 737-38. The court invalidated the provision vesting
unfettered discretion in the Park Board over issuance of permits, stating that "[in essence, the
Park Board relies on its own intuitive judgment; however well exercised, it is an insufficient
standard to be applied in determining the permissibility of First Amendment activities." Id. at
741.
In Rubin v. City of Santa Monica, 823 F. Supp. 709 (C.D. Cal. 1993), the court struck down
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amplification equipment.415
Any scheme that vests arbitrary discretion in the licensing
official "'has the potential for becoming a means of suppressing
a particular point of view.' 416 If a regulation leaves room for
assessing the speaker's viewpoint in deciding whether or not
to grant a permit, "'the danger of censorship and abridgment
of our precious First Amendment freedoms is too great' to be
permitted."4 17
These principles are so firmly grounded in precedent that
a district judge, confronted over thirty years ago with the sup-
a permit scheme governing demonstrations in public parks because, among other reasons, it
vested undue discretion in the licensing official.. See Rubin, 823 F. Supp. at 713. Under the
challenged ordinance, demonstrations of 35 or more people were permissible only if they fell
within an undefined exception for "First Amendment Activities," and the licensor had unbridled
discretion to inquire into the content of applicant's speech in determining whether to grant a
permit under the exception. See Rubin, F. Supp. at 711. The court identified "two evils" in
speech licensing schemes "that will not be tolerated": (1) vesting "unbridled discretion" in the
licensing authority, and (2) "fail[ing] to place limits on the time within which the decisionmaker
must issue the license." Id. at 711 n.3 (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 225-26
(1990)).
In Invisible Empire Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of West Haven, 600 F. Supp. 1427 (D.
Conn. 1985), the court granted injunctive relief to the KKK in its facial challenge to an ordi-
nance restricting expressive activity in public parks. See id. at 1436. The court held that the
permit scheme was unconstitutional due to its failure to provide the administrator with any
standards for granting or denying permits. See id. at 1432-33.
415. See, e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948) (striking down an ordinance
prohibiting the use of a loudspeaker in public places without permission of the police chief,
whose discretion was unlimited); Friedrich v. City of Chicago, 619 F. Supp. 1129, 1147-48
(N.D. Ill. 1985) (holding, inter alia, that a provision forbidding street performers from using
sound amplification equipment unless they were granted a special permit issued by the city
council violated the First Amendment because the ordinance did not specify how to obtain such
a permit and set no standards or guidelines concerning issuance of such permits).
416. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992) (quoting Heffron
v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649 (1981)).
417. Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 131 (quoting Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S.
546, 553 (1975)). Accordingly, "[a] permit scheme is constitutional as a reasonable time, place
and manner restriction [only] if it is content neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and leaves open ample alternatives for communication." Gay & Lesbian
Servs. Network, Inc. v. Bishop, 832 F. Supp. 270, 275 (W.D. Mo. 1993) (citing Forsyth, 505
U.S. at 130) "The burden.of proof on these three factors falls squarely on the government." Id.
(citing Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 n.5 (1984)). "If it
is determined that the permit scheme is not content neutral, then it must be enjoined unless the
[state] can show that it is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest." Id.
(citing Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992)).
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pression of Vietnam War protesters, observed even then that:
It is established beyond need for an extended discussion
that municipalities cannot validly leave decisionmaking
for allowance of peaceful parades or demonstrations to the
unbridled discretion or mere opinion of a local official.
The lodging of any such broad discretion in a public
official would permit such official to say which
expressions of view ... will be permitted [-] a power
fraught with possibilities for selective administration that
would in effect deprive some groups of the equal
protection of the laws.418
Accordingly, a permit scheme will survive constitutional
scrutiny only if it employs content-neutral criteria,419 and only
if it contains "narrowly drawn, reasonable, and definite stan-
dards for the officials to follow." '420 Without such standards,
"post hoc rationalizations by the licensing official and the use
of shifting or illegitimate criteria are far too easy, making it
difficult for courts to determine in any particular case whether
the licensor is permitting favorable, and suppressing unfavor-
able, expression."42'
418. Hurwitt v. City of Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995, 1000-01 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
419. See Gay & Lesbian Servs., 832 F. Supp. at 275.
420. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271 (1951); accord Shuttlesworth v. City of
Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969) (holding that "a law subjecting the exercise of First
Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite
standards to guide the licensing authority, is unconstitutional"). A permit scheme fails this test
if it "'involves appraisal of facts, the exercise ofjudgment, [or] the formation of an opinion' by
the licensing authority." Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 131 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 305 (1940)).
421. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 758 (1988). A vivid
example of the danger adverted to in Lakewood is addressed in Women Strike for Peace v.
Morton, 472 F.2d 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In Morton, an anti-war group fought with the Interior
Department for three years in a futile effort to secure a permit to erect on the Ellipse a temporary
display (comprised of 11 styrofoam tombstones) commemorating those who died in Vietnam.
See id. at 1274. The government kept denying the plaintiffs a permit, each time offering a
different reason, and all the while allowing more extensive displays to be erected on the Ellipse
for the annual Christmas Pageant. See id. at 1275-76. Therefore, the court affirmed the grant
of injunctive relief, and permitted the plaintiffs to erect their display on a portion of the Ellipse
not then occupied by the Christmas Pageant. See id. at 1294.
496 [Vol. 45
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2. Permit Schemes That Allow the Licensing
Official to Consider the Controversial Na-
ture of a Speaker's Message or Its Potential
for Inspiring a Hostile Response
Closely akin to the "unfettered discretion" cases are those
in which the permit scheme allows licensing officials to consider
either the controversial nature of a speaker's message or its
potential for inspiring a hostile response. These schemes are
struck down just as readily, and for the same reason, as the
schemes affording unbridled discretion. In both contexts, the
First Amendment flaw is the same: public forum access is left
to hinge on the popularity of a speaker's message.
The permit schemes in this line of precedent are of two
(equally fatal) types: (1) those allowing the licensor to forbid
or restrict speech activities based on concerns that the speaker's
message will inspire a hostile response,422 and (2) those allowing
422. For example, in Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan Invisible Empire, Inc. v. District
of Columbia, 972 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1992), even though the KKK's previous rallies in Wash-
ington, D.C. had been cut short by violent crowds, resulting in brick-throwing, injuries, and
multiple arrests, the court here affirmed the grant of an injunction to the Klan, allowing it to
march the full eleven block route that it had requested rather than the truncated four block route
for which the D.C. police had granted a permit. See id. at 369, 376. Since the District's place
restriction, resting as it did on concerns about violent reaction to controversial speaker, was
content based, it could be sustained only if necessary to advance a compelling interest, and it
could not be sustained where the district court found that the threat of violence, although sub-
stantial, was not beyond reasonable control. See id. at 375. The facts supported the district
court's conclusion that reduction from eleven blocks to four blocks could not bejustified in light
of testimony by the National Park Police that the greatest confrontation was expected to occur
at an assembly point of the march, planned force levels at the assembly point were sufficient to
overcome attempts to stop the march by violence and to assure safety, and planned force levels
were sufficient to assure a reasonable level of safety along the march route itself, notwithstand-
ing testimony by D.C. police that they would not have been able to control violence if the march
went the full eleven blocks. See id.
In Beckerman v. City of Tupelo, 664 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1981), a First Amendment challenge
to parade and sound equipment ordinances was brought by civil rights activists seeking to
conduct a protest march. See id. at 509-10. Here, the court struck down a provision authorizing
the police chief to deny the parade permit if he determined that issuance would "provoke disor-
derly conduct." Id. at 506, 509-10. On its face, this section was an unconstitutional prior
restraint on free speech since it sanctioned the permit denial on the basis of a heckler's veto. See
id. The court held that the city may not deny a parade permit simply out of fear that the marchers
may produce an adverse reaction by onlookers. See id. "The existence of a hostile audience,
standing alone, has never been sufficient to sustain a denial of or punishment for the exercise of
First Amendment rights." Id. at 510.
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In Collin v. Chicago Park District, 460 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1972), the court held that Nazis
were entitled to injunctive relief after city officials denied their application for a permit to hold
a demonstration in a public park. See id. at 748, 757. "As to the possibility of there being
hostile audience members causing violence, the law is quite clear that such considerations are
impermissible in determining whether to grant permits.... [I]t is impermissible even to consider
the threat of a hostile audience when ruling on a permit application or a request for injunction
against a demonstration." Collin, 460 F.2d at 754-55 (citations omitted).
In Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Martin Luther King Jr. Worshippers, 735 F. Supp. 745
(M.D. Tenn. 1990), the court struck down portions of a parade permit ordinance that vested
licensing officials with broad discretion to deny a permit based on the possibility of violence.
See id. at 749-50.
In Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Movement, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 419 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Ill.
1976), a civil rights organization sought to march through a white neighborhood where its
previous foray there was curtailed when bystanders pelted the procession with rocks, bricks, and
explosive devices. See id. at 672. The court held that city officials violated the First
Amendment in denying organizers a permit for a second march through the same neighborhood
and proposing instead an alternate route through an all-black neighborhood, even though the
first march left 31 police officers injured and produced 52 arrests, plaintiffs conducted them-
selves peacefully and cannot be denied a permit based on the threat of a hostile audience. See
id. at 674-75.
The threat of a hostile audience cannot be considered in determining whether a permit shall be
granted or in ruling on a request for an injunction against a demonstration. Thus, our laws bespeak
what should be; for were it otherwise, enjoyment of constitutional rights by the peaceable and law-
abiding would depend on the dictates of those willing to resort to violence.
Id. at 675 (citations omitted).
In Hurwitt v. City of Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995 (N.D. Cal. 1965), the court enjoined city
officials from prohibiting a parade intended to protest U.S. military intervention in Vietnam,
even though plaintiffs' previous marches had been disrupted by angry spectators, including the
Hell's Angels, who hurled tear gas bombs, broke through a police cordon, ripped banners, and
disabled loudspeakers, where plaintiffs and their followers had always remained nonviolent. See
id. at 1001. The potential that the speaker's viewpoint may "stir the public to anger, invite
dispute, and thus create, or appear.., to create, unrest or even disturbance" cannot be the basis
for withholding a permit. Id. at 1001.
In Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965), the court granted civil rights
activists injunctive relief and ordered the State of Alabama to permit, and not to interfere with,
plaintiffs' plans to march from Selma to Montgomery. See id. at 109. "The [State's] contention
that there is some hostility to this march will notjustify its denial. Nor will the threat of violence
constitute an excuse for its denial." Id. at 109 (citations omitted).
In Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America, 366 N.E.2d 347 (I11. App. Ct.
1977), rev'd in part, 373 N.E.2d 21 (111. 1978), the court declined to enjoin a group of Nazis
from marching through an Illinois suburb populated by hundreds of Holocaust survivors. See
id. at 349. The court did so even though the government put on evidence showing that "if the
defendants ever appear in Skokie to demonstrate, there.., is a virtual certainty that thousands
of irate Jewish citizens [will] physically attack [them]." Id. at 353. The court held that the
possible presence of a hostile and violent audience is an impermissible consideration in granting
an injunction or for withholding a permit, and held that the appellate panel correctly refused to
enjoin the Nazi march but erred in barring the Nazis from wearing their uniforms. See id. at
353-54.
In Wolin v. Port ofNew YorkAuthority, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968), the court afforded injunc-
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the licensor to charge a higher police protection fee based on
the anticipated level of hostility among onlookers.423
The first category is famously exemplified by cases in which
Ku Klux Klansmen and Nazis were denied permits to march.
In Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party,424 the court
declined to enjoin a group of Nazis from marching through an
Illinois suburb populated by hundreds of Holocaust survivors. 42 5
Even though it was "a virtual certainty" that the appearance
of parading Nazis would prompt "thousands of irate Jewish
citizens [to] physically attack [them], 426 the court refused to
tive relief to anti-war protesters who sought access to New York City's Port Authority Bus
Terminal for the purpose of expressing their views on Vietnam by distributing leaflets, carrying
placards, and conducting discussions with passers-by, even though the expression of these
views, especially to traveling servicemen, posed the risk of hostile reaction. Wolin, 392 F.2d
at 85-86 "The potential provocation caused by heated debate is not a valid reason to preclude
discussion." Id. at 92.
423. See Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 124 (striking down an ordinance permitting government admin-
istrator to vary the fee for assembling or parading to reflect the estimated cost of maintaining
public order, and holding that the ordinance unconstitutionally required the administrator to
examine the content of the prospective speaker's message, and to charge a higher fee for contro-
versial viewpoints); Central Fla. NuclearFreeze Campaign v. Walsh, 774 F.2d 1515, 1516 (11 th
Cir. 1985) (involving a First Amendment challenge brought by a nonprofit anti-nuclear organi-
zation where the court struck down, both facially and as applied, an Orlando ordinance that
required persons wishing to demonstrate in city streets and parks to prepay amount of costs for
additional police protection, to be determined at the police chief's discretion; therefore, by
allowing the licensing official to consider the potential for hostile counter-demonstrations in
fixing an applicant's permit fee, the instant scheme offends the First Amendment by charging
more for controversial speech than for mainstream expression); Gay & Lesbian Servs., 832 F.
Supp. at 272, 275 (striking down, under Forsyth, a Kansas City Police Department policy
governing parade permits authorizing the assessment of a crowd control fee that would vary
depending upon the level of hostility likely to be generated by the speaker or message); see also
Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Mayor of Thurmont, 700 F. Supp. 281,
285-86, 290 (D. Md. 1988) (holding that town officials unconstitutionally denied the KKK a
parade permit where licensing officials were vested with unfettered discretion, the Klan was
required to pay the cost of police protection, and issuance of the permit hinged on a
never-before-imposed "nondiscrimination condition" that effectively entitled blacks to march
in the Klan's parade); Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of W. Haven,
600 F. Supp. 1427, 1433 (D. Conn. 1985) (granting injunctive relief to KKK in its facial chal-
lenge to an ordinance restricting expressive activity in public parks, thereby striking down the
permit scheme, inter alia, for requiring an applicant to post a bond to cover costs of police
protection).
424. 366 N.E.2d 347 (III. Ct. App. 1977), rev'd in part, 373 N.E.2d 21 (111. 1978) (holding
that the appellate panel correctly refused to enjoin the Nazi march-but erred in barring the Nazis
from wearing their uniforms).
425. See Village of Skokie, 366 N.E.2d at 349.
426. Id. at 353.
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prevent the march, holding that the possibility of a violent
audience reaction is an impermissible consideration in granting
an injunction or withholding a permit.4 27 In Christian Knights
of the Ku Klux Klan Invisible Empire, Inc. v. District of Colum-
bia,42 the KKK'obtained an injunction permitting it to march
in Washington, D.C., 429 even though its previous rallies there
had been cut short by violent crowds, 430  resulting in
brick-throwing, injuries, and multiple arrests .43 Evincing little
enthusiasm for its result,43 2 the D.C. Circuit nevertheless af-
firmed the Klan's injunction-holding that permit denials are
content-based if grounded on concerns about audience
hostility, 43 and therefore cannot be sustained where the threat
of violence, even if substantial, is "not beyond reasonable con-
trol. 4
427. See Village ofSkokie, 366 N.E.2d at 353 (citing, inter alia, Collin, 460 F.2d at 754; Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. Movement, 419 F. Supp. at 675).
428. 972 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
429. Under the injunction, the Klan was allowed to march the full eleven-block route that it
had requested, rather than the truncated four-block route for which the D.C. police had granted
a permit. See id. at 368, 376.
430. See id. at 367.
431. See id. at 369.
432. See Christian Knights, 972 F.2d at 374. Expressing sympathy with the government's
response here--rather than denying the Klan a permit, it reduced the scope of the Klan's march
from eleven to four blocks-the D.C. Circuit drew a distinction between limiting and refusing
a permit, asserting that the state is afforded some leeway in restricting the parameters of a dem-
onstration when confronted with "the prospect of a violent response." Id. Rejecting more
absolutist approaches urged by counsel and amici, including (1) that restrictions may be imposed
only where the threatened violence is "truly real and substantial and beyond reasonable control";
(2) that "the fear of a hostile audience is never to be considered in ruling upon permit applica-
tions"; and (3) that authorities may impose restrictions "only on the scene in response to a clear
and present danger of violence," the court arrived at a position that is more indulgent of the state:
We cannot agree that a threat of violence "is an impermissible ground even for a time, place, and
manner limitation." When the choice is between an abbreviated march or a bloodbath, government:
must have some leeway to make adjustments necessary for the protection of participants, innocent
onlookers, and others in the vicinity.
Id.
433. See id.
434. Id. at 375. In rejecting the contention by D.C. police that the Klan's march had to be
reduced from eleven blocks to four blocks or the threat of violence would be beyond reasonable
control, the district court relied upon testimony by the National Park Police that the greatest
confrontation would likely occur at the assembly point of the march, that planned force levels
at the assembly point were sufficient to overcome any violent attempts to stop the march, and
that planned force levels along the proposed eleven block route were sufficient to assure a
reasonable level of safety, notwithstanding testimony by D.C. police that they would not be able
to control violence if the march were to cover the full eleven blocks. Id.
500 [Vol. 45
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This first category of precedent stretches back through
the anti-war and civil rights eras-where, once again, we find
permit denials invalidated on factual records bristling with
violence. Even where prior marches were greeted with great
hostility-where Vietnam protests were derailed by tear gas
bombs43 and civil rights processions were pelted with rocks,
bricks, and explosive devices 436-the courts consistently held
that such speakers could not be denied a permit based on the
likely antagonism that their message would inspire. 437 "This
is so," explained one court, "because under such a doctrine,
unpopular political groups might be rendered virtually inarticu-
late."438 The alternative, explained another, would leave the
exercise of First Amendment freedoms "depend[entl on the
dictates of those willing to resort to violence."43 9
The second category of precedent in this area is prominently
exemplified by Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement,440 where
the Supreme Court struck down a licensing scheme that permit-
ted the administrator to vary the fee for assembling or parading
to reflect the estimated cost of maintaining public order.441
The ordinance had been enacted "[a] s a direct result"442 of two
violent demonstrations in which civil rights activists, protesting
racial discrimination in a rural Georgia county, were confronted
by hostile residents. The first march was brought to a premature
halt when 400 Klan members, shouting racial slurs, began throw-
ing rocks and beer bottles .4 3 The second march featured 20,000
marchers, 1000 counter-demonstrators, and 3000 law enforce-
435. See Hurwitt v. City of Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995, 1005 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
436. See Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Movement, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 419 F. Supp. 667,
672, 678 (N.D. II1. 1976).
437. See Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Movement, 419 F. Supp. at 675; Hurwitt, 247. F. Supp.
at 1001; see also Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965) (granting civil rights
activists injunctive relief ordering the state of Alabama to permit, and not to interfere with,
plaintiffs' plans to march from Selma to Montgomery, stating that "[the State's] contention that
there is some hostility to this march will not justify its denial. Nor will the threat of violence
constitute an excuse for its denial.") (citations omitted).
438. Hurwitt, 247 F. Supp. at 1001.
439. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Movement, 419 F. Supp. at 675.
440. 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
441. See id. at 126-27.
442. Id. at 126.
443. See id. at 125.
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ment officers.444 It was punctuated (though not halted) by
rock-throwing and produced sixty arrests. 44 5
Though these facts presented an "emotional" context in
which to review the county's response, 446 its ordinance vested
the administrator with the same unfettered discretion that
invariably proves fatal in licensing schemes. 447 Here, that discre-
tion came into play in fixing police protection fees on an appli-
cant-by-applicant basis: "The fee assessed will depend on the
administrator's measure of the amount of hostility likely to
be created by the speech based on its content. Those wishing
to express views unpopular with bottle-throwers, for example,
may have to pay more for their permit."448 In striking down
the ordinance, the Court concluded: "Speech cannot be finan-
cially burdened, any more than it can be punished or banned,
simply because it might offend a hostile mob."449
B. Limits on the Time Frame for Issuing a Per-
mit
Courts will treat as "a species of unbridled discretion" any
failure by a licensing scheme to place limits on the time frame
within which the decisionmaker must issue the license.45 ° In
444. See Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 125-26.
445. See id.
446. See id. at 124.
447. On this point, the Court observed:
Based on the county's implementation and construction of the ordinance, it simply cannot be said
that there are any "narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standard[s]," guiding the hand of the
Forsyth County administrator. The decision how much to charge for police protection or adminis-
trative time-or even whether to charge at all-is left to the whim of the administrator. There are
no articulated standards either in the ordinance or in the county's established practice. The adminis-
trator is not required to rely on any objective factors. He need not provide any explanation for his
decision, and that decision is unreviewable. Nothing in the law or its application prevents the
official from encouraging some views and discouraging others through the arbitrary application of
fees. The First Amendment prohibits the vesting of such unbridled discretion in a government
official.
Id. at 132-33 (quoting Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271 (1951)) (citations and foot-
notes omitted).
448. Id. at 134 (emphasis added).
449. Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 134-35.
450. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 223-24 (1990). In FW/PBS, the Court
struck down the licensing scheme in an ordinance regulating sexually-oriented businesses
because it lacked "an effective limitation on the time within which the licensor's decision must
be made," and because it "fail[ed] to provide an avenue for prompt judicial review" in the event
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this section, we will address in turn the principal ways in which
a licensing scheme may run afoul of this requirement: by failing
to afford prompt processing of permit applications or prompt
judicial review of permit denials, and by imposing advance
registration requirements that build into the application process
a lengthy delay before the licensee may speak.
1. The Need for Prompt Processing and Prompt
Judicial Review
Courts consistently invalidate speech licensing schemes
that fail to afford either prompt processing of permit
applications 45 ' or prompt judicial review of permit denials. 452
These procedural safeguards come from Freedman v.
of a license denial. FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 229. In performing its analysis, the Court identified
"two evils" in speech licensing schemes "that will not be tolerated"-vesting "unbridled discre-
tion" in the licensing authority, and "fail[ing] to place limits on the time within which the
decisionmaker must issue the license." Id. at 225-26, & 229.
451. See F W/PBS, 493 U.S. at 226-27 (striking down a permit scheme for sexually-oriented
businesses because a key prerequisite in securing a permit was an inspection visit by city offi-
cials; a visit that, under the ordinance, the city was free to put off indefinitely); Collin v. Chicago
Park Dist., 460 F.2d 746, 756-57 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that Nazis were entitled to injunctive
relief after city officials denied their application for a permit to hold a demonstration in a public
park by striking down a permit scheme that gave the licensor five days in which to grant or deny
a demonstration permit but, in the event of inaction, left the matter in limbo pending a written
request from the applicant for a review by the licensor's supervisor).
452. See FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 229; Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546,
559-61 (1975) (holding that a municipal board's refusal to permit a theatrical performance was
a prior restraint that violated the First Amendment because it was effected under a scheme that
gave unfettered discretion to the board and afforded applicants no procedure for prompt judicial
review, where the board, charged with managing a city auditorium and a city-leased theater,
refused to permit the staging in either facility of the rock musical "Hair," asserting that the
production would not be "in the best interest of the community"); Baby Tam & Co. v. City of
Las Vegas, 154 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 1998) (striking down a speech licensing ordinance
under which the plaintiff had been denied a license to operate an adult bookstore because the
ordinance failed to provide for prompt judicial review of denials); Central Fla. Nuclear Freeze
Campaign v. Walsh, 774 F.2d 1515, 1526 (1 Ith Cir. 1985) (holding that in a First Amendment
challenge brought by a nonprofit anti-nuclear organization, an Orlando ordinance that required
persons wishing to demonstrate in city streets and parks to prepay amount of costs for additional
police protection, to be determined at police chief's discretion was unconstitutional (both Fa-
cially and as applied), and identifying a separate and independent basis for striking down this
ordinance: failure to provide for prompt judicial review of permit denials); United Food &
Commercial Workers Union v. City of Valdosta, 861 F. Supp. 1570, 1583-84 (M.D. Ga. 1994)
(striking down a range of legislative restrictions on demonstrations, picketing, leafletting, and
parades and holding that the city's permit requirement for parades violated the First Amendment
by failing to provide for judicial review of permit denials).
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Maryland,4 53 where the Supreme Court, in striking down a
motion picture censorship system, set forth the following require-
ments for any speech licensing scheme:
(1) any restraint prior to judicial review can be imposed
only for a specified brief period during which the status
quo must be maintained; (2) expeditious judicial review of
that decision must be available; and (3) the censor must
bear the burden of going to court to suppress the speech
and must bear the burden of proof once in court.4 54
The "core policy" underlying Freedman is that any license
for expressive activity "must be issued within a reasonable period
of time, because undue delay results in the unconstitutional
suppression of protected speech. ' 455 Accordingly, "the licensor
must make the decision whether to issue the license within
a specified and reasonable time period during which the status
quo is maintained, and there must be the possibility of prompt
judicial review in the event that the license is erroneously de-
nied."45
The Freedman safeguards have been extended beyond the
realm of motion picture licensing 457 to schemes governing public
demonstrations 458 and parades. 459 They have been invoked to
strike down schemes that allowed indefinite delays in processing
permit applications,460 or left the applicant in procedural limbo
453. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
454. FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 227-28 (distilling the Freedman procedural safeguards); see also
Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-60.
455. FWIPBS, 493 U.S. at 228.
456. Id.
457. See id. at 227-29 (approving an ordinance regulating sexually-oriented businesses);
Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 559-61 (approving a theatrical performance in a city
auditorium and a city-leased theater).
458. See, e.g., Central Fla. Nuclear Freeze Campaign v. Walsh, 774 F.2d 1515, 1526 (11 th
Cir. 1985); Collin, 460 F.2d at 756-57.
459. See, e.g., LeFlore v. Robinson, 434 F.2d 933, 947-48 (5th Cir. 1970), vacated on other
grounds, 446 F.2d 715 (5th Cir. 1971); United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. City of
Valdosta, 861 F. Supp. 1570, 1583-84 (M.D. Ga. 1994).
460. See FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 226-27 (striking down a permit scheme for sexually-oriented
businesses because a key prerequisite in securing a permit was an inspection visit by city offi-
cials; a visit that, under the ordinance, the city was free to put off indefinitely).
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after a permit denial.461 Thus, any permit scheme governing
public forum expression will be vulnerable to facial challenge
if it lacks express provisions either limiting the time frame
for processing an application or affording prompt judicial review
in the event of a denial.
2. Advance Registration Requirements
Because a speech licensing scheme must contain limits
on the time frame for issuing permits,462 courts are consistently
hostile toward schemes that impose advance registration require-
ments of any significant duration.463 Such requirements are
vulnerable to First Amendment challenge because they build
into the application process a mandatory delay before the li-
censee may speak. The problem with any built-in delay, as
Justice Harlan once observed, is that "timing is of the essence
in politics. It is almost impossible to predict the political future;
and when an event occurs, it is often necessary to have one's
461. See Collin, 460 F.2d at 756-57 (striking down permit scheme that gave licensor five
days in which to grant or deny a demonstration permit but, in the event of inaction, left the
matter in limbo pending a written request from the applicant for a review by the licensor's
supervisor)(holding that Nazis were entitled to injunctive relief after city officials denied their
application for permit to hold demonstration in public park).
462. See FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 223-24.
463. See, e.g., Douglas v. Brownell, 88 F.3d 1511, 1523-24 (8th Cir. 1996) (striking down
a parade permit ordinance as not narrowly tailored because it imposed a five-day advance
registration requirement); Grossman v. City of Portland, 33 F.3d 1200, 1206-08 (9th Cir. 1994)
(strik-ing down an ordinance that required an advance permit for any demonstration, no matter
how small, to be conducted in any public park, and holding that the ordinance was not narrowly
tailored because it burdened all expressive gatherings, no matter how few the number of partici-
pants, and because it effectively banned spontaneous expression by requiring all prospective
speakers to obtain a permit in advance); NAACP v. City of Richmond, 743 F.2d 1346, 1349,
1357 (9th Cir. 1984) (striking down an ordinance requiring advance notice of 20 days for secur-
ing a parade permit, where the city had invoked this provision in denying a permit to the
NAACP, thereby thwarting a proposed march to protest the death of a black man in police
custody); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. City of Rocky Mount; 672 F.2d 376, 377, 380 (4th
Cir. 1982) (striking down, on overbreadth grounds, an ordinance governing picketing on public
streets that required the permit to be obtained at least 72 hours in advance); Rosen v. Port of.
Portland, 641 F.2d 1243, 1247-50 (9th Cir. 1981) (sustaining a First Amendment challenge,
brought by Jews for Jesus, to advance-notice and identification disclosure requirements for
speech activities at an airport; in striking down the airport's requirement that prospective speak-
ers register one business day in advance, the court distinguished cases upholding advance-notice
requirements for parades and White House demonstrations, asserting that the underlying govern-
mental interests in those cases-traffic congestion and presidential security, respectively-had
no comparably significant analogue in the airport context).
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voice heard promptly, if it is to be considered at all."464  In
NAACP v. City of Richmond,465 the death of a black man in police
custody prompted immediate plans for a protest march-but
city officials thwarted the march by invoking a twenty-day
advance registration requirement in their parade permit
ordinance.466 Rejecting the ordinance as effectively "outlaw[ing]
spontaneous expression,"467 the Ninth Circuit stressed that:
simple delay may permanently vitiate the expressive
content of a demonstration. A spontaneous parade
expressing a viewpoint on a topical issue will almost
inevitably attract more participants and more press
attention, and generate more emotion, than the "same"
parade 20 days later. The later parade can never be the
same. Where spontaneity is part of the message,
dissemination delayed is dissemination denied.468
Advance registration requirements have been invalidated
in a broad range of contexts, including permit schemes for parad-
ing,469 demonstrating, 4 0 picketing, 47' and leafletting. 47 2 Since
parades and demonstrations create greater congestion than
picketing or leafletting, they necessarily require greater lead
time473 -but even for parades and demonstrations, the courts
464. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 163 (1969) (striking down a parade
permit scheme in the context of a thwarted civil rights march) (Harlan, I., concurring); accord
Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 182 (1968) (invalidating a
speech-restrictive injunction imposing a ten-day freeze on demonstrations by a white suprema-
cist group and finding that a delay "of even a day or two" may be intolerable when applied to
"political speech in which the element of timeliness may be important").
465. 743 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir. 1984).
466. See id. at 1349.
467. Id. at 1355.
468. Id. at 1356.
469. See, e.g., Douglas v. Brownell, 88 F.3d 1511, 1523-24 (8th Cir. 1996) (striking down
a five-day advance registration); City of Richmond, 743 F.2d at 1357 (striking down a 20-day
advance registration).
470. See, e.g., Grossman v. City of Portland, 33 F.3d 1200, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 1994) (striking
down an ordinance that required an advance permit for any demonstration, no matter how small,
to be conducted in any public park).
471. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. City of Rocky Mount; 672 F.2d 376, 380
(4th Cir. 1982) (striking down a seventy-two-hour advance registration requirement).
472. See, e.g., Rosen v. Port of Portland, 641 F.2d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 1981) (striking down
airport restrictions that required registration one business day in advance of leafletting).
473. Rosen, 641 F.2d at 1247-48.
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have consistently rejected advance registration requirements
beyond two days.4 74 Thus, if a speech licensing scheme imposes
a built-in delay of more than two days, it will be especially
vulnerable to constitutional challenge.
VI. JUDICIAL REGULATION: INJUNCTIONS
A. Judicial Power to Regulate Public Forum
Access and Expression
Through their injunctive powers, courts have long exercised
detailed control over public forum access and expression. With
greater precision than any ordinance475-and bolstered by their
contempt powers over injunction violators476-courts have speci-
fied the date,477 time, 478 duration, 479 and location 411 of public
474. See City of Richmond, 743 F.2d at 1357. Compare Douglas, 88 F.3d at 1523-24 (8th
Cir. 1996) (striking down a parade permit scheme imposing a five-day advance registration
requirement), and International Bhd. of Teamsters, 672 F.2d at 377, 380 (striking down a permit
scheme for picketing imposing a 72-hour advance registration requirement), with A Quaker
Action Group v. Morton, 516 F.2d 717, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (upholding a 48-hour advance
registration requirement for demonstrations near the White House), andBaylessv. Martine, 430
F.2d 873, 878 (5th Cir. 1970) (upholding a 48-hour advance registration requirement for
on-campus demonstrations), and Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 84 (2d Cir. 1968) (upholding a
48-hour advance registration requirement for on-campus demonstrations), and Local 32B-32J,
Serv. Employees Int'l Union v. Port Auth. of N.Y., 3 F. Supp. 2d 413, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(upholding a 36-hour waiting period for permits to stage protests at the World Trade Center and
Port Authority Bus Terminal), and Jackson v. Dobbs, 329 F. Supp. 287, 292 (N.D. Ga. 1970)
(upholding an ordinance requiring marchers to obtain a permit by 4:00 p.m. on the day preceding
a march), a/f'd, 442 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1971).
475. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) (observing that
injunctive restrictions on speech, because they can be "tailored" to the individual circumstances
of a case, afford opportunities for greater precision than "generally applicable statutes").
476. See, e.g., United States v. Terry, 802 F. Supp. 1094, 1096 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (involving
criminal contempt proceedings against an anti-abortion protester who, in violation of the district
court's injunction, presented then-Governor Bill Clinton with a fetus). Cf United States v.
Lynch, 952 F. Supp. 167, 168, 170-71 (S.D.N.Y.) (involving a criminal contempt proceeding
against an elderly bishop and a young monk who blocked access to an abortion clinic in violation
of a permanent injunction, where the court held that the defendants, who sat quietly praying in
the clinic driveway, did not manifest the requisite willfulness to be convicted of criminal con-
tempt, acting as they did from a sense of conscience and sincere religious conviction; separately,
the court invoked its "prerogative of leniency," announcing that it would refuse to convict on
these facts even if defendants' conduct could be deemed willful), aff'd mem., 104 F.3d 357 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1170 (1997).
477. See, e.g., City of Seven Hills v. Aryan Nations, 667 N.E.2d 942, 945 (Ohio 1996)
(striking down an injunction which permissibly specified the date, time, duration, and location
of residential picketing because it imposed a flat ban on the simultaneous presence of protest
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forum expression, housing protesters in protective pens,4""
stationing them behind barricades, capping their number,8 3
limiting their noise level,48 4 and restricting their proximity to
the target of their message. 48 5 But the injunctive powers of
groups with opposing viewpoints; the trial court had issued the injunction to prevent Holocaust
survivors and the Ku Klux Klan from demonstrating simultaneously on the residential street of
accused Nazi prison guard John Demjanjuk, whose recent release by Israeli prison authorities
had prompted the expression of sharply opposing views on Demjanjuk's return to the United
States).
478. See, e.g., Seven Hills, 667 N.E.2d at 945.
479. For example, in Olivieri v. Ward, 801 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
917 (1987), the court held that advocates and opponents of gay rights who sought access to the
same unique forum, the sidewalk in front of St. Patrick's Cathedral, in order to raise their voices
in response to New York City's annual Gay Pride Parade were entitled to equal recognition of
their First Amendment rights and equal time in the desired forum for conducting their demon-
strations. See id. at 608. In striking down a police order "freezing" the sidewalk in front of the
Cathedral and thereby banning any demonstrations or pedestrian traffic there during the Gay
Pride Parade, the Second Circuit imposed an injunctive scheme that afforded each of the two
rival groups a separate 30 minute time slot in which to protest before the Cathedral, housed in
a protective pen. See id. at 607; see also New Alliance Party v. Dinkins, 743 F. Supp. 1055,
1057, 1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (denying permission to demonstrate to a political party promoting
a "Black Agenda" in a sector of a public park within sight and sound of the mayor's mansion;
issuing a preliminary injunction, the court granted a limited right of access to a park sector, but
authorized the erection of barricades to contain protesters, imposed limits on the size (100
participants) and duration (two hours) of any protest, and vested the police with the authority to
terminate any demonstration that became threatening to public safety or to the mayor's security);
Seven Hills, 667 N.E.2d at 945.
480. See, e.g., Olivieri, 801 F.2d at 607-08; Seven Hills, 667 N.E.2d at 945.
481. See, e.g., Olivieri, 801 F.2d at 607-08.
482. See, e.g., New Alliance Party, 743 F. Supp. at 1068.
483. See, e.g., Olivieri, 801 F.2d at 607-08; New Alliance Party, 743 F. Supp. at 1068; Seven
Hills, 667 N.E.2d at 945.
484. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 758 (1994). In Madsen,
the Court analyzed a speech-restrictive injunction that was aimed at anti-abortion protesters
who, in willful violation of previous injunctions, had continued to block clinic driveways and
doorways and used loudspeakers and bullhorns that were audible in the clinic's surgery and
recovery rooms. See generally id. The Court upheld the noise restrictions, and the 36-foot
buffer zone around the clinic, but struck down the other provisions, including a 300-foot
no-approach zone around the clinic and a sweeping ban on "images observable" by patients
inside the clinic. See id. at 770, 772-74.
485. See, e.g., Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 377-78, 380(1997) (striking down, because it burdened more speech than necessary, an injunction that
imposed a"floating buffer zone," requiring pro-life protesters to stay 15 feet from those entering
or leaving an abortion clinic; but upholding, on the other hand, a "fixed buffer zone" injunction,
requiring protesters to remain 15 feet from clinic doorways and driveways, because it was
necessary to ensure access to the clinic); Madsen, 512 U.S. at 768-70 (upholding a 36-foot
injunctive buffer zone around an abortion clinic); McKusick v. City of Melbourne, 96 F.3d 478,
485-86 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (upholding a state court's abortion clinic injunction that imposed a
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a trial court are circumscribed by appellate review.
B. Appellate Review of Speech-Restrictive In-
junctions
This section will address a number of discrete issues con-
cerning appellate review of speech-restrictive injunctions: the
heightened (and newly-minted) standard of review; problems
in gauging the content-neutrality of such injunctions; the gen-
eral prohibition against granting them exparte; and the need
for restricting their scope as narrowly as possible.
In Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc. ,486 the Supreme
Court announced a new and heightened standard of appellate
review for speech-restrictive injunctions.487 The Court was
confronted in Madsen with an injunction against anti-abortion
protesters who, in willful violation of previous injunctions, had
continued to block clinic driveways and doorways, using
loud-speakers and bullhorns that were audible in the clinic's
surgery and recovery rooms.488 Among the provisions contained
in the injunction were a thirty-six -foot "buffer zone" surround-
ing the clinic that anti-abortion demonstrators were forbidden
to enter; a 300-foot "no-approach" zone surrounding the clinic
in which anti-abortion protesters were barred from pursuing
unwanted communications with clinic visitors; a sweeping ban
on "images observable" by patients inside the clinic; and noise
restrictions on the protesters' use of amplification equipment.489
Observing that "[ilnjunctions . . . carry greater risks of
censorship and discriminatory application than do general ordi-
nances,"49 ° the Madsen Court held that speech-restrictive injunc-
tions should therefore be subjected by appellate courts to more
36-foot buffer zone, as consistent with Madsen); New Alliance Party, 743 F. Supp. at 1055. Cf
Sabelko v. City of Phoenix, 120 F.3d 161, 165 (9th Cir. 1997) (striking down a"floating buffer
zone" ordinance-similar to the injunction in Schenck-that required abortion clinic protesters,
upon request, to maintain an eight-foot distance from any person entering or exiting a clinic).
486. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
487. See id. at 765 ("We must ask ... whether the challenged provisions of the injunction
burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest.").
488. See id. at 758-61.
489. See id. at 759-61.
490. Id. at 764.
509
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"stringent" First Amendment scrutiny than comparable legisla-
tion-that, "when evaluating a content-neutral injunction, we
think that our standard time, place, and manner analysis is
not sufficiently rigorous."49 ' Announcing a new standard of
review for speech-restrictive injunctions, the Court held that,
rather than inquiring whether the order is "'narrowly tailored
to serve a significant governmental interest,"'492 "[w]e must
ask instead whether the challenged provisions of the injunction
burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant
government interest."
493
Since the new standard pertains only to content-neutral
injunctions,494 the Madsen Court was next confronted with the
task of gauging the order's content-neutrality. The Court re-
jected the contention that the injunction, because it was directed
solely at anti-abortion protesters, was content or viewpoint
based.495 By its very nature, an injunction is directed atparticu-
lar individuals because of their particular conduct; here, it was
the misconduct of the anti-abortion demonstrators, including
their violation of previous court orders, that led to the instant
injunction. 49 6 That this injunction did not reach pro-choice
protesters "is justly attributable to the lack of any similar
demonstrations"-or misconduct-"by those in favor of abor-
tion." '497 Thus, to accept the petitioners' argument here "would
be to classify virtually every injunction as content or viewpoint
based. '498
Applying its newly-minted standard to the challenged
491. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 765 (emphasis added).
492. Id. at 764 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
493. Id. at 765 (emphasis added).
494. Strict scrutiny is reserved for speech restrictions that are content-based. See Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1988).
495. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 762-63.
496. See id. at 762; accord McKusick v. City of Melbourne, 96 F.3d 478, 485-86 (1 th Cir.
1996) (upholding the court's abortion clinic injunction and imposing a 36-foot buffer zone,
similar to the injunction upheld in Madsen, because it was neither unduly broad nor view-
point-based and because it was targeted at particular demonstrators who had acted on particular
occasions in a violent or disruptive manner).
497. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 762.
498. Id.
[Vol. 45
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injunction, the Court upheld the noise restrictions 499 and the
thirty-six-foot "buffer zone,"500  but invalidated the
"no-approach" zone 5° ' and the sweeping ban on "images observ-
able" inside the clinic.50 2 The Court has since reaffirmed its
new test.50 3
There remain two fundamental principles governing appel-
late review of speech-restrictive injunctions: Such injunctions
must not be granted exparte, and their restraints must be lim-
ited to the narrowest possible scope. These twin teachings were
emphatically delivered in Carroll v. President & Commissioners
of Princess Anne,5"4 where the Supreme Court struck down a
ten-day injunction, issued exparte,60 that banned further dem-
onstrations by a white supremacist group.5 0 6 Local officials
secured the injunction only hours after petitioners had staged
an "aggressively and militantly racist" rally, held on the court-
house steps before a large mixed-race crowd, featuring amplified
speeches that were "deliberately derogatory, insulting, and
threatening" to blacks.50 7 The crowd grew increasingly tense
as the rally progressed; sixty state policemen from surrounding
499. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 772-73.
500. See id. at 768-70.
501. See id. at 773-74.
502. See id. at 773.
503. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 (1997). In Schenck, the
Court reaffirmed the Madsen test for gauging the constitutionality of speech-restrictive injunc-
tions. See id. at 372-73. Because it burdened more speech than necessary, the Court struck
down the injunction that imposed a "floating buffer zone," instead requiring anti-abortion
protesters to stay 15 feet from those entering or leaving an abortion clinic; but upholding, on the
other hand, a "fixed buffer zone" injunction, requiring protesters to remain 15 feet from clinic
doorways and driveways, because it was necessary to ensure access to the clinic. See id. at
361-63. Before the complaint was filed, the clinics were subjected to numerous large-scale
blockades in which protesters marched, stood, knelt, sat, or lay in clinic parking lot driveways
and doorways, blocking or hindering cars from entering the lots, and blocking patients and clinic
employees from entering the facility. See id. at 362-63. In addition, other protesters consis-
tently attempted to stop or disrupt clinic operations by milling around clinic doorways and
driveway entrances, trespassing onto clinic parking lots, crowding around cars, and, as to women
and their escorts trying to enter the facility, surrounding, crowding, jostling, grabbing, pushing,
shoving, yelling, and even spitting at them. See id. at 363. These actions continued even in the
face of a temporary restraining order. See id. at 365.
504. 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
505. See id. at 177 & n.2.
506. The group was known as the National States Rights Party. See id. at 176.
507. Id. at 176-77.
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counties arrived and were held in readiness." 8 Petitioners
concluded the rally by exhorting the whites in the audience
to return the following night and "bring every friend you have"
in order to "raise a little bit of hell for the white race." 50 9
The following night's rally was averted when local officials,
without bothering even informally to contact petitioners, ob-
tained a sweeping ten-day injunction that barred them from
holding meetings or rallies anywhere in the county "which will
tend to disturb and endanger" the local citizenry.510 In striking
down this injunction, the Supreme Court suggested that exparte
speech restrictions are presumptively unconstitutional; this
is because, by definition, their issuance takes place without
the crucial benefit of evidentiary input from both sides of the
dispute, 511 and the procedural safeguards necessary for sustain-
ing a prior restraint are thus entirely lacking. 12
The injunction was offensive to the First Amendment not
only for its ex parte issuance but also for its broad scope. On
this point, the Court stressed that speech-restrictive injunctions:
must be couched in the narrowest terms that will
accomplish the pinpointed objective permitted by
constitutional mandate and the essential needs of public
order. In this sensitive field, the State may not employ
"means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties
when the end can be more narrowly achieved." In other
words, the order must be tailored as precisely as possible
to the exact needs of the case.51 3
The Court's language here-"narrowest terms," "pinpointed
objective," "exact needs," "precisely as possible"-could hardly
be more emphatic. To survive appellate review, a
speech-restrictive injunction must be sharply confined to the
narrowest possible scope.
508. See Carroll, 393 U.S. at 176.
509. Carroll, 393 U.S. at 176 n.I.
510. Id. at 177.
511. Seeid. at 183.
512. See id. at 180-82.
513. Id. at 184 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).
512 [Vol. 45
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VII.A REGULATORY PRESENCE ON THE
STREET: THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF
POLICE
Often overlooked in First Amendment law is the unique
role of police, who serve as a regulatory presence on the street.
Their powers and duties in regulating speech are rarely regarded
as a distinct analytical matter-but, in fact, these questions
have produced discrete lines of precedent. In this section, we
examine the First Amendment role of the police from two per-
spectives: (1) the extent of their control over public forum access,
use, and expression; and (2) their duty to protect unpopular
speakers.
A. Police Power to Regulate the Conduct of
Public Demonstrations
The cases involving police power to regulate public forum
expression fall into two basic categories: (1) those addressing
police-imposed time, place, and manner restrictions; and (2)
those addressing police power to arrest or disperse demonstra-
tors.
The first category essentially involves police power to impose
ground rules on the use of a given forum, tailored to accommo-
date the unique characteristics of the occasion, the demonstra-
tion, and the space. 514 Employing conventional time, place,
and manner analysis, courts have upheld police segregation
of pro-choice and pro-life demonstrators outside an abortion
clinic,515 the confinement of anti-Soviet picketers to a "bullpen"
514. See, e.g., Grider v. Abramson, No. 98-5282, 1999 WL 398010 (6th Cir. June 18, 1999)
(upholding crowd control methods employed by police during a KKK rally and a simultaneous
opposition rally where these methods included keeping the rallies separated, setting up a magne-
tometer to check for weapons, and maintaining a police-occupied buffer zone between those
attending and those speaking at the Klan rally), aff'g 994 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Ky. 1998).
515. See Fischer v. City of St. Paul, 894 F. Supp. 1318, 1323, 1328-29 (D. Minn. 1995)
(upholding the police segregation of pro-choice and pro-life demonstrators outside a Planned
Parenthood clinic during a ten-day Operation Rescue campaign, including a police order fencing
off the clinic's front sidewalk and banning all public access to it except by Planned Parenthood
invitees seeking entrance to the clinic and holding that the police restrictions here, which gave
anti-abortion protesters three different vantage points from which to protest-on the sidewalk
in front of property adjacent to the clinic, in a specially blocked off lane of traffic directly across
513
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across the street from a Russian embassy, 516 and a buffer zone
restricting sidewalk demonstrations at the United Nations
building.517
Though courts are generally quite deferential in reviewing
these forum housekeeping measures, a recent decision by the
Second Circuit indicates that message-based segregation of
rival protest contingents may warrant heightened scrutiny.
In Johnson v. Bax,518 a visit by President Clinton to New York
City prompted police to funnel demonstrators into distinct "pro"
and "anti" areas, with a view toward reducing the possibility
of conflict between supporters and opponents of the President. 51 9
The plaintiff appeared on the scene bearing a sign-reading
"Mr. Clinton: Stop Campaigning and Lead!"-that he regarded
as offering "constructive criticism" of the President. 20 Police
arrested the plaintiff when he refused to be placed in the "anti"
area, asserting that the "anti" area afforded less favorable access
to the President, and that being placed there, in the midst of
"professional Marxists," effectively radicalized his message
of constructive criticism.521 Though the Second Circuit did not
reach the constitutionality of this message-based segregation,
ruling that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary
the street from the clinic, and authorization for one protester to stand-at the clinic's driveway
entrance to hand out literature-were narrowly tailored to serve significant government interests
and left open alternative channels of communication).
516. See Concerned Jewish Youth v. McGuire, 621 F.2d 471, (2d Cir. 1980) (rejecting a First
Amendment challenge by a Jewish group to police restrictions on demonstrations at the Russian
Mission to the United Nations where the restrictions limited the number of protesters to twelve,
confined their closest location to a "bullpen" diagonally across the street from the Mission, and
banned the use of sound amplification equipment anywhere on the Mission block), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 913 (1981).
517. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. City of New York, 504 F.
Supp. 118, (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (upholding police policy regulating time, place, and manner of
sidewalk demonstrations in the vicinity of the United Nations building, thereby rejecting the
claims for injunctive relief by Krishnas who sought to proselytize and solicit funds on the
sidewalk immediately adjacent to the U.N. visitor's gate when the challenged policy merely
barred "a continuous presence" on the sidewalk directly contiguous to the U.N. building, but
freely allowed picketing, demonstrations, and other expressive activity on the opposite side of
the street).
518. 63 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 1995).
519. See id. at 156.
520. Id.
521. Id.
514 [Vol. 45
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judgment against the plaintiff, 22 the court identified a range
of vexing First Amendment issues posed by plaintiff's claims:
(1) whether dividing demonstrators into "pro" and "anti" areas
may be deemed a content-neutral forum regulation; (2) whether
the respective vantage points to which the groups were assigned
genuinely afforded them equal access to the President; (3)
whether the First Amendment is offended by the discretion
enjoyed by police in deciding whether a speaker's message falls
into the "pro" or "anti" category; and (4) whether the act of
placing a particular speaker in a particular area unconstitution-
ally alters his intended message.
21
Though Johnson v. Bax will not likely disturb the general
judicial deference to time, place, or manner restrictions imposed
by police, it does indicate that the message-based segregation
of rival protesters is vulnerable to heightened scrutiny.
We turn next to police power to arrest or disperse public
forum demonstrators. Courts are generally deferential to
on-the-street judgments by police to arrest or disperse, so long
as evidence of illegal5 24 or unruly5 25 behavior exists; 526 but that
522. See Johnson, 63 F.3d at 160.
523. See id. at 158-59 & n.2.
524. See, e.g., Habigerv. City of Fargo, 80 F.3d 289,295 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
518 (1996)(holding that police officers had qualified immunity in a suit brought by an abortion
protester who was arrested for violating a temporary restraining order governing clinic demon-
strations); United States v. Cinca, 56 F.3d 1409, 1416 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that U.S. Park
Police were properly empowered to revoke the permit of White House demonstrators and then
arrest them where the demonstrators, in violation ofNational Park Service regulations, sat down
and held signs in the center portion of the White House sidewalk, forcing other pedestrians into
the street).
525. See, e.g., Redd v. City of Enterprise, 140 F.3d 1378, 1383 (1Ith Cir. 1998) (granting
qualified immunity to police officers concerning their arrest of sidewalk preachers who were
speaking loudly and yelling at passers-by; although the preachers were engaged in constitution-
ally protected speech in a traditional public forum, the arrest was lawful because their behavior
could reasonably be construed as disorderly conduct); Washington Mobilization Comm. v.
Cullinane, 566 F.2d 107, 122-23 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (authorizing the arrest or dispersal of violent
or "obstructive" demonstrators, the court here rejects claims by anti-war protesters for injunctive
restrictions on the crowd-control tactics used by Washington, D.C. police); Spratlin v. Mont-
gomery County, 772 F. Supp. 1545, 1552 (D. Md. 1990) (holding that the police did not violate
the First or Fourth Amendment rights of a protester whom they briefly detained after he had
publicly called for the death of a county official), affd mem., 941 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1991);
Landry v. Daley, 288 F. Supp. 183, 188-89 (N.D. II1. 1968) (holding that there was no basis
under First Amendment for enjoining state court prosecutions of fair housing protesters who,
515
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deference vanishes upon proof that police expelled or arrested
a protester based on the viewpoint he sought to express.5 27 The
latter situation seems most frequently to arise when police
while proceeding without a permit to erect a large tent on a vacant lot, repeatedly defied and
physically resisted police orders to dismantle the tent and disperse).
526. Absent illegal or unruly behavior on the part of the demonstrators, courts do not employ
the same deference in analyzing police power to arrest or disperse. See, e.g., Lamb v. City of
Decatur, 947 F. Supp. 1261, 1264-65 (C.D. Iii. 1996) (holding that police officers who pep-
per-sprayed labor protesters as they conducted a peaceful demonstration were not entitled to
qualified immunity; notwithstanding the alleged excitability of the crowd, the widely-recognized
protection for First Amendment protection was enough to put police on notice that using force
against non-violent demonstrators was prohibited and therefore, qualified immunity is not
widely available to police in First Amendment cases); Nuremberg Actions v. County of Contra
Costa, 697 F. Supp. 11 1, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that plaintiff protesters adequately
stated a claim for injunctive relief against police use of "pain holds" in dealing with demonstra-
tions at a naval weapons station).
527. See, e.g., Johnston v. City of Houston, 14 F.3d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1994) (refusing to
grant summary judgment based on qualified immunity to Houston police officers who arrested
the plaintiff during a protest at a Chinese consulate where evidence indicated that the plaintiff
may have been arrested for voicing views critical of the Bush Administration); Cannon v. City
& County of Denver, 998 F.2d 867, 878 (10th Cir. 1993) (denying police officers the ability to
assert a qualified immunity defense to a section 1983 action brought by anti-abortion protesters
whom they arrested for carrying signs reading "The Killing Place" which could not be justified
as an effort to suppress "fighting words" or to halt expression inherently likely to cause a breach
of the peace); ACT-UP v. Walp, 755 F. Supp. 1281, 1289-90 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (holding that
police, in their effort to shield governor from criticism and thwart planned protest by gay rights
organization, violated First Amendment by closing state legislature's public gallery for the first
time ever during governor's annual address and that police committed content-based closure of
limited public forum); Farber v. Rizzo, 363 F. Supp. 386, 393-95 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (addressing
a broad range of police actions regulating protesters who sought to demonstrate against President.
Nixon, including police violation of a temporary restraining order designed to guarantee the
protesters access to a public space adjacent to the hall where the President was speaking and
finding that police, with the aim of limiting visible expressions of dissent during the President's
visit, pursued a policy of excluding and arresting sign-bearing demonstrators who sought access
to the public space designated in the temporary restraining order, thereby holding that the offi-
cers' willful violation of the temporary restraining order constituted civil contempt); Sparrow
v. Goodman, 361 F. Supp. 566, 585 (W.D.N.C. 1973) (holding that the police and the Secret
Service violated the First Amendment in their selective exclusion and arrest of individuals, based
solely on their physical appearance as likely Nixon antagonists, who, holding valid tickets, tried
to enter a "Billy Graham Day" event at the Charlotte Coliseum, to be attended by President
Nixon), aff'd sub nom. Rowley v. McMillan, 502 F.2d 1326 (4th Cir. 1974). But see Kroll v.
United States Capitol Police, 847 F.2d 899, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (upholding the power of the
Capitol Police to arrest a protester who held up a sign that, in the officer's estimation, "conflicted
with the spirit of" an Olympic welcoming ceremony conducted outdoors on Capitol Hill, thereby
holding that the officer enjoyed qualified immunity in performing this arrest, even though he
arrested the plaintiff for demonstrating without a permit but allowed other onlookers, equally
bereft of permits, to hold up signs that directed no criticism at the Olympics).
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attempt to shield public officials from criticism or dissent.528
When demonstrators engage in illegal behavior-when,
for example, an abortion clinic protester violates a temporary
restraining order,529 or White House picketers refuse to abide
by National Park Service regulations5 3 -police power to arrest
them is clear. Likewise, police have the power to arrest or
disperse demonstrators who engage in obstructive, unruly, or
violent behavior. In Landry v. Daley,531 for example, a federal
judge held that there was no First Amendment basis for enjoin-
ing state court prosecutions of fair housing protesters who, while
proceeding without a permit to erect a large tent on a vacant
lot, repeatedly defied and physically resisted police orders to
dismantle the tent and disperse.5 2
Singularly useful in affording guidance on police power
to arrest or disperse is Washington Mobilization Committee
v. Cullinane,"' where the D.C. Circuit rejected claims by anti-
war protesters for injunctive restrictions on the crowd-control
tactics used by Washington police. In a three-week trial, plain-
tiffs adduced evidence that the police, in an effort to quell Viet-
nam War protests from 1969 to 1971, used stationary police
lines to block the progress of marches; used moving police lines,
or "sweeps," to enforce dispersal orders; and made widespread
use of the District's "failure-to-move-on" statute to conduct
528. See, e.g., Johnston, 14 F.3d at 1058 (protester allegedly expressed views critical of the
Bush Administration); ACT-UP, 755 F. Supp. at 1289 (shielding governor from expected dissent
at his State of the Commonwealth address); Farber, 363 F. Supp. at 393-95 (systematically
excluding and arresting any sign-bearing demonstrator critical of President Nixon); Sparrow,
361 F. Supp. at 569-76 (selective exclusion and arrest of likely Nixon antagonists attempting
to enter a "Billy Graham Day" event to be attended by President Nixon).
529. See Habiger, 80 F.3d at 289.
530. See United States v. Cinca, 56 F.3d 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
531. 288 F. Supp. 183 (N.D. III. 1968).
532. See id. at 185-86. Problematic, and probably wrong under current law, is the court's
conclusion regarding one protester who offered no physical resistance but did exhort a crowd
of 175 onlookers that the arrests they were witnessing were wrong. See id. at 188-89. The case
of Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969), was not decided until the following
year-and might have altered the outcome in light of Landry's finding, 288 F. Supp. at 189, that
this defendant's exhortations to the crowd, while "generating increasing response and tension,"
did not direct them "to specific action."
533. 566 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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mass arrests of nonviolent demonstrators.3 4 Reversing the
grant of injunctive relief below, the D.C. Circuit attempted to
place a more benign spin on the plaintiffs' evidence of police
behavior. Whether or not the court is persuasive in its interpre-
tation of the record, the opinion offers more detailed guidance
than any other on police power to arrest or disperse. "In ordering
obstructive demonstrators to 'move on,"' observes the court,
"the initial police objective must be merely to clear passage
[for vehicular and pedestrian traffic], not to disperse the demon-
strators, or to suppress the free communication of their views."535
Under the First Amendment, police may "impose reasonable
restraints upon demonstrators to assure that they be peaceful
and not obstructive," and, by the same token, "to contain or
disperse demonstrations that have become violent or obstruc-
tive.", 36 As for "violent or obstructive" protesters, the police
"may validly order [them] to disperse or clear the streets. If
any demonstrator or bystander refuses to obey such an order
after fair notice and opportunity to comply, his arrest does not
violate the Constitution even though he has not previously been
violent or obstructive."5
37
Tempering the expansive police powers recognized in
Cullinane are Nuremberg Actions v. County of Contra Costa53 1
and Lamb v. City of Decatur5 3 9-cases that deal with police
officers resorting to "pain holds" and pepper spray, respectively.
In Nuremberg, a federal district judge ruled that protesters
had adequately stated a claim for injunctive relief against police
use of "pain holds" in regulating demonstrators at a naval weap-
ons station. 540 In Lamb, a district court held that police officers
who pepper-sprayed labor protesters as they conducted a peace-
ful demonstration were not entitled to qualified immunity; the
alleged "excitability" of the protesters, even if true, did not
justify forcibly dispersing an otherwise orderly demonstration.54'
534. See Cullinane, 566 F.2d at 111.
535. Id. at 116-17.
536. Id. at l9.
537. Id. at 120.
538. 697 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
539. 947 F. Supp. 1261 (C.D. I1. 1996).
540. See Nuremberg, 697 F. Supp. at 1112.
541. See Lamb, 947 F. Supp. at 1264.
518 [Vol. 45
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Nuremberg and Lamb indicate that there are limits to the
judicial deference normally accorded on-the-streetjudgments
by police, even when those judgments are made under shifting
and stressful circumstances. Lamb shows- that the decision
to disperse a demonstration must be based on more than mere
unrest among the protesters.542 Nuremberg shows that when
dispersal is appropriate-as, for example, when expelling pro-
testers from a nonpublic forum543-the use of force should not
exceed what is necessary.5 44 In a word, it is police overreaction
that explains the results in these cases. Absent a sense that
police were overreacting in some way, a judge will normally
treat their on-the-street judgments with considerable respect.
Police overreaction of a different sort-stemming from a
zealous desire to protect public officials from criticism or dis-
sent-has produced a line of cases in which the usual judicial
deference is conspicuously absent. These are the cases involving
viewpoint-based expulsion or arrest of public protesters. With
minor exceptions,545 courts consistently hold that this type of
police behavior violates the First Amendment.
546
In Johnston v. City of Houston,54 7 the Fifth Circuit denied
qualified immunity to Houston police officers because the record
indicated that they arrested plaintiff at a public forum protest
for voicing views critical of the Bush Administration. 548 In
ACT-UP v. Walp,549 a district judge ruled that police violated
the First Amendment when, in their effort to shield the governor
from criticism and thwart a planned protest at his annual ad-
542. See Lamb, 947 F. Supp. at 1267.
543. The naval weapons station in Nuremberg, like any military installation, is a nonpublic
forum for First Amendment purposes. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976).
544. See Nuremberg, 697 F. Supp. at 1112.
545. See, e.g., Kroll v. United States Capitol Police, 847 F.2d 899, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(upholding the power of Capitol Police to arrest a protester who held up a sign that, in the offi-
cer's estimation, "conflicted with the spirit of" an Olympic welcoming ceremony conducted
outdoors on Capitol Hill, and held that the officer enjoyed qualified immunity in performing this
arrest, even though he arrested the plaintiff for demonstrating without a permit but allowed other
onlookers, equally bereft of permits, to hold up signs that directed no criticism at the Olympics).
546. See supra notes 527-28 and accompanying text.
547. 14 F.3d 1056 (5th Cir. 1994).
548. See id. at 1058.
549. 755 F. Supp. 1281 (M.D. Pa. 1991).
519
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dress, they closed the state legislature's public gallery for the
first time ever during such a speech.55 ° In Sparrow v.
Goodman,55' a district judge held that police and Secret Service
agents violated the First Amendment in their selective exclusion
and arrest of individuals-based solely on their physical appear-
ance as likely antagonists of President Nixon-who, holding
valid tickets, tried to enter a "Billy Graham Day" event at the
Charlotte Coliseum, which the President was scheduled to at-
tend.552 And, in Farber v. Rizzo,"'3 Philadelphia police officers
were held in civil contempt when, with the aim of suppressing
visible expressions of dissent during a visit by President Nixon,
they violated a temporary restraining order by systematically
arresting any sign-bearing demonstrator who sought access
to a public forum adjacent to the hall where the President was
speaking.554 The Farber court observed:
We reject completely [the police] contention that [their]
actions were justified by the past activities of some
plaintiffs at demonstrations and by the uncorroborated
reports of unidentified informants. The term "security
risk" is not a talisman by which constitutional limitations
are erased and police are given a free hand. The actions
of plaintiffs at prior demonstrations may not be used to
deprive them of the opportunity to exercise their First
Amendment rights. The police cannot be given the
unfettered right to suppress demonstrations because they
consider them risky from prior experience.555
550. See Walp, 755 F. Supp. at 1289-90.
551. 361 F. Supp. 566 (W.D.N.C. 1973), affdsub nom. Rowley v. McMillan, 502 F.2d 1326
(4th Cir. 1974).
552. See id. at 569-76.
553. 363 F. Supp. 386 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
554. See id. at 393-95.
555. Id. at 397 n. 11 (citations omitted). In Farber, the court held that the police violated the
First Amendment in arresting a protester who, while ensconced in the public area protected by
the temporary restraining order, used a bullhorn to address the other crowd members, since there
was no showing that the bullhorn's volume was beyond a reasonable range. See id. at 396. The
court also held that police did not violate the First Amendment in arresting an individual who
was screaming abuse at the arresting officers and urging onlookers to interfere with the arrest.
See id.
520 [Vol. 45
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We turn now from police regulatory control over public
demonstrations to their duty to protect unpopular speakers.
B. Police Protection of Speakers Who Inspire
a Hostile Audience Reaction
The First Amendment does not merely bar police from
silencing a speaker whose message is provocative or unpopular;5 6
it imposes an affirmative duty toprotect a speaker whose mes-
sage has produced a hostile audience reaction.5 57
556. For example, in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989), the Court overturned a
flag-burning conviction and stated that "the government may [not] ban the expression of certain
disagreeable ideas on the unsupported presumption that their very disagreeableness will provoke
violence," nor may it "assume that every expression of a provocative idea will incite a riot." Id.
at 409. Indeed, "if it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason
for according it constitutional protection." Id. (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S.
726, 745 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring)) (emphasis added).
In Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969), the Court overturned a flag-burning conviction,
stating that "[i]t is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may
not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers."
Id. at 580-81, 592. In Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), the trial court con-
strued a breach-of-the-peace ordinance as "permitt[ing] conviction of petitioner if his speech
stirred people to anger, invited public dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest. A convic-
tion resting on any of those grounds may not stand." Id. at 5.
557. For example, in Sabel v. Stynchcombe, 746 F.2d 728 (1 1th Cir. 1984), the court over-
turned refusal-to--disperse convictions ofseveral Revolutionary Communist Party demonstrators
who, in the course of a May Day rally, inspired a hostile reaction by almost 200 onlookers. Id.
at 729-31. The court recognized that the police have a duty to protect unpopular speakers
confronted by a hostile crowd. See id. at 73 1. The court also concluded that the "shouting,"
"shoving," and "cursing" that witnesses observed among the 200 onlookers "provided an insuffi-
cient basis for governmental restriction of protected speech." Id. at 731 & n.7.
In Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1975), the court sustained a section
1983 action by a solitary anti-Nixon protester whose sign was destroyed by police at the behest
of hostile on-lookers. See id. at 901, 906. The court held that the police not only violated the
First Amendment by destroying the plaintiff's sign, but had an affirmative duty to protect her
from the hostile crowd. See id. at 906.
In Wolin v. Port ofNew York Authority, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968), the court afforded injunc-
tive relief to anti-war protesters who sought access to New York City's Port Authority Bus
Terminal for the purpose of expressing their views on Vietnam by distributing leaflets, carrying
placards, and conducting discussions with passers-by. See id. at 85-86. The court held that
protesters were "entitled to protection by Terminal police" against disturbances provoked by
hostile audience. Id. at 94 (emphasis added).
In Downie v. Powers, 193 F.2d 760 (10th Cir. 1951), the Tenth Circuit reversed a district
court's dismissal of a civil rights action brought by Jehovah's Witnesses against a police depart-
ment for standing by and failing to protect them when a mob burst into the auditorium where
they were gathered and, using "sticks, rocks, guns, and other instruments of violence ... attacked
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These principles are vividly illustrated in Glasson v. City of
Louisville,5 8 where a solitary anti-Nixon protester, waiting
along the route of a Presidential motorcade amid a sea of Nixon
[them] and broke up the assembly." Downie, 193 F.2d at 762. The court held that it is not
enough for police to remain neutral in a hostile audience situation; they have an affirmative duty
to protect the unpopular speaker. See id. at 764. "One charged with the duty of keeping the
peace cannot be an innocent bystander where constitutionally protected rights of persons are
being invaded. He must stand on the side of law and order or be counted among the mob." Id.
In Hurwitt v. City of Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995 (N.D. Cal. 1965), the court enjoined city
officials from prohibiting a parade intended to protest U.S. military intervention in Vietnam,
even though plaintiffs' previous marches had been disrupted by angry spectators, including the
Hell's Angels, who hurled tear gas bombs, broke through a police cordon, ripped banners, and
disabled loudspeakers, where the plaintiffs and their followers had always remained non-violent.
Id. at 998-1001, 1007.
[S]uppression by public officials or police of the right of free speech and assembly cannot be made
an easy substitute for the performance of their duty to maintain order by taking such steps as may
be necessary and feasible to protect peaceable, orderly speakers, marchers, or demonstrators in the
exercise of their rights against violent or disorderly retaliation or attack at the hands of those who
may disagree and object.
Id. at 1001 (emphasis added).
In Beckerman v. City of Tupelo, 664 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1981), civil rights activists brought a
First Amendment challenge to parade and sound equipment ordinances because they were
seeking to conduct a protest march. See id. at 506. The court stated that the
state is not powerless to prevent imminent violence or lawlessness resulting from a clash between
the marchers and onlookers. If this situation arises, the police must tryfirst to disperse and control
the crowd, and if that becomes impossible, the marchers may be arrested. Likewise, if the marchers
exceed the bounds of persuasion and argument and enter the realm of incitement to imminent
lawless action, they can be punished. Such punishment or curtailment of First Amendment rights
must be based on a present abuse of rights, not a pre-nascent fear of future misconduct.
Id. at 510 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
However, to the above cases compare Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951), where the
Court upheld a disorderly conduct conviction of a college student who, standing atop a soapbox
and using a loudspeaker, gave a streetcorner speech to a crowd of eighty people in which his
derogatory remarks about President Truman, the American Legion, the Mayor of Syracuse, and
other local officials inspired a hostile audience reaction. See id. at 316-17, 321. The court held
that the conviction could be sustained based on the trial court's findings that defendant encour-
aged his audience to become divided into hostile camps, that the gathering crowd was interfering
with traffic, and that defendant repeatedly refused police requests to cease talking. See id. at
318-21.
It is neither unusual nor unexpected that some people at public street meetings mutter, mill about,
push, shove, or disagree, even violently, with the speaker. Indeed, it is rare where controversial
topics are discussed that an outdoor crowd does not do some or all of these things ... [The officers']
duty was to protect petitioner's right to talk, even to the extent of arresting the man who threatened
to interfere.
Id. at 325-26, 327 (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). "It is against that
kind of threat that speakers need police protection. If they do not receive it and instead the
police throw their weight on the side of those who would break up the meetings, the police
become the new censors of speech." Id. at 331 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
558. 518 F.2d 899, 905 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930 (1975).
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supporters, unfurled a protest sign that read: "[L]ead us to
hate and kill poverty, disease, and ignorance, not each other."559
The woman's sign prompted "grumbling and mutter[ed] threats"
among onlookers across the street, and this hostility escalated
until a nearby police officer feared that "the crowd ... [was]
going to go over and get her-maybe hurt her."5 60
Obeying a general directive "to destroy all signs detrimental
to the President,"561 the police officer
approached appellant and, according to his testimony,
asked her, "Would you please take this sign down, Lady;
it's detrimental to the United States of America." When
[the protester] refused, and replied that she had a right to
display it, [the police officer] took it from her and tore it
up. The hecklers acrfdss the street cheered and then
immediately quieted down and began to disperse. 62
Holding that the officer was liable for violating the pro-
tester's First Amendment rights, the Glasson court observed
that "hostile public reaction does not cause the forfeiture of
the constitutional protection afforded a speaker's message,"563
and declared:
To permit police officers to prohibit the expression of ideas
which they believe to be "detrimental" or "injurious" to the
President of the United States or to punish for incitement
or breach of the peace the peaceful communication of such
messages because other persons are provoked and seek to
take violent action against the speaker would subvert the
First Amendment, and would incorporate into that
constitutional guarantee a "heckler's veto" which would
empower an audience to cut off the expression of a
speaker with whom it disagreed. The state may not rely
on community hostility and threats of violence to justify
559. Glasson, 518 F.2d at 901-02.
560. Id at 902.
561. Id.
562. Id.
563. Id. at 905.
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censorship.6 4
The Glasson court concluded that a police officer's duty
in a hostile audience situation is not merely to refrain from
enforcing a heckler's veto; the officer has an affirmative duty
to protect the unpopular speaker:
A police officer has the duty not to ratify and effectuate a
heckler's veto, nor may he join a moiling mob intent on
suppressing ideas. Instead, he must take reasonable
action to protect from violence persons exercising their
constitutional rights.565
The other federal courts to address this issue have agreed
that it is not enough for police to remain neutral in a hostile
audience situation; officers have an affirmative protective duty
toward the speaker.566 As the Tenth Circuit observed: "One
charged with the duty of keeping the peace cannot be an innocent
bystander where the constitutionally protected rights of persons
are being invaded. He must stand on the side of law and order
or be counted among the mob."567
The Eleventh Circuit has identified a variety of options
that police may pursue in carrying out their duty to protect.
In Sabel v. Stynchcombe, the court overturned the re-
fusal-to-disperse convictions of Revolutionary Communist Party
demonstrators who, in the course of a May Day rally, inspired
a hostile reaction by almost 200 onlookers.5 68 The court observed:
If police believed, as they stated, that they were less
concerned with appellants' intrusions than with
protecting them from an increasingly threatening crowd,
they enjoyed an even greater range of choice. They could
have taken steps to protect appellants while allowing the
564. Glasson, 518 F.2d at 905-06 (footnote omitted).
565. Id. at 906.
566. See Sabel v, Stynchcombe, 746 F.2d 728,731 & n.7 (11 th Cir. 1984); Beckerman v. City
of Tupelo, 664 F.2d 502, 510 (5th Cir. 1981); Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d
83, 94 (2d Cir. 1968); Downie v. Powers, 193 F.2d 760, 764 (10th Cir. 1951); Hurwitt v. City
of Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995, 1001 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
567. See Downie, 193 F.2d at 764.
568. 746 F.2d 728, 729-31 (1 1th Cir. 1984).
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demonstration to continue, such as surrounding the
speakers or arresting those spectators who threatened
violence. Or they could have taken [Revolutionary
Communist] Party members into protective custody,
curtailing the demonstration but not subjecting
appellants to prosecution.569
The court concluded that the "shouting," "shoving," and
"cursing" that witnesses observed among the 200 onlookers
"provided an insufficient basis for governmental restriction
of protected speech." 57
0
These duty-to-protect cases impose on police a responsibil-
ity that few officers will relish; but the role assigned them is
crucial to ensuring that "freedom of speech" remains more than
merely a platitude.
VIII. CONCLUSION
There are four regulatory players in the realm of public
protest: legislators,5 7' administrators,5 72 judges,5 73 and police. 574
This Article identifies discrete lines of precedent that have grown
up around each of those players. From the duty-to-protect
cases governing police5 75 to the permit cases governing
administrators,5 76 these lines of precedent-though frequently
overshadowed by the public forum doctrine-represent a signifi-
cant undercurrent in the law of public protest. Failure to distin-
guish among the four regulatory players, and failure to account
for their respective lines of precedent, are salient causes for
the confusion that so often plagues this branch of First Amend-
569. Sabel, 746 F.2d at 731 (footnotes omitted).
570. Id. at 730-31.
571. See Section IV, supra notes 268-408 and accompanying text.
572. See Section V, supra notes 409-474 and accompanying text.
573. See Section VI, supra notes 475-513 and accompanying text.
574. See Section VII, supra notes 514-570 and accompanying text.
575. See, e.g., Sabel v. Stynchcombe, 746 F.2d 728, 731 (11 th Cir. 1984); Glasson v. City
of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899,905-06 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930 (1975); Wolin v. Port
of N.Y. Auth., 392 F.2d 83, 94 (2d Cir. 1968).
576. See, e.g., Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992); Shuttlesworth
v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); NAACP v. City of Richmond, 743 F.2d 1346 (9th
Cir. 1984).
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